1/6
Currently, 49% of addresses eligible to claim $1INCH tokens have done so.

They took 75% of what was originally available on a $1INCH distributor smart contract. This is primarily because many big claimers are liquidity providers, and they needed to create markets. Image
2/6
The chart shows the distribution of the first actions which were taken by the wallet owners with all their 1INCH tokens.

Only 19% are holding tokens or stake them in the @1inchExchange ecosystem.

Almost 25% of wallets sold all their tokens at once after a claim. Image
3/6
29% transferred all their tokens to another address. This is because these are mainly additional user wallets.

The “Others” includes wallets that performed actions with parts of the claimed tokens, such as sending tokens to several addresses or selling them in parts.
4/6
The picture changes as expected if we look at the volumes of tokens split by action:
- 7M was sold immediately without hesitation.
- 15M 1INCH changed from one owner to another.
- 40.5M tokens were sold or changed owners in multiple transactions. Image
5/6 One of the whales (0xa0f7) that claimed 9.7M tokens deserves special attention.

He has already sold 6.7M 1INCH on Binance, and the remaining 3M in the staking contract gives them 80% of the total DAO voting power. Image
6/6 Hopefully, token distribution models that include a fair airdrop will bring not only easy money to users but also a large community interested in the long-term success of the protocols.

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More from @FrankResearcher

23 Nov
1/9
Today I’m starting a new chapter in my life by joining @TheBlock__ family as a Research Analyst. I am very grateful to @lawmaster and all the rest of the team who supported the materials that I published here.
Also from today, I will be using my real name Igor on Twitter.
2/9
All articles on Medium and the most interesting threads that were written as Frank will be listed below with a few comments. Take a few minutes of your time to find out about how Blockstack faked users or what MEV transactions look like. Let’s go.
3/9
The announcement that @blockstack has over 1 million users was just ridiculous, so I wondered if I could find anything on their blockchain.
Apparently, the answer should have been news of the integration of Firechat (fc-). The messenger is now dead.
medium.com/@FrankResearch…
Read 9 tweets
21 Nov
1/11
I really like @FTX_Official and their flexibility, but let’s see how it started. One of their most interesting innovations during their launch were leveraged tokens - tokenized margin positions with daily rebalancing. Image
2/11
It’s worth noting that leveraged tokens were launched by @AlamedaResearch about two months before FTX launched them. They even got their own website: leveragedtokens.com Image
3/11
In fact, the operation mechanism of the tokens, with the exception of tokenization, was transferred from the traditional market - where such an instrument is called a leveraged ETF. Image
Read 11 tweets
17 Nov
1/8
6 hours ago, there was another attack using flash loan, this time @OriginProtocol was affected. This attack is similar to Akropolis hack, because the problem is in re-entrancy and use of a fake token. All of this was needed to manipulate rebasing. Let’s see how it happened:
2/8
1. Flash loan 70k ETH from dYdX
2. Swap 17.5k ETH for 7.86 mln USDT on Uniswap
3. Swap 52.5k ETH for 20.99 mln DAI on Uniswap
4. Allow to rebase the attack contract
5. Mint 7.5 mln OUSD with 7.5 mln USDT
3/8
6. Call MintMultiple() function with:
6.1 mint 20.5 mln OUSD with 20.5 mln DAI
6.2 mint 2k OUSD with 2k USDT with rebasing through re-entrancy because the second asset is a fake token
7. Swap 300k OUSD to 158.5k USDT on Uniswap
8. Swap 1 mln OUSD to 520.7k USDT on Sushiswap
Read 8 tweets
30 Sep
1/11 Okay, MEV is coming
MEV is a consequence of the fact that miners (pool operators) have the right to choose the tx order in a block.
They can be the first to:
- execute arbitrage
- get access to token offerings
- perform liquidation
Plus, they may not pay a fee for this.
2/11 As far as I know before, this was mainly used only for free distribution of rewards to miners. In this case, at the beginning of the transaction block, transactions are made to the pool miners, and only then all transactions, in order of decreasing gas price.
3/11 However, the DeFi boom led to the fact that more often, txs with not the highest gas price began to be the first in blocks. In some Spark Pool blocks, the first places in the block were occupied by txs from some address, although the price for gas in them was ~1 gwei.
Read 11 tweets
29 Sep
$ENM hacker used Tornado to fund his address a week ago. Right after that, he claimed $UNI tokens for one of arbitrage contracts and withdrew them to himself in another tx by simulating arb. In theory, this claim could be a hack, which is why a mixer might have been used.
But it was necessary to guess without source code that arb function would help to withdraw $UNI and then use it in a certain way. Because of this, I’m more confident that it was the creator of the arb contract himself - 0x2d033fe
My hypothesis based on on-chain data:

0x223034e = $ENM hacker
0x762bfbd = the contract from which the hacker withdrawn $UNI
0x2d033fe = address of creator of 0x762bfbd
0x2f14f72 = address which funded creator (very likely one owner)
Read 4 tweets
29 Jun
Two random facts about the hack of @BalancerLabs pools:
- the hacker made five 0.1 ETH withdrawals from Tornado, in the first of them relayer was used and the rest using his own address. Consequently, the hacker had experience with Tornado and he made at least 5 deposits there. ImageImage
Currently, there are 1312 unique addresses that deposited 0.1 ETH into Tornado. Of these, 112 made at least 5 deposits. In addition, the number of addresses can be reduced by using heuristics from this paper: arxiv.org/pdf/2005.14051…
It will be cool if someone takes a look at it.
- the contract that withdrew the money from the STA pool couldn't withdraw it from the STONK pool due to an "Out of gas" error. However, after 40 minutes, the hacker rewrote the code and drained funds from the second pool using a new contract. ImageImage
Read 4 tweets

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