1/ So I use to run a competitive intel team and spent a god awful amount of time sourcing data.
If you aren't familiar with Second Measure they effectively aggregate online sales data (ie credit cards) which they then sell to co's as market share data
2/ In the old offline world, retailers such as Walmart, Target, etc. would sell their sales data to someone like Nielsen. Nielsen packages this up with consulting services and resells it back to manufacturers (ie P&G, Colgate, etc.) or other co's such as investment firms
3/ This structure has not replicated itself in the online world. Amazon, DoorDash, Netflix, etc. aren't sharing their data with anyone.
4/ If you wanted to procure online market share in a particular category you have a some options.
1. Consumer panels and surveys 2. Banks / credit cards 3. Apps that skim your receipt emails 4. Apps that can see your transactions (ie Honey - not sure if they actually do this)
5/ Aggregating all this data in a way that is accurate is hard. You need huge unbiased samples with sophisticated data science models. Even if your off by a 2-3% that would be unacceptable to most clients since they're making >$100M decisions based on this stuff
6/ And each source has its own issues. Ie credit card data doesn't allow you to drill down to the city or neighbourhood which is important for someone like DoorDash. Apps that skip your email are biased towards certain users and can have sampling issues
7/ This data can be particularly helpful for making investments. Ie VCs might use to determine which start-up to invest in for a particular category. Sell-side would use this to inform their models.
8/ Second Measure is one of the industry leaders. So, Bloomberg already has a captive customer base and salesforce. Similar to $SFDC or $ORCL, their plan would be heavily cross sell this at a premium. Lower CAC and higher prices = profit
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1/ Been following $BABA comments on FinTwit, not an expert but some observations and thoughts:
(1) Lots of ppl selling seemed to have bought the stock speculatively; assuming it'll go up and to the right (2) China experts I've spoken to think the 13% drop is a major overreaction
(3) IMO if your primary source of info is the WSJ that's probably a red flag. Owning $BABA probably requires either first hand research and a network of experts. If not, then your going to be out arbitraged based on information flow alone (let alone the follow on analysis)
(4) In general, ppl have a hard time pricing political / regulatory risk. Ie. I'd approach it as a 20% chance of a 30% decrease in future cash flows = 6% discount to current price. Unable to calculate the risk, ppl bifurcate it as 0% or 100%. The latter sold their shares
1/ $DASH about to IPO for around $30B. On top of the profitability question, there's another one about the durability of that profitability (moats). Having launched 2 and 3 sided mktplces for Eats, I can tell you the latter was exponentially harder to build *and* manage.
2/ In food delivery, a 2 sided mktplace is a traditional aggregator. A sales team adds restos to the platform and marketing acquires users. Restos complete their own delivery, so the aggregator gets to skip all the messy parts and friction in the physical world.
3/ 2 sided food delivery different from ride hailing where it's viewed as an incremental earnings. If restos don't get any orders, that's OK because they're running their dine-in biz. This takes pressure off the aggregator, especially as they launch new markets and demand lags.
For a great summary checkout @juliey4’s substack. Instead, below is a thread on risks 👇
1/ Still Building its Moat - right now SEA’s entire strategic focus is on creating their flywheel which Free Fire (FF) is at the heart of. It generates the CF that is reinvested into Shopee and SeaMoney to drive growth and build their moats (free deliveries, R&D, etc.).
2/ Gaming Inconsistency - specific titles tend to ebb and flow as hits eventually lose their appeal to new games. Pre-covid, rev growth was expected to slow to <12%. Can Garena sustain FF’s growth, consistently create new hits, and renew it’s exclusive Tencent contract in 2023?