Munger complained again today that "Almost everybody smart is sucked into finance by the money. I don't welcome it at all. I don't think we want the whole world trying to get rich outsmarting the rest of the world in marketable securities." Some thoughts below:
I wonder if Munger has contemplated whether this has occurred simply because equity valuations have historically been too low. It's been too easy to get rich just picking a bunch of half decent stocks, sitting on them and letting the money compound over time (cont).
Maybe the solution needs to be/eventually will be stocks going to 100x earnings, just like bond yields have now gone to basically zero, such that there will no longer be an opportunity to do so, and intelligent & hard working will be forced to go into other fields to make money.
You used to be able to get rich (slowly) just buying bonds yielding 6-8% and compounding over time. Can't do that anymore. Used to be able to get rich buying properties yielding 10%+. Can't do that anymore. They now yield 2%. The same thing could eventually happen to stocks.
Probably, people should not be able to become billionaires simply by picking stocks. They should have to go and create great companies that improve the world. If people still can, stocks are probably too cheap. The cost of capital equity capital should probably only be 2-3%.
Will it actually happen? I doubt it. Stocks will remain volatile and that will continue to scare ppl into selling em cheap from time to time. I do think the long term trend will be for stocks to get ever more expensive though. Grantham-esque mean reversion is probably foolhardy.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Uber is abandoning its self-driving car efforts to try to cut costs and become profitable. As Kalanick himself observed, self-driving cars are an existential threat to Uber. When tech is ready & commercialized, there is a good chance UBER's ride hailing biz is disrupted to zero.
Whoever gets there first will use/license the tech, launch an Uber-like app with autonomous cars at a fraction of current prices, and Uber's expensive, labour intensive model won't be able to compete.
At best, Uber will have to pay whatever it takes to license the tech, but Uber will be in a weak bargaining position and up against many other potential cashed-up tech bidders (or tech owner launching their own app/network). At best huge amount of value is paid away in licensing.
Value investing seems to suddenly be back in vogue, and the old saying "good things happen to cheap stocks" starting to work again. When you trade at half of one times earnings (albeit with lots of risks, leverage etc etc..), sometimes your stock can go up 4x in a few days.
Extrapolation and momentum work until they don't. Value traps are value traps until they aren't. The outlook is bleak and dire until suddenly it isn't. Stocks lack a catalyst until one arrives.
I've talked about this many times in past - if you bought this stock you've looked wrong and underperformed virtually every day until 3-4 trading days ago. Greenblatt has talked about how best performing managers over a decade spend 3yrs in worst performance DECILE. This is why.
When you're doing a sum-of-the-parts valuation, you should always use a value for each of the parts that is a price you would be happy to own that asset at, not its market value. Otherwise, a SOTP discount story is simply a case for a better way of making a bad investment.
Suppose a company owned $1 a share of long term treasuries at a 0.9% yield. It trades at a 20-30% discount. Would you directly buy long dated treasuries yielding 0.9% at 20-30% off? If not, then why are you buying the stock, because that's exactly what you're actually doing.
The only exception is if there is an explicit and credible intention to liquidate the said assets and return capital to shareholders. Otherwise, in a discount you're just finding a better way to make a bad investment.
Why economy/consumer spend/bad debt has been better than expected:
1) Consumers stopped spending on travel & entertainment so had more money in pockets. 2) Ordinarily one person's spending is another's income, so this would decimate economy, but fiscal stimulus has plugged gap.
Has had some perverse outcomes. Some industries have seen record consumer spend (e.g. home improvement), due to reallocation of T&E spend coupled with fiscally preserved aggregate income. Also increase retail stock market participation/speculation as savings rates rose.
Investors also expected a huge wave of bad debt in banking system, but because savings rates actually rose (lack of ability to spend money + govt propping up incomes), consumer loan defaults have in many cases actually fallen as they've had more net savings to pay down debt.
Compounder bros overlook that the most effective long term compounding often comes from high distributed FCF yields (dividends and buybacks) that are then reinvested at high distributable FCF yields. Has little do to with growth per se - esp if paid up for in advance.
The other thing effective long term compounding requires is the avoidance of periodic, catastrophic losses. When growth stocks go wrong they go down 90%. If that happens once every 20 years it destroys your ability to compound. Avoidance of the risk of large losses is imperative.
In good times, people often criticise Buffett for missing winners. But Buffett knows that great long term results require one place primacy on avoiding losses, not missing winners. A large part of Buffett's track record is due to him having avoided any major losses for 70yrs.
Australian iron ore producer Fortescue (FMG AU) is a great example of how value investing often works in practice. In 2018 the stock was trading for A$4. It was cheap at spot iron ore - a mid single digit FCF multiple, even w historically high discounts on low-grade 58pc Fe (1/n)
The reason it was cheap was investors believed the increased 58pc discount was structural not cyclical, and benchmark iron ore prices of US$60-70/MT were not sustainable - Chinese demand would surely falter, and send prices down to US$40-50/MT (2/n).
I basically agreed with the market. That was also my expectation. But I decided to buy some anyway because I recognized I could be wrong, and if either iron ore prices stayed at US$60/MT or rose; OR 58pc discounts narrowed to historical levels, the stock would prove very cheap.