One point worth making, because I think there could be some confusion about this (the point is implicit in Jon’s article but not spelt out). It’s about what sort of vote there will be.
As Jon points out, there is no requirement for an “meaningful vote” (on the principle of the deal). That requirement only arose in the last Parliament because that Parliament insisted on one in relation to the Withdrawal Agreement (and wrote it into the EU Withdrawal Act).
The current Parliament has placed no such requirement on the current government. Funny, that.
The government could *offer* an indicative vote (eg a vote on a motion praising the govt’s achievement of a deal) but that’s politics, not law. (Eg it might do so to embarrass Labour or because its own MPs wanted one.)
So what vote will there be? The critical point is that whatever deal there is will be well nigh certain to require legislation: changes to domestic law which can only be done by Parliament.
That will require a Bill. A Bill that will have to be passed in the normal way in both Houses. But rushed through at huge speed (which can be done - see the Coronavirus Act 2020).
The key votes “on the deal” will therefore be the usual key votes on a Bill: Second and Third Reading.
If the Bill were to fail at either stage, the government couldn’t ratify the deal (because it wouldn’t be in a position to make the changes to UK law that the ratified deal would require): so the vote on the Bill is in effect a (or rather “the”) vote on the deal.
Note too that amending the Bill won’t be possible in any way that would change the deal. And any amendment that blocked a change to UK law required by the deal would in effect kill the deal (previous tweet).
You could add amendments calling on or requiring the govt to go off and negotiate further things on top of what has been agreed: they wouldn’t affect ratification. (They wouldn’t be passed by the HoC either, but that’s another matter.)
The Bill is anyway likely to be a short one, essentially annexing the deal and giving government power to modify the law as necessary to ratify it.
So the critical question for Labour - on each of 2nd and 3rd reading - will be “do you vote for the Bill or abstain or vote against?”
Footnote: Jon’s reference to the HoC passing a motion against ratification is a reference to CRAG: the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. See a great summary of what that Act requires by @hhesterm here. constitution-unit.com/2019/03/14/par…
But TLDR
Key point to hold onto: CRAG doesn’t matter here (hence left to a footnote) because the deal will require an Act of Parliament anyway.
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I don’t like legal inaccuracy: a lawyer’s professional deformation. But I particularly dislike it when the subject is vaccines, and Ministers like @NadineDorries are going to be asking us for trust. Nothing destroys trust more than inaccuracy and puff.
The UK is still entirely within the EU medicines regime. Under that regime, licensing of the Covid-19 vaccines is reserved to the EMA (technically the Commission advised by the EMA, but let’s simplify): only the EMA can license biotechnological products for medical use.
However, the Medicines Directive (2001/83) allows national medicines regulators (the MHRA) to approve unlicensed products for use in response to the spread of pathogens (Article 5(2)). That is what the MHRA has done here.
Hypothesis 1: a sub-national approach to COVID-19 restrictions works well where the decision is actually taken by sub-national governments. Means that restrictions are well tailored to local circumstances and priorities.
Hypothesis 2: A national government can’t effectively operate different rules in different regions because it cannot ever fully justify differences of treatment. No objective mathematical formula can work: and judgment will always be questioned by those who feel worse treated.
Germany (or the UK when thinking about 🏴 vs 🏴 🏴 and NI) may illustrate hypothesis 1: England when considered on its own may well illustrate hypothesis 2.
But I also disagree with voting for it: any deal will be a bad one, driven by the current government’s incoherent obsession with “sovereignty” (an obsession that appears to apply only to agreements with the EU). theguardian.com/politics/2020/…
Labour should promise to go back and renegotiate this bad FTA when it gets into government. Its inadequacies will reveal themselves pretty swiftly over the next year or so.
This an incoherent and, frankly, silly way of thinking about the issues here. All treaties - all contracts - involve a surrender of freedom of action (“sovereignty”).
The question is whether what you are agreeing not to do is something you value doing so much that you will sacrifice all the benefits of an agreement in order to keep the ability to do it.
So when the EU insists on the UK operating a robust and independent subsidy control regime, the meaningful question is whether the things we couldn’t do in such a regime are things we really want to do.
The problem with the proposed position emerges down the article, when the author accepts that if there were any chance that the implementing legislation might be defeated (eg a large Tory rebellion) Labour should abstain.
So the suggested vote against is purely symbolic, and contrary to what Labour (and the author) actually wants, which is to get the legislation passed (given what will happen if it isn’t: the lesser of two evils).