I would say that all philosophy is, or should be, "profoundly social" if I am to remain committed to my Deweyan and East-Asian philosophical roots. (1/n)
The problem here is that philosophers generally choose not to return the results of their inquiry to the experiences of the cultures that spawned them. Philosophy is disconnected from the vital activity of culture. Dewey warned about this in philosophy specifically. (2/n)
Because folks like Leiter and Stock and their ilk do not believe in the organic connection of philosophy to the broader activity of culture, we get inane nonsense that argues for the disconnection of the effects of a given philosophical argument from the world around it. (3/n)
Now, what I would amend in your statement is that this is not solely a problem of the discussion at hand, but of the way that we're trained to do philosophy broadly: we are taught that the concerns of the world are not relevant to our research. (4/n)
To this point, I recall a question from an instructor during one of my talks in graduate school about public philosophy wherein he asked "why should I bother to do work aimed at cultural issues? what does it matter what I think," which characterizes this disconnect. (5/n)
In case, Leiter and Stock make the argument that transphobic research should be permitted BECAUSE it is not connected to the social, which parallels the arguments made by "free speech" and "academic freedom" defenders who forget the responsibility of philosophy to culture. (6/n)
Thus, people can be "just asking questions" in order to evade the responsibility for the fallout of the answers they develop on those whose existence is the subject of the question. We see this crop up in all kinds of ways, especially in things like ethics (8/n)
Which is how we get Peter Singer and the other folks who are "just asking questions" about the rights of disabled folks to live and go on living. Again, because they don't view their work is connected to the social, they view themselves as permitted to "ask questions." (9/n)
Now, this is a critique I've made of the discipline before, and it is one that William James and John Dewey have both made of philosophy, and you can find it in Dogen, Kongzi, Mengzi, and Norinaga, all of whom say that philosophy must grapple with the social to be "good." (10/n)
But this is also a critique which is interestingly ironic because these folks have explicitly social aims for the resolution of their problem. So there's this hypocrisy there that they claim to be disconnected from the social but desire to effect social change. (11/n)
Thus, they seek to take responsibility for only those social changes that support their ideological commitment. Stock rejects responsibility for transphobia in the field or violence against trans people, yet they are committed to social change in line with transphobia. (12/n)
All of this is to say that you're not wrong about your point, but that the problem you're pointing out is much broader than the social nature of the conversation of gender: it is rooted in how philosophy takes up social questions without care for social consequences. (13/n)
Which, ironically, is one of the pitfalls Dewey pointed out about science: that, in its rush to address questions, it never considered the social implications and consequences of the answers in the form of scientific progress when it is integrated in society. (14/n)
In this, philosophers are just as irresponsible: not only do we not consider the consequences of our work, most of us are trained to view these consequences as irrelevant or not worthy of consideration when we do the work, which is wrapped up in academic freedom. (15/n)
That is, many philosophers take academic freedom to mean "freedom from considering the consequences of our work," which is a dangerous position for an entire field to take, much less defend when those consequences are intensified bigotry. (16/n)
So, you're absolutely right and this is not just a Stock or Leiter or conversation about transphobia problem, this is a philosophy problem.
Philosophers are massively irresponsible with the tools they've been given. So, as I've said before: replace scientists with philosophers.
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I say this with all the epistemic authority I can muster: fuck you.
Now, before I am inundated by folks rushing to this grifter’s defense, I am compelled to note that Lindsay and his grievance grifters helped usher in a climate of mistrust in the very fields that could have helped us navigate this white supremacist, anti-LGBTQ shitstorm. (1/n)
Their work provided the intellectual ground for the anti-CRT executive order signed by the very man this asshole is pandering to. The same man who invited an insurrection in our nation’s capitol which cost lives and very nearly upended our democratic theater. (2/n)
White Americans saying "this is not who we are" isn't just the projection of an self disconnected from the past with which it is continuous, it is the projection of an imagined present disconnected from the past for the sake of a future that doesn't reckon with the past. (1/n)
Put more plainly, the America of today is a consummation of the history of America that preceded it. To say that "this is not who we are" is to say that the "we" being referred to is not the outcome of a history that itself is structured by white supremacist violence. (2/n)
And it is to do so for the sake of maintaining the comfortable fiction that White Americans are not responsible for how they take up the past that results in our racist present, for the sake of a "non-racist" future. But a future that rejects the past is no future at all. (3/n)
But seriously, if you're going to draw upon Lincoln as inspiration, you should recognize that the man was committed to the prosecution of the Civil War to ensure the preservation of the union, and the men he employed were willing to do whatever it took to achieve that end. (1/n)
Which is to say that many of the men employed by Lincoln were absolutely reprehensible in their personal views, even as they were unwavering in their commitment to the country. These men saw as their duty the swift prosecution of the Civil War, regardless of cost. (2/n)
That is, Lincoln, and the men he employed, are not to be emulated as unifiers, EXCEPT with reference to the sheer ruthlessness with which they sought the restoration of the union through any means at their disposal, up to and including the utter destruction of the south. (3/n)
In an academic contexts, I'd say it's when people frame the labor in ways that dehumanize the subject, either through elevation of the sex worker to a paragon of sexual liberation or in the more traditional negative mode. (1/n)
In both modes, the agency of the sex worker is stripped away. You can dehumanize someone by putting them on a pedestal, as a paragon of sexual liberation disconnected from their context, without understanding the material conditions that lead to the labor they're doing. (2/n)
So, one can support sex workers as paragons of sexual liberation because of some assumed reclamation of "sexual agency" regarding how they use their bodies, without understanding the context in which the appearance of "sexual agency" through sex work comes about. (3/n)
This is not going to be the case, and it has everything to do with the way that the organization of academia makes some things, some options, as "viable," or "in reach" while others are not. Until COVID, these accommodations were one such "unreachable" object. (1/n)
Even in the above tweet, which I agree with, the organization of academia as a space is made clear through the language we use: academia must be made "accessible," disabled folks must be "accommodated" by a space that was not organized with us in mind. (2/n)
In this sense, "access" and "accommodation" have the same affective force as "imposition:" disabled folks impose themselves, and their desires, upon an institution whose workings were just fine BEFORE our crip selves started to complain about not being able to conference. (3/n)