Some comments on the subsidy/State aspects here (this is the clearest and probably, given @tconnellyRTE’s record and deep understanding of the issues, one of the most reliable, accounts of the current state of play).
What seems to have happened is that the EU has agreed that a subsidy need not be cleared first by an independent regulator before it can legally be granted.
That is a key aspect of EU rules - albeit very importantly tempered in practice by block exemptions that automatically approve aid falling within them - in normal years the overwhelming bulk of aid is granted that way.
For aid that falls outside an exemption the need to get it approved first can cause delay (though NB the Commission can move fast and a UK regulator should be able to move a bit faster).
But note that if a regulator can order the reversal of a subsidy after it is granted (and if there is to be a regulator that is more than a toothless commentator it must be able to do that) the absence of a prior clearance requirement may not be worth much (or even harmful).
That’s because, if there’s a risk of reversal, any well-advised recipient will get the regulator’s view before accepting a subsidy: no point in accepting the subsidy and spending your own money on top of the rug could be pulled under you later.
And if for some reason it can’t do that, a prospective recipient may well refuse to accept a subsidy at all rather than take that risk: defeating the policy.
So the apparent EU concession may not actually help the UK much, in practice.
As for third party rights, these are rarely used but can be useful where a regulator won’t act (though JR of a regulator who has wrongly cleared a subsidy or failed to act also works). Useful for UK firms and not just EU ones, I’d add.
This further passage makes (I think) an important point I have been going on about: a UK regime based on its own concept of “subsidy” (taken from the WTO definition, probably) and with public policy exceptions won’t be much different from Article 107 TFEU, in practice.
Note in particular that the WTO definition extends to tax measures. Of course it does: a tax break to all widget-makers is the same as a cash grant to all widget-makers. So a clash between tax policy and subsidy rules is a feature, not a bug, of any coherent subsidy regime.
Where the tax policy is in a tax statute, that raises issues in a system where no constraint can be placed on Parliament’s ability to legislate. Though that can be managed (eg by allowing a regulator to point out that a tax rule is a subsidy and giving Ministers power to amend).
And the (now deleted) provisions of the IM Bill on subsidy control shows that the current government has no problem with constraining the power of devolved parliaments to grant subsidies by tax rules (or anything else).
This is the current UK position. (A slight inaccuracy by Tony here: it’s a statutory instrument - purportedly made under the Withdrawal Act - not a draft Bill).
NB that getting an entirely new UK regime that complies with subsidy obligations in the FTA, has a regulator, but makes real changes from EU State aid rules will - to put it mildly - be tricky.
I suspect EU State aid rules will have to roll over for some months, if there is an agreement, until a new regulator and regime can be set up. (The current government should have used this year to do that: so only itself to blame here.)
Anyway, we will have to see. Lots of magician’s patter around: though I’d trust Tony more than almost anyone to ignore it and see how the trick is actually being done.
“State aid”
“if the rug”
For a detailed review of where we are, including the current UK government’s veering around like a shopping trolley on the point, see competitionlawinsight.com/incoming/state…

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More from @GeorgePeretzQC

4 Dec
An important update: the government has announced that COVID-19 vaccines *will* be brought within the Vaccine Damages Act 1979 regime. gov.uk/government/new…
A sensible and well-crafted announcement: getting the language right here isn’t straightforward.
As my article points out, however, there are some serious problems with the VDPA regime. A review is called for.
Read 4 tweets
3 Dec
Must-read piece by @ProfMarkElliott on the current government’s proposed repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act. publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/12/02/rep….
TLDR
Other questions: is it really appropriate in a democracy for those who are accountable to us to choose the time at which they are prepared to be made accountable?
Read 5 tweets
2 Dec
I don’t like legal inaccuracy: a lawyer’s professional deformation. But I particularly dislike it when the subject is vaccines, and Ministers like @NadineDorries are going to be asking us for trust. Nothing destroys trust more than inaccuracy and puff.
Read 4 tweets
2 Dec
I think an explanation is needed. Here goes.
The UK is still entirely within the EU medicines regime. Under that regime, licensing of the Covid-19 vaccines is reserved to the EMA (technically the Commission advised by the EMA, but let’s simplify): only the EMA can license biotechnological products for medical use.
However, the Medicines Directive (2001/83) allows national medicines regulators (the MHRA) to approve unlicensed products for use in response to the spread of pathogens (Article 5(2)). That is what the MHRA has done here.
Read 9 tweets
30 Nov
One point worth making, because I think there could be some confusion about this (the point is implicit in Jon’s article but not spelt out). It’s about what sort of vote there will be.
As Jon points out, there is no requirement for an “meaningful vote” (on the principle of the deal). That requirement only arose in the last Parliament because that Parliament insisted on one in relation to the Withdrawal Agreement (and wrote it into the EU Withdrawal Act).
The current Parliament has placed no such requirement on the current government. Funny, that.
Read 15 tweets
29 Nov
Hypothesis 1: a sub-national approach to COVID-19 restrictions works well where the decision is actually taken by sub-national governments. Means that restrictions are well tailored to local circumstances and priorities.
Hypothesis 2: A national government can’t effectively operate different rules in different regions because it cannot ever fully justify differences of treatment. No objective mathematical formula can work: and judgment will always be questioned by those who feel worse treated.
Germany (or the UK when thinking about 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿 vs 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁷󠁬󠁳󠁿 and NI) may illustrate hypothesis 1: England when considered on its own may well illustrate hypothesis 2.
Read 4 tweets

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