I said mildly because I completely agree with him that Trumpism is "an anti-leftist, anti-elitist cultural stance" and that most working-class Trump supporters do not have deeply-held views on, say, the details of industrial policy.
However the survey data he cites seems to show two things. First that working-class Trump supporters are not suffering from a deep sense of economic despair:
Second that what we call conservative "cultural resentment" or anti-elitism or what-have-you is stronger as you move up the income and educational ladder:
But if the second point is true then it seems less certain, not more, that cultural resentment alone was the elixir that moved more rural and working-class votes to the GOP in the Trump era -- since they're *not* the most resentful part of the coalition.
So what moved them? Working class Trump voters are as economically optimistic as upper-class Trump voters, but their views on economics nonetheless tend to be less libertarian -- visible, e.g., in the latest polling on Covid relief:
Ryan writes that "if Trump had campaigned on eliminating the inheritance tax for the rich while keeping up his anti-elitist bluster, his support would have remained unchanged." That might be so. But consider a different example: Health care.
Had Trump run in 2016 on the Ryan plan for Medicare and kept up his anti-elitist bluster, would he have won the Midwest? I doubt it, not least because his lowest approval ratings as president came when ... his party attempted to repeal Obamacare:
The point being: Working-class voters don't necessarily support the specifics of any given populist policy agenda, and they don't necessarily feel a sense of despair over the economy. But they do hold economic views that place them to left of the Tea Party-era GOP ...
... and moving away from Tea Party policy in some ways, away from austerity and entitlement cuts especially, probably was crucial to Trumpism's power, no less than all the cultural stuff than Ryan rightly highlights. /end
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Quick Saturday thread on this entertaining Michael Lind exercise in explaining the recent arc of liberalism as the return of the WASPs: tabletmag.com/sections/news/…
Lind stresses continuities; I would tell a somewhat similar story but stress disjunction more. I think the WASPs really did abolish themselves in the 1960s, and what has returned in social justice is an inheritor but not a resurrection.
You can under the transition from Yankee aristocracy to national meritocracy as mid-century WASPdom deciding that it had to die as a culture so that its institutions - the Ivy League above all - could not only sustain themselves but expand their power.
The latest issue of @Plough Quarterly, on the theme "What Are Families For?," includes a raft of interesting essays. Here's my contribution, on the case for one more child: plough.com/en/topics/life…
Let me briefly defend @ezraklein's claims about the centrality of polarization to America's problems against @ezraklein's argument that the "dearth of the democracy" is really America's biggest challenge. vox.com/21561011/2020-…
I'm sympathetic to the idea that the G.O.P. would be a better political formation if it were forced to compete more outside its rural/exurban base, which is one reason among many I don't particularly fear the abolition of the filibuster or the addition of new states. But ...
... one thing that 2020 should make clear is that the G.O.P., while not a majority coalition, is a *highly* competitive one relative to minority coalitions in the US past. It isn't staring down the barrel of demographic collapse. It's always within hailing distance of 50 percent.
I think a key question for any newer right is whether it will fight hard *for* every vote, aspiring to the majorities Nixon and Reagan won, or whether it will be content to try to grasp the levers of state power on behalf of a 45-48 percent coalition.
The promise of Against-the-Dead-Consensus arguments on the right is that they aspire to build a *majoritarian* populism, not just sustain a defensive coalition propped up by a Senate edge. The voter-fraud fixation belongs to a we-can't-win-majorities mentality, not a winning one.
Against-the-Dead-Consensus conservatives should be spinning the results of a high-turnout election optimistically for their project. The GOP did not, in fact, collapse when more people voted! Trump even did a little better with black voters in Dem cities!
Some of the agony is a rage against the injustice of winning popular majorities and being unable to govern. But it's important to recall that modern America has no tradition of 49-47 or 51-48 majorities leading to sweeping legislative change.
The major eras of ideological legislation -- New Deal, Great Society, and to a lesser extent Reaganism -- all depended on larger presidential majorities. Presidents who sought big change on smaller majorities (Bush after '04, for instance) have been quickly rebuked.
Proposed magazines:
The New Standard (The Bulwark + The Dispatch)
The Populist (American Affairs + Modern Age + The American Conservative)
Contrary (Sullivan/Taibbi/Greenwald + The Tablet)
The Populist should be based in Dallas, Contrary on the Pacific Coast, the New Standard in DC.
Persuasion, Harper's and the new Wieseltier venture can merge to form Liberty, based in Boston, occupying the Atlantic's former offices.