The UK is still entirely within the EU medicines regime. Under that regime, licensing of the Covid-19 vaccines is reserved to the EMA (technically the Commission advised by the EMA, but let’s simplify): only the EMA can license biotechnological products for medical use.
However, the Medicines Directive (2001/83) allows national medicines regulators (the MHRA) to approve unlicensed products for use in response to the spread of pathogens (Article 5(2)). That is what the MHRA has done here.
It is therefore incorrect to say that what has happened is something that could not have happened while we were in the EU (which we essentially still are, for these purposes). Raine is right.
What will happen after 31/12/2021 is that the MHRA will be the body that decides whether to grant a full licence to the vaccines (though any full licence granted by the EMA before then will continue to apply in the UK as a matter of UK law).
It would take a while to explain the differences that flow from the fact that the Pfizer vaccine is now “approved” but not yet licensed: there are a number of regulatory consequences important to those involved but not so much to the public.
This rings true. The MHRA is impressive. (Disclosure: I have often acted for it.)
This, unfortunately, does not ring true and should be corrected. The UK regulations dealt with some of the regulatory consequences of approval under Article 5(2) of the Directive. They did not add to the power to approve, which was already there in EU law, as explained above.
An important update: the government has announced that COVID-19 vaccines *will* be brought within the Vaccine Damages Act 1979 regime. gov.uk/government/new…
Other questions: is it really appropriate in a democracy for those who are accountable to us to choose the time at which they are prepared to be made accountable?
I don’t like legal inaccuracy: a lawyer’s professional deformation. But I particularly dislike it when the subject is vaccines, and Ministers like @NadineDorries are going to be asking us for trust. Nothing destroys trust more than inaccuracy and puff.
One point worth making, because I think there could be some confusion about this (the point is implicit in Jon’s article but not spelt out). It’s about what sort of vote there will be.
As Jon points out, there is no requirement for an “meaningful vote” (on the principle of the deal). That requirement only arose in the last Parliament because that Parliament insisted on one in relation to the Withdrawal Agreement (and wrote it into the EU Withdrawal Act).
The current Parliament has placed no such requirement on the current government. Funny, that.
Hypothesis 1: a sub-national approach to COVID-19 restrictions works well where the decision is actually taken by sub-national governments. Means that restrictions are well tailored to local circumstances and priorities.
Hypothesis 2: A national government can’t effectively operate different rules in different regions because it cannot ever fully justify differences of treatment. No objective mathematical formula can work: and judgment will always be questioned by those who feel worse treated.
Germany (or the UK when thinking about 🏴 vs 🏴 🏴 and NI) may illustrate hypothesis 1: England when considered on its own may well illustrate hypothesis 2.
But I also disagree with voting for it: any deal will be a bad one, driven by the current government’s incoherent obsession with “sovereignty” (an obsession that appears to apply only to agreements with the EU). theguardian.com/politics/2020/…
Labour should promise to go back and renegotiate this bad FTA when it gets into government. Its inadequacies will reveal themselves pretty swiftly over the next year or so.