That is because Article 12 of the Protocol says this.
The 1st sentence of para 4 tells you, for present purposes, that the Commission has all the powers over the UK in relation to Article 10 as it has over Member States under Articles 107-108 TFEU. Powers to find that aid has been granted under Article 10 and to order repayment.
The 2nd sentence tells you that the Court of Justice of the EU has the same jurisdiction in relation to Article 10 as it has in relation to Articles 107-108 in a Member State.
Those powers are: powers to hear and decide appeals from the Commission about decisions to find, or not to find, State aid. Also powers to rule on questions of law when national courts ask it to (and they are sometimes are required to ask): see the reference to Article 267 TFEU.
What does all that mean? Well, it means that the decision as to what Article 10 means is for the CJEU, not for the Commission or the UK, or for the Joint Committee.
If the Commission decides that a measure does not fall under Article 10 (applying the “clarification”) that is not the end of the matter.
A dissatisfied party could appeal to the General Court of the EU on the ground that the “clarification” is not what Article 10 actually means. Or it could argue that before a UK court, seeking a request for a ruling from the CJEU. Either way, the matter gets to the CJEU.
The CJEU might pay attention to the “clarification”. It might not. That is a matter for it. But what it says is law. The clarification is not law.
What about the dispute settlement mechanism? What if the UK says that the CJEU has got the law wrong and goes to the Joint Committee?
The real issue there is that - under Article 174 of the main agreement - questions of interpretation of concepts of EU law are for the CJEU to resolve. So the invocation of the JC just appears to lead straight back to the CJEU.
But that assumes that the questions at issue are “concepts of EU law”. Is that assumption right?
The problem with the answer “no” is that the key Article 10 concept (“measures which affect that trade”) picks up on the “affects trade between Member States” concept in Article 107 TFEU.
And the idea that it is a “concept of EU law” is strengthened by the fact that the CJEU is given power in Article 12 to interpret it: a fact that makes more sense if the concept is one of EU law.
Further, the answer that it is not a concept of EU law gives rise to the obvious risk that the result of the arbitration could differ from the result arrived at by the CJEU, even though Article 12 gives jurisdiction to the CJEU.
In my view, therefore, the JC route would not assist the UK in those circumstances: it just sends the issue back to the CJEU.
So my initial conclusion stands: the “clarification” is not law and does not change the law. What Article 10 means, and what it applies to, are for the courts, and ultimately the CJEU, to decide.
If the UK government does not like the result, there are two answers. 1. You shouldn’t have signed it, then.
2. Instead of spending 2020 prevaricating and veering around on the subsidy issue, you should have used the time to produce a robust UK subsidy regime, agreed to commit to it, and then sought the EU’s agreement to cut back or remove Article 10.
That would have been a far more sensible use of your time than the damaging fiasco of Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill.
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The devil is in the detail. But ultimately the UK choice is whether (a) to accept a deal the benefits of which cld be withdrawn if the EU (after arbitration) later decides that divergence has in fact become too great for those benefits to be in its interests any more; or
(b) to refuse a deal, and those benefits, now (and before we have decided what if any divergence we actually want.
It’s a bit like someone who balks at renting a nice house they rather like because there’s a term in the lease that gives the landlord a right reasonably to refuse them having pets, even if they have no pets and aren’t sure whether they ever will.
Note, however, that as explained here, politico.eu/article/uk-scr…, it was not at all clear in WTO law that the UK could take advantage of the WTO ruling authorising the EU to impose those tariffs.
Nor is it clear that there is domestic law power to impose such tariffs: legislation would have been got through by the end of the year.
Since subsidy control is at the core of the “tricky” issues, ask these questions, and demand answers, when evaluating the coherence and rationality of the current PM’s position that “there are limits which no sensible independent country could go.”
1. He fought the 2019 election on the basis of a political declaration that promised to “uphold the common high standards applicable in the [EU] ... in the areas of State aid ... [and] to maintain a robust and comprehensive framework for ... state aid control.”
He presumably did not then believe that a commitment to a robust subsidy control regime exceeded “limits [beyond] which no sensible independent country could go”. And nor, presumably, did those who voted for him. What, precisely, has changed?
Another example of the current government’s allergy to democratic and Parliamentary scrutiny. For roll-over agreements like Japan barely justifiable (done at speed and little change). But for the US? CPTPP? These agreements could mean major and controversial changes to policy.
Note, also, that reducing democratic scrutiny to a “dumped on Parliament at the last minute, take it or leave it” approach is bad strategy as well as being unprincipled.
It increases the chance (even with a majority of 80) of rejection if something has been conceded which causes such outrage that even Tory MPs feel forced to oppose.
This is not, in my view, a sensible hill for the current UK government to die on. In practice, ex ante approval will be insisted on *by the recipient* if there is any risk that a regulator can order the reversal of a subsidy after it is granted.
(And if there is to be a regulator that is more than a toothless commentator it must be able to order the reversal of subsidy that distorts more than it helps achieve any public policy objective.)
So winning the absence of a prior clearance requirement should be not an important UK objective, here.
Some comments on the subsidy/State aspects here (this is the clearest and probably, given @tconnellyRTE’s record and deep understanding of the issues, one of the most reliable, accounts of the current state of play).
What seems to have happened is that the EU has agreed that a subsidy need not be cleared first by an independent regulator before it can legally be granted.
That is a key aspect of EU rules - albeit very importantly tempered in practice by block exemptions that automatically approve aid falling within them - in normal years the overwhelming bulk of aid is granted that way.