The debate about stablecoin regulation is at bottom part of a broader debate about regulatory classification of fintech payment service providers (PSPs). But it is, IMHO, wrong to reduce this debate to the question, "Is it a 'bank' or not?"
Posing the question that way implies that there are only two options: (1) Fintech PSPs aren't banks, and therefore shouldn't have to get stnd. bank charters or abide by the reg's that go w/ such to gain access to public settlement facilities. That's what many stablecoin fans say.
(2) fintech PSPs are banks; and therefore must be get bank charters and be subject to the same regulations ordinary banks must abide by. That's the answer offered by the STABLE Act tlaib.house.gov/media/press-re…
The second answer relies, not unreasonably, on the standard regulatory definition of a bank as a "deposit taking" institution. But IMHO it's that definition that's problematic, and that renders the conventional bank-nonbank dichotomy so.
For conventional banks aren't just "deposit taking institutions." They combine deposit taking with lending. It's this combined set of activities, not deposit taking per se, that (rightly or wrongly) supplies the rationale for many bank regulations, including deposit insurance.
According to many, a similar but broader combination of services--the use of overnight funding of any sort to finance longer-term investments--supplies a similar rationale for like regulation of "shadow" banks.
But not all stablecoins or fintech PSPs can be said to resemble either ordinary or shadow banks in taking part in such risky "maturity mismatching." Subjecting such fintech PSPs to all "bank" regulations, as requiring ordinary bank licenses would, makes little sense.
That's why I think the right solution is to get away from the one-size-fits-all federal banking charter, and to come up with special charters specifically suited to PSPs that don't engage in risky maturity mismatching, granting them bank-like access to Fed settlement facilities.
That's the spirit of the OCC's special charter approach. There may be a better one; but I strongly believe that regulators should be thinking along these lines. occ.gov/publications-a…
Addendum: Many established banks will naturally fight tooth-and-nail against alternative charters, just as they fought tooth-and-nail against money market funds some decades ago. This has given rise to a "bootleggers and Baptists" coalition against such charters, 1/2
where the banks are primarily (but not necessarily exclusively) anxious to squelch potential competition Baptists are (mostly) sincerely worried about risk. For that reason, unless some Baptists get on board, the special charter solution faces a tough uphill battle!
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The WSJ responds to Lamar Alexander's suggestion that placing Shelton on the Board of Governors would have meant handing control of monetary policy "to a Congress and a President who can’t balance the federal budget."
It tries to turn the tables on the Shelton-less Fed, observing it has already "willingly become the chief enabler" of the present government's failure to balance the budget--as if the Fed were a schoolyard drug pusher and Trump and Congress were innocent schoolchildren.
That 1672 ban was still in effect when another--and much bigger--round of private token issuance started a bit over a century later. It was those illicit private coiners who showed the Royal Mint how to solve "The Big Problem of Small Change." 1/n
Despite what Sargent and Velde, Angela Redish, and many numismatists have claimed, the key to the solution was _not_ steam-powered coining presses. It was, most fundamentally, and in a word, _competition_. See here for my most detailed argument on this: jstor.org/stable/2322655…
See also jstor.org/stable/3698572…. My book Good Money, which includes a version of the second article, tells the whole surprisingly dramatic story. (It also has very nice pictures!) amazon.com/Good-Money-Bir…
I think Yellen's rate increases are badly misunderstood. In fact there were a blunder; and not a small one (1.5% is a lot more than it used to be!). However....
the culprit IMHO wasn't Phillips curve thinking or any hawkish overestimation of the risk of inflation. It was the Fed's frankly unthinking approach to post-QE policy "normalization."
Genuine normalization should have been about (1) unwinding the Fed's balance sheet and (2) moving from a floor to a "corridor" system of the sort planned when interest payments on reserves were 1st authorized in 2006.
The article makes some interesting observations, based on conversations with credit unions that have participated in MSLF loans, concerning how its terms might be modified by the new administration to make its loans more attractive.
Of particular interest is the suggestion that the loans' present "very odd structure" makes them more appealing to larger lenders. I'm not sure that this is reflected in the actual loans made thus far. Thoughts?
Thread: OK, I'm going to get into (more) hot water saying so, but I think there's a great deal of both exaggeration and more than a little hypocrisy involved in the fuss being made about Mnuchin's decision to not extend the Fed's CARES-Act backstopping.
I should begin by noting that I've held for some time that the whole Fed "backstopping" approach was mistaken, and that Congress "should either have made no use of the Fed, or it should have used it as a mere distributor, and not as a source, of funds" nationalreview.com/2020/09/a-real…
So I'm bound to agree in principle with Mnuchin's suggestion that more can be achieved by having Congress re-appropriate the funding in question--if only Congress can get its act together!