debate we should be having is whether stablecoin issuers should be regulated via a new federal money transmitter charter or via updated bank chartering laws. What he gets wrong about the STABLE Act is that it specifically allows regulators to create new rules for narrow banks,
so that the relevant choice is not between a 'vanilla banking license' and a new money transmitter license, but between a narrow bank license and a money transmitter license.
3. Nic is wrong that with stablecoins, "the representation of value is simply leaving the commercial
bank system and hopping onto an alternative set of rails." The value does not, in fact, "leave" the commercial bank system, it simply piggy-backs on top of it. Indeed, the guarantees of safety within a money transmitter framework are dependent on the guarantees provided by the
underlying relationship with a licensed commercial bank. In other words, peel back any money transmitter business model, and there's always a bank somewhere (and behind them, the central bank and the govt). Which is why the STABLE Act proposes to skip the unnecessary middleman &
have stablecoin issuers have direct access to the Fed's balance sheet, like other banks, and/or require banks to take responsibility for the stablecoins issued on the backs of their balance sheet directly, avoiding the 'rent-a-charter' phenomenon we see with fintechs today.
4. I also appreciate Nic's honestly that all the propaganda and hype about stablecoins being inherently 'beyond the reach of regulators' is bullshit. As he notes, "stablecoin issuers register with FinCEN, obtain money transmitter licenses on a state by state basis, maintain
stable bank and audit relationships, and in some cases obtain even more rigorous regulatory designations like the NY Trust Charter." The actual question is not "regulate or don't regulate", it's "what is an effective regulatory model?". Obviously, our view is that the patchwork
of 50-state money transmitter laws is problematic, as is, indeed, the broader trend of letting shadow banks avoid more effective regulatory oversight by hiding behind the money transmitter label, which we've already observed with PayPal & others:
5. I'd note one clarification: Nic cites to @GeorgeSelgin as authority for the claim that stablecoin issuers don't engage in banking because they don't make loans. This is, in my opinion, simply inaccurate. One of the core activities of banking is accepting deposits & processing
payments. There have been many 'narrow bank' models in different periods of history and across jurisdictions - the idea a bank must issue loans to be a bank is simply not true, and more importantly inconsistent with existing law, which requires any actor that accepts deposits to
get a banking charter. If the argument is that stablecoins are not deposits (see point 1 above), then we can disagree on that basis, but the idea an entity must issue loans to be a bank is simply wrong.
6. Finally, while I disagree with Nic's characterization of how $USD
denominated stablecoins actually function across the world, I do agree that they currently function as a tool of American foreign policy, or at the very least have serious implications for foreign policy/national security. Which is why I find the inconsistency in his position
so bizarre - does he really believe that the US government is uniquely incapable of forcing licensed money transmitters to engage in Operation Choke Point style activities vis-a-vis chartered banks? I understand the rhetorical appeal of positioning stablecoins in opposition to
manipulation by law enforcement, but it's not really coherent to hold that view *while simultaneously claiming that all stablecoin issuers should be required to get money transmitter licenses and be subject to federal regulation on that basis*. Pick a lane, mate.
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Post-Keynesians (rightly) love to lambast orthodox economics for their willful ignorance of intellectual history, but they equally suffer from willful ignorance of the history of *how to actual build successful intellectual movements* which is why they by & large don't have one.
"Ah but MMT has all those Mosler millions, it's not a fair fight!" they shout from their office at the Bob Pollin Center for Definitely Not Paid For By Millionaire Money Heterodox Economics.
I'm thrilled to share the announcement of @RashidaTlaib's new "Stablecoin Tethering & Bank Licensing Enforcement (STABLE) Act", (#STABLEAct) cosponsored by @ChuyForCongress & Chair of the House Financial Services Committee's Fintech Task Force, @RepLynch.
A big thanks also to @RealBankReform, @ConsumerReports, and @LPE_Project for their endorsement and input on the bill. This is a complex and technical area of financial regulation, and it's critical to ensure consumer voices and interests are represented in the lawmaking process.
1. From the outset, it commits original sin of CBDC discourse: naturalizing the CB as the sole monetary institution of relevance to the analysis. Where is Tsy?
The paper is structured around the premise that CBs are the only govt entities responsible for public money. There is only one reference to Tsy's money power in the whole paper, & it is buried in a footnote, where they begrudgingly acknowledge this premise is not, in fact, true.
2. The paper also displays its bias from the outset - asserting, without justification, that digital public currency *must* be designed in compliance with existing AML/CFT laws. If you were hoping for a more balanced analysis of privacy/law enforcement tensions, look elsewhere.
"If the bond has been issued in the last week, we will steer clear of that bond," Dr Lowe said, "We are doing this partly because we want to avoid any possibility that people see us as financing the government."
How stupid do you have to be to find this remotely credible?
--
"Dr Lowe drew a distinction between "providing finance" and "affecting the cost of that finance".
"The RBA is not providing finance to the government, but our actions are lowering the cost of government finance.""
I can think of, oh, I dunno, one pretty big difference in what happens to those payments.
--
"He said the bonds purchased by the RBA will have to be repaid by the government at maturity "in exactly the same way as would occur if the bonds were held by others".
After thinking more about @TheStalwart's argument that Microsoft should pay a fee to govt to offset the undue benefits it gets from a govt-induced acquisition, I've decided I think it's a bad idea (no shade at Joe, the motivation is sound). The reason is that the real benefit to
Microsoft long term is not in acquiring a specific product or business but in expanding its already vast data empire. The problem is that the social harms and risks posed by that kind of expansion can't be offset by "paying money". Once the data is collected and consolidated the
Damage is done. In this sense, making Microsoft pay a fee is the firm-level equivalent to trying to impose a tax on data-gathering as a solution to the threat of surveillance capitalism. It's a category error to think this risk can be stripped from larger social context, priced