The WSJ responds to Lamar Alexander's suggestion that placing Shelton on the Board of Governors would have meant handing control of monetary policy "to a Congress and a President who can’t balance the federal budget."
It tries to turn the tables on the Shelton-less Fed, observing it has already "willingly become the chief enabler" of the present government's failure to balance the budget--as if the Fed were a schoolyard drug pusher and Trump and Congress were innocent schoolchildren.
And as if Powell had not pushed back against Trump's repeated complaints that the Fed hadn't lowered rates enough, and that it should have gone negative. markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/tr…
The article then goes on to suggest that had @judyshel been on board, she'd have been a bulwark of Fed independence--clearly implying that she'd have gone further than Powell & Co. in resisting pressure on the Fed to "accommodat[e] the political class."
It's an awkward thesis, to say the least, because it conflicts with Shelton's avowed views on interest rate policy at the time. And the WSJ editorial staff know it. But it doesn't stop them from pressing on with it.
They write: "Ms. Shelton’s supposed sin against Fed independence is that she warned against raising interest rates as the Trump-era economy began to benefit ordinary workers, having opposed low rates when Barack Obama was President. That’s an oversimplification of her views."
It is indeed an oversimplification; but not just in the way the editorial suggests. For it oversimplifies the oversimplification by ignoring the fact that Shelton argued not just "against raising" but for lowering rates, just as Trump did, and not just in 2018.
I take no view on Judy's position here, or on what her motivation for taking it was. My beef isn't with her but with the WSJ staff. They must think very little of their readers to have written such twaddle. Perhaps they think all are like those inhabiting its comment section.
Well, if they keep up this sort of thing, they'll soon be right!
The debate about stablecoin regulation is at bottom part of a broader debate about regulatory classification of fintech payment service providers (PSPs). But it is, IMHO, wrong to reduce this debate to the question, "Is it a 'bank' or not?"
Posing the question that way implies that there are only two options: (1) Fintech PSPs aren't banks, and therefore shouldn't have to get stnd. bank charters or abide by the reg's that go w/ such to gain access to public settlement facilities. That's what many stablecoin fans say.
(2) fintech PSPs are banks; and therefore must be get bank charters and be subject to the same regulations ordinary banks must abide by. That's the answer offered by the STABLE Act tlaib.house.gov/media/press-re…
That 1672 ban was still in effect when another--and much bigger--round of private token issuance started a bit over a century later. It was those illicit private coiners who showed the Royal Mint how to solve "The Big Problem of Small Change." 1/n
Despite what Sargent and Velde, Angela Redish, and many numismatists have claimed, the key to the solution was _not_ steam-powered coining presses. It was, most fundamentally, and in a word, _competition_. See here for my most detailed argument on this: jstor.org/stable/2322655…
See also jstor.org/stable/3698572…. My book Good Money, which includes a version of the second article, tells the whole surprisingly dramatic story. (It also has very nice pictures!) amazon.com/Good-Money-Bir…
I think Yellen's rate increases are badly misunderstood. In fact there were a blunder; and not a small one (1.5% is a lot more than it used to be!). However....
the culprit IMHO wasn't Phillips curve thinking or any hawkish overestimation of the risk of inflation. It was the Fed's frankly unthinking approach to post-QE policy "normalization."
Genuine normalization should have been about (1) unwinding the Fed's balance sheet and (2) moving from a floor to a "corridor" system of the sort planned when interest payments on reserves were 1st authorized in 2006.
The article makes some interesting observations, based on conversations with credit unions that have participated in MSLF loans, concerning how its terms might be modified by the new administration to make its loans more attractive.
Of particular interest is the suggestion that the loans' present "very odd structure" makes them more appealing to larger lenders. I'm not sure that this is reflected in the actual loans made thus far. Thoughts?
Thread: OK, I'm going to get into (more) hot water saying so, but I think there's a great deal of both exaggeration and more than a little hypocrisy involved in the fuss being made about Mnuchin's decision to not extend the Fed's CARES-Act backstopping.
I should begin by noting that I've held for some time that the whole Fed "backstopping" approach was mistaken, and that Congress "should either have made no use of the Fed, or it should have used it as a mere distributor, and not as a source, of funds" nationalreview.com/2020/09/a-real…
So I'm bound to agree in principle with Mnuchin's suggestion that more can be achieved by having Congress re-appropriate the funding in question--if only Congress can get its act together!