Another example of the current government’s allergy to democratic and Parliamentary scrutiny. For roll-over agreements like Japan barely justifiable (done at speed and little change). But for the US? CPTPP? These agreements could mean major and controversial changes to policy.
Note, also, that reducing democratic scrutiny to a “dumped on Parliament at the last minute, take it or leave it” approach is bad strategy as well as being unprincipled.
It increases the chance (even with a majority of 80) of rejection if something has been conceded which causes such outrage that even Tory MPs feel forced to oppose.
More importantly, being able to point to MPs’ and other stakeholders’ opposition to possible concessions can strengthen the government’s hand: it’s the equivalent for a lawyer of being able to say “*I* see your point but my client just won’t wear that.”
It’s yet another indication that the current government is far more interested in re-fighting the battles of the 2017-2019 parliament than dealing with the challenges of the current one: in this case, working out how to build wide support for a coherent trade policy.
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That is because Article 12 of the Protocol says this.
The 1st sentence of para 4 tells you, for present purposes, that the Commission has all the powers over the UK in relation to Article 10 as it has over Member States under Articles 107-108 TFEU. Powers to find that aid has been granted under Article 10 and to order repayment.
Since subsidy control is at the core of the “tricky” issues, ask these questions, and demand answers, when evaluating the coherence and rationality of the current PM’s position that “there are limits which no sensible independent country could go.”
1. He fought the 2019 election on the basis of a political declaration that promised to “uphold the common high standards applicable in the [EU] ... in the areas of State aid ... [and] to maintain a robust and comprehensive framework for ... state aid control.”
He presumably did not then believe that a commitment to a robust subsidy control regime exceeded “limits [beyond] which no sensible independent country could go”. And nor, presumably, did those who voted for him. What, precisely, has changed?
This is not, in my view, a sensible hill for the current UK government to die on. In practice, ex ante approval will be insisted on *by the recipient* if there is any risk that a regulator can order the reversal of a subsidy after it is granted.
(And if there is to be a regulator that is more than a toothless commentator it must be able to order the reversal of subsidy that distorts more than it helps achieve any public policy objective.)
So winning the absence of a prior clearance requirement should be not an important UK objective, here.
Some comments on the subsidy/State aspects here (this is the clearest and probably, given @tconnellyRTE’s record and deep understanding of the issues, one of the most reliable, accounts of the current state of play).
What seems to have happened is that the EU has agreed that a subsidy need not be cleared first by an independent regulator before it can legally be granted.
That is a key aspect of EU rules - albeit very importantly tempered in practice by block exemptions that automatically approve aid falling within them - in normal years the overwhelming bulk of aid is granted that way.
An important update: the government has announced that COVID-19 vaccines *will* be brought within the Vaccine Damages Act 1979 regime. gov.uk/government/new…
Other questions: is it really appropriate in a democracy for those who are accountable to us to choose the time at which they are prepared to be made accountable?