1/ "the availability of BECCS proved critical to the cost-efficiency, & indeed the theoretical possibility, of these deep mitigation scenarios, leading to systemic inclusion of BECCS in RCP2.6 scenarios" says @katedooley0, Christoff, @KA_Nicholas
2/ "The incorporation of NETs in IPCC scenarios is one clear illustration of how, as @EstherTurnhout put it, “dominant political discourses compel scientists to create assessments that work within these discourses”..." writes @wim_carton
3/ I know people don't like these sorts of statements. They illustrate that 1.5°C, even <2°C, are considerably harder without large-scale CDR.
If we take CDR out of IAMs, then very few will be able to reach deep mitigation pathways. (there are some buts, to follow)
4/ Sure, there are scenarios like LED (which still uses large-scale afforestation), which shift feasibility to demand side issues (nature.com/articles/s4156…)
You could argue then, that if we exclude technical CDR, we just shift discussion from crazy BECCS to crazy demand side?
5/ There are deeper issues here. The white boxes are elements not included in IAMs.
IAMs all include BECCS, but many don't include advanced nuclear or synthetic fuels or... Very few demand side measures are included in most IAMs.
6/ The excessive use of CDR in IAMs has meant there has been a spotlight on CDR & the narrative CDR is "necessary".
There has been less spotlight on what is not included in IAMs or why IAMs preferentially seem to follow high CDR pathways.
7/ In this sense, there is a clear argument that IAMs have been performative. They have framed the climate debate, the technologies we consider, the discussions we have, even what a pathways looks like (or "has" to look like).
8/ We are all now 'trained' to think CO₂ emissions must be negative in 2100, & all scenarios have to be peak & decline (overshoot) scenarios. We struggle to see alternatives, because the alternatives are swamped by the standard.
9/ The reason we have these peak & decline scenarios goes back 10+ years. IAMs struggled to get to 450ppm without first exceeding 450ppm.
The climate target was shifted to 2100 instead of "not-to-exceed" any time, just so IAMs could find a solution!
11/ These things are all well-known by IAMers, it is bread & butter for them. They have huge trust & respect through, eg, the IPCC process. Critiques are therefore outsiders, pushing against the mainstream & established science.
12/ If you push back on any of this, or try & do alternative scenario, it is a constant battle. "What about those 1000 scenario assessed by the IPCC, why do we need more scenarios" 🤦
This just slows the inevitable down!
13/ IAMers eventually get to some of the issues raised: low energy demand, discount rates, high renewables, alternative scenario designs, etc, but it all comes 5 years slower than it needs to (IMHO).
14/ Ok, that thread went on more of a tangent then I had originally planned. I guess I am trying to reflect that critiques are not just random, people have actually thought through many issues, read literature, etc.
Now, to work...
/end
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2/ "As the IPCC points out, aggregate mitigation costs in IAMs generally increase when action is delayed. ... The longer mitigation is delayed, ... the more investments and/or devaluations it will therefore take to eventually bring emissions down to net zero/net negative."
3/ "The cost of mitigation is therefore not a function of continued fossil fuel use per se, but of the steepness of the mitigation curve, that is, of how quickly fossil fuel consumption needs to fall in order to reach the specified temperature target."
2/ Does it make sense to include current policies or NDCs across all SSPs? Doesn't the existence of current policies or NDCs begin to preclude some SSPs?
One could use SSP2 (current socioeconomic trends) with scenarios performed with varying SPAs.
3/ This is really a challenge of the SSP/SPA/RCP framework. The three axes are essentially assumed to be independent, this makes theoretical sense but not really practice sense. I understand why that decision was made, but does it make the framework too unrealistic?
2/ The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) are used as input to Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) & combined with Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs) to get different forcing levels (RCPs) in 2100. Earth System Models use pathways generated from the IAM SSP/RCP combinations.
3/ Not all combinations are possible. That is, IAMs often cannot solve for some SSP/RCP combination:
* Only SSP5 can get to RCP8.5 in IAMs
* Many IAMs cannot get to RCP1.9 or 2.6 with SSP3, 4, 5
2. I looked into how Shell compares to mainstream scenarios in 2017.
Compared to the quantified Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs, in grey), Shell uses a lot of energy, but the CO₂ emissions are well within the range of mainstream <2°C scenarios RCP2.6.
3. As @wim_carton documents in his paper, Shell uses quite a bit of fossil fuels. A bit more coal than in the average SSP, gas a bit less, oil sort of an average with others with a long tail.
How is it possible to use so much fossil fuel & hit net-zero CO₂ emissions?
We don't need another decade building more complex models that exploit exascale computing, but one that: 1. Better understands & characterizes fundamental conceptual issues 2. Integrates multi-disciplinary knowledge & perspectives
Many presume that inadequacies of current models can be solved with more resolution, more detail, more computer.
But, fundamental questions on the inadequacies of models have note been addressed (eg model structure, initial conditions, nonlinear dynamics, etc)
2/
"Climate economists [have] spent decades attempting to provide ever-better numerical estimates of a benefit-cost ratio... Even if the ECS isn’t strictly fat-tailed, the benefit-cost ratio [is] highly sensitive to ... parameters which suffer from deep uncertainty"
3/