1/x Just finished building a new toy in python, gotta share. How it works: you type in a stock, group of stocks, index, sector, industry, factor, WHATEVER, plus date range. It then goes into OSAM research database & builds massive graphical report, 130 chart pdf.
Here's an example of the code run on the S&P 500 (OSAM US Large Stock universe).
In addition to doing dispersion work on individual stock returns, valuations, profitability, etc., etc. code aggregates income statements, balance sheets, & cash flow statements of companies in the index (which user defines) and presents those as graphics. Example:
The above tweet is the "income statement" of the S&P 500 from 1963 to 2020. Here's everything expressed as % of sales, with special items and non-operating income included in the graphic:
Here's bottom line portion of SPX income statement expressed as a % of EBITDARD. (New term--EBITDA w/ R&D treated as if it were CAPEX. Incoherent to exclude CAPEX depreciation expense from an earnings measure but then allow R&D expense to be included. Should be expensed alike)
One thing that stands out is role of declining interest & tax expense in SPX margin increase from early 1990s to present. In chart below, interest & taxes (orange) and depreciation & R&D expense are grouped (purple). You can see the massively shrinking orange, while purple grows.
Not the theme of the thread, but that point was important to the profit margin mean reversion debates that took place several years ago. Chart helps put a picture on it.
Anyways, there's way too much in the pdf to discuss here, so you can just go through the charts. Basically everything you ever wanted to know about that index and probably much more than anyone needs to know.
The cool thing I want to highlight is how the code can be run on any stocks you pick. So, let's just make one up, $FNMAGA = $FB, $NFLX, $MSFT, $AMZN, $GOOG, $AAPL. Date range: Dec 2012 to Sep 2020. Here's the result: philosophicaleconomics.com/wp-content/upl…
Interestingly, as a group, $FNMAGA profit margins really haven't grown that much. From 2012 to present, it's more of a sales growth and multiple expansion story. Here's the income statement as % of sales.
Tons of cash on the balance sheet, no surprise:
Uses of Capital. Obviously huge R&D spend, and also big buyback increase starting several years ago from $AAPL.
Here's cumulative buyback next to equity.
The companies have high FCF to Earnings because they expense their investments up front via R&D more than they defer them via capitalization. Relative to the rest of the market, their reported earnings power is likely understated.
OFC, as we know, they're also priced very expensively relative to those earnings, particularly as large, mature companies. Huge multiple expansion over the period:
Finally, can run code on individual stocks. Example: $MSFT starting Dec 1989. philosophicaleconomics.com/wp-content/upl… Raw numbers for MSFT "index" are different from actual $MSFT numbers b/c scaled to starting 1989 price of 100, w/ all divs converted into share BB. But information preserved.
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THREAD: Market-Cap Weighting under Policy Dominance (Fiscal nGDP Targeting)
The disadvantages of market-cap (mcap) weighting are well known. Here, I want to elaborate on a benefit that it might offer, which I mentioned in recent ILTB podcast. Small, but potentially interesting.
When you weight a portfolio by market capitalization, you end up owning roughly the same % of the outstanding shares of each company in the market. You end up with the same ownership "stake" in each.
This point is simple to prove mathematically, but the quickest way to see it is to just look at a popular mcap-weighted ETF--e.g., $SPY. (The example that best captures the overall point of the thread would be a total mkt ETF like $VTI, but $SPY suffices to make the current pt).
THREAD: Stock returns by category from Dec 1976 to Dec 2019 for MSCI US, Japan, Europe ex-UK and UK indices, each separated into growth, broad market and value. Description and discussion below, to include charts of different sub-periods.
Empty black boxes represent total returns, colored columns represent fundamental returns (annualized dividend growth w/ all dividend payouts recast as share buybacks). When a box is higher (lower) than a column, it means the category grew more expensive (cheaper) over the period.
With charts like these, it's best to measure peak-to-peak. Dec 1976 was ~ a peak, Dec 2019 was ~ a peak. The chart below moves the end date to the left--Dec 1976 peak to Dec 1989 peak, the peak of the Nikkei bubble:
It's a bit passé to bring up valuation in this environment, but here's an update on two metrics, with SPX at 3563 (commentary in subsequent tweet):
From '11-'13, CAPE was making mkt look more expensive relative to past, bc it had bad fortune of 2 big recessions in its 10 yr average earnings window. Well, NOW, the situation is reversed. CAPE is understating things, bc it has no recessions (yet) in its trailing 10 yr window.
P/IE ratio is basically the ratio of price to all of the index's trailing retained earnings back to pseudo-inception (1871), adjusted for CPI. It avoids distortion of measuring value based on luck of what gets included in the trailing 10 yr window. ~7% off Tech Bubble peak.
USS Enterprise pilots who successfully dive-bombed the Japanese carrier fleet @ Midway tell the story: "last meal" at 4AM, adrenaline of manning planes, taking off from ship, finding the fleet, the fight itself & treacherous return. Fascinating! #VJDay75
"So that morning... way ahead of dawn... around 4 o'clock in the morning. We came down and had steak & eggs for breakfast... The chiefs really knew when there was going to be a real battle... When you had steak & eggs you knew you were in for a real bad day."
"Then you start manning your planes, & you know that you... you are going up there and you are going to have a problem. And you know you're gonna have a problem, that's why you're there. So... that gets the old adrenaline pumping & the old heart begins to pound pretty fast."
@PeterContiBrown Peter, as a US Federal Reserve expert, wanted to ask you a question about negative interest rates. Do you think the FRA as currently written provides a legal basis for implementing them?
Looking at section 11 in particular, the language doesn't seem to provide much room. Hard to see how "balances may ... receive earnings to be paid by the Fed" could be reasonably interpreted as "balances may ... incur interest expense to be paid to the Fed."
Was thinking maybe they could use Section 11A to impose a fee for the service of holding excess reserves, but fees for services have to match costs actually incurred.