I'm glad to see this, but we should also be looking at vehicle-mounted loitering munitions. We could equip every infantry battalion with a 7 ton truck with 12 or more Harops with a range of >200km. Are 81mm mortars' (5.7km) still the longest-range organic battalion asset?
For SOF, you can adapt loitering munitions to light vehicles. An MRZR can carry at least 2 Harops or 8-10 30km range Spike NLOS ATGM. You could deploy an ODA with 3-5 MRZRs from CH-53/47 helos that could fly 100s of km, drive 100s of km and then strike targets at 100s of km. 2/
If we're talking about a conflict with a peer/near-peer adversary, we can't assume that air power can take care of our tank-killing and other critical target needs. So why not push longer-range organic fires and anti-tank capabilities to lower levels (e.g. battalion/company)? 3/
For the SOF world, imagine the Long Range Desert Group, but, instead of Vickers MGs, they have loitering munitions that can destroy command posts, tactical ballistic missiles, strategic-level EW systems, or long-range air defense systems at ranges of several hundred km. 4/
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Thread: Some people are questioning whether the war in Karabakh proves that the tank is obsolete. A better question to ask is how Azerbaijan was able to punch through NKR's defenses, seize fortified positions, and exploit that success in the south? businessinsider.com/drones-in-arme…
TB2 didn't seize fortified positions. They degraded Armenia's ability to defend its positions, but ultimately Az SOF or infantry forces had to take those positions while under fire. T-72/90S tanks, BMP-2/3, BTR-82A, SandCats, and MRAPs all played a key role supporting them. 2/
There are some obvious lessons from the conflict, but some conclusions are premature. We still have little idea of Azerbaijan's death total. If Azerbaijan sustained comparable casualties to Armenia, will people still write hyperbolic pieces about the dominance of UAVs? 3/
Since I'm seeing a number of people tweet this article, I'm gonna type up a thread listing some errors, questionable conclusions, and weak sources. There are many important lessons from this conflict, and this article draws some wrong ones.
First, the article states that "Armenia had just received eight Su-30 interceptors from Russia this summer". Armenia received its first 4 Su-30SM in December 2019. As far as I'm aware, they haven't received anymore though there were plans for 8 more. 2/
I haven't seen evidence that Russia forced Armenia to ground its Su-30SM. Instead, if Armenia had used these 4 fighters, they likely would have been shot down by Turkey's F-16s or Azer air defenses. Plus, Armenian officials claimed that their Su-30SM never received missiles. 3/
The USS John S. McCain conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the vicinity of Peter the Great Bay in the Sea of Japan today. Russia claimed that it violated Russia's maritime border by 2km. It was met by the Pacific Fleet's Admiral Vinogradov. tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/co…
From the US Navy's 7th Fleet, "By conducting this operation, the US demonstrated that these waters are not Russia's territorial sea and that the US does not acquiesce in Russia's claim that Peter the Great is a "historic bay" under international law." 2/ c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Dis…
Last week the Odintsovo Project 22800 Karakurt small missile ship (serial # 253) was commissioned into the Baltic Fleet's 36th Missile Boat Brigade from the Pella Shipyard. The Odintsovo is the first Karakurt and Russian ship with the Pantsir-M AD system.
The Odintsovo, formerly called the Shkval, was laid down in July 2016 and launched in May 2018. It is Russia's and the Pella Shipyard's 3rd Karakurt MRK. The Mytishchi and Sovetsk were commissioned in December 2018 and October 2019, respectively. 2/ bmpd.livejournal.com/4192251.html
The Pella Shipyard is also building the Burya (serial # 257), Kozelsk (serial # 254), Okhotsk (serial # 255), and Vikhr (serial # 256) the latter 3 of which had the hulls built by the More Shipyard in Feodosia, Crimea. 3/ bmpd.livejournal.com/4192251.html
The Russian MoD says that the VDV's 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division will receive ~60 BMD-4M and BTR-MDM Rakushka armored vehicles on Wednesday. A standard battalion set is 31 BMD-4M and 8 BTR-MDM, so 60 is larger than normal. function.mil.ru/for_media/even…
Photos of the ceremony for the VDV's 7th Mountain Air Assault Division as it accepts a battalion set of BMD-4M and BTR-MDM armored vehicles today. All of the servicemen received 2 months of training on the vehicles at the VDV's 242nd Training Center. 2/ function.mil.ru/news_page/coun…
There is no evidence that TB2 destroyed S-300 or S-400 systems in Syria (we would know), and there is no evidence that Anka-S are in Libya. You also need to mention that plenty of TB2 were shot down by Pantsir-S1 (and probably Buk-M2E) in Syria and Libya. rferl.org/a/technology-t…
Modern Russian air defense systems like the Pantsir and Tor can shoot down TB2, but they can also be destroyed by TB2, particularly when operating alone. Training matters as do supporting assets (medium-range AD systems, electronic warfare, C2, radar, etc.)
The TB2 is a very effective system, particularly because it is cheap and its losses are sustainable, but if you send TB2 by themselves against an integrated air defense system like a Russian Ground Forces tank or motorized rifle division, they will get shot down.