The cost-benefit on "shutting things with a vaccine literally being rolled out" is not the same as the cost-benefit on "shutting things with no idea when a vaccine will come, if ever." Can we please stop pretending the policy debate now is the same as then?
In the early stages of COVID, there was a reasonable arg to make that cases averted at very high cost were just cases delayed. The benefits of delay were therefore uncertain, reflecting our uncertainty about how treatments would evolve. That is no longer true.
For every infection in a high risk group which we avert in the next month or so, there is a high probability that said infection is then averted *forever* because the high risk indiv gets vaccinated. Therefore, restrictions have both a clear & obvious benefit and end point.
This is a strong argument for basically doing everything possible to bring down infection spread *now* because it doesn't mean shifting things to a few months down the road, it means preventing death and illness for good.
This should be so obvious it need not be said. Yet much of the government rhetoric, and the media's discussion of it, seems to proceed from the assumption that this is just the latest round of the same "virus prevention vs economic costs" debate we've been having since last March
It isn't. Sometime this year we are moving on from that debate. Everything we do *now* should be focussed on preventing avoidable deaths and suffering for the time it takes to get the vaccine shots into sufficient arms. There is no "but what about the LT costs?" counter. At all.
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One lesson, at least for British politics, of the cursed year we are about to wave goodbye to is that the political agenda can shift very rapidly in response to unexpected events. We have spent a year discussing things we didn't even have words for on NYE 2019.
COVID-19, social distancing, R numbers, tiers, furloughs, a whole lexicon spawned by a virus whose existence we were barely aware of a year ago. 2021 begins with a different puzzle: what happens when an issue which has dominated the agenda suddenly disappears?
While nothing is ever certain, the vaccine rollout and the completion of the UK-EU trade deal make it highly *likely* that the second half of 2021 will be the first extended period of time since perhaps 2014 (if not earlier) where politics is not dominated by Brexit or COVID.
If you see people citing the "one dose of the Pfizer vaccine is only 52% effective" claim, refer to this thread. The claim, like so many panicky claims this year, is based on poor understanding/ contextualisation of the statistical analysis it is plucked from.
A more accurate figure for efficacy, from the same trials, and based on examining only the period after a full immune response has developed, is 86%.
As high profile journalists have also, once again, been citing this statistic without doing the 10 minutes or so of reading needed to understand what is wrong with it, I will reiterate my plea for compulsory statistics training for journalists.
Kaufmann seems either not to know or not to care that throughout most of history, and in most of the world today, the thing academics fought for freedom *from* was government interference in their lives and thinking of exactly this kind.
Universities in autocracies commonly are obliged to recruit people based on their political beliefs, for example. This is not generally thought of by those involved as "protecting academic freedom" (though no doubt imaginative apparatchiks try to sell it as such)
This is an issue we discuss a lot in Brexitland with regards the British context too. One difficult feature of identity conflicts is that they are battles over values and social norms - and people find it hard to compromise with/engage those they perceive as norm violators.
This is perfectly understandable - values and (for example) anti-racism norms are central to many people's political identities and priorities. But it poses significant electoral probs if a party needs support from voters who do not share such norms in same form in order to win
In Britain, as in the US, "political correctness gone mad" is very much the battle cry on both sides of this argument. Used by identity conservatives to articulate what alienates them. Used dismissively, by identity liberals to denigrate what they regard as an imagined complaint
Kind of inevitable Farage would return. Be interesting to see whether he is once again able to mobilise distrust and discontent when his two winning issues - immigration and Europe - are no longer at the top of the agenda.
The problem for Farage is that opposing lockdown is a libertarian stance, while the kind of voters he ha traditionally appealed to are older authoritarian types who are generally very keen on lockdowns.
As for government reform that’s not an issue to send anyone to the barricades unless it can be married to populist or nationalist resentments. Still, the Scottish elections next year may soon give him a target for such resentments in England
*Sigh*. Disappointing to see that Guardian, like many media orgs, continues to focus exclusively on the "numbers game" Q, which is a poor way to measure imm attitudes. 1/2
2/2 In the article, authors acknowledge "people had generally moved away from the belief that the costs of immigration outweigh the benefits". That is a *better* measure of views to imm, but is dismissed because it doesn't fit alarmist framing of authors
We observe in survey data repeatedly that people default to saying they want "a little less" immigration *regardless* of immigration levels. It is just a default response pattern. It is informative in that it highlights that many ppl default to seeing imm as a negative thing