Hypothesis 1: a sub-national approach to COVID-19 restrictions works well where the decision is actually taken by sub-national governments. Means that restrictions are well tailored to local circumstances and priorities.
Hypothesis 2: A national government can’t effectively operate different rules in different regions because it cannot ever fully justify differences of treatment. No objective mathematical formula can work: and judgment will always be questioned by those who feel worse treated.
Germany (or the UK when thinking about 🏴 vs 🏴 🏴 and NI) may illustrate hypothesis 1: England when considered on its own may well illustrate hypothesis 2.
I suspect that those hypotheses are more or less what Catholic social teaching calls subsidiarity. A critical concept with a dreadful name.
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One point worth making, because I think there could be some confusion about this (the point is implicit in Jon’s article but not spelt out). It’s about what sort of vote there will be.
As Jon points out, there is no requirement for an “meaningful vote” (on the principle of the deal). That requirement only arose in the last Parliament because that Parliament insisted on one in relation to the Withdrawal Agreement (and wrote it into the EU Withdrawal Act).
The current Parliament has placed no such requirement on the current government. Funny, that.
But I also disagree with voting for it: any deal will be a bad one, driven by the current government’s incoherent obsession with “sovereignty” (an obsession that appears to apply only to agreements with the EU). theguardian.com/politics/2020/…
Labour should promise to go back and renegotiate this bad FTA when it gets into government. Its inadequacies will reveal themselves pretty swiftly over the next year or so.
This an incoherent and, frankly, silly way of thinking about the issues here. All treaties - all contracts - involve a surrender of freedom of action (“sovereignty”).
The question is whether what you are agreeing not to do is something you value doing so much that you will sacrifice all the benefits of an agreement in order to keep the ability to do it.
So when the EU insists on the UK operating a robust and independent subsidy control regime, the meaningful question is whether the things we couldn’t do in such a regime are things we really want to do.
The problem with the proposed position emerges down the article, when the author accepts that if there were any chance that the implementing legislation might be defeated (eg a large Tory rebellion) Labour should abstain.
So the suggested vote against is purely symbolic, and contrary to what Labour (and the author) actually wants, which is to get the legislation passed (given what will happen if it isn’t: the lesser of two evils).
This rejected clause is the provision that makes subsidy control a reserved matter - giving Westminster power to legislate to impose a subsidy control regime on the devolved parliaments without breaching the Sewel convention.
Note, though, that clause itself is a breach of the Sewel convention, since it takes power from the devolved parliaments without their consent. Paradox number 1.
Paradox number 2 is that the current government’s current declared plan for a subsidy control regime is ... not to have a plan. We might do something some time if we feel like it.
But the point exhibits a peculiarly English Tory type of constitutional reductionism. Many, if not most, federal or devolved systems exhibit a constant tension between central and sub-central units, and constant bargaining over powers.
That can be healthy: political tension and conflict, and divided power, is often a good thing. Read Machiavelli or the Federalist Papers.