2/Some people say that we're already heading into the danger zone with respect to debt.
My instinct is that these people are completely wrong, and we're not in danger. But I can't *prove* them wrong, because we don't actually know how much is too much.
3/How can we think about what the government's borrowing constraint really is?
Well, it helps to do a thought experiment. Let's imagine if the government kept borrowing exponentially more. $100 trillion. $100 quadrillion. Etc.
What would happen?
4/Well, here are the three groups of people who lend money to the U.S. government.
If foreigners and private U.S. companies/citizens stop buying U.S. government bonds, we'd need to have the Fed step in.
5/If the Fed steps in and starts lending money to the Treasury to spend, it's basically the same thing as if the Treasury just decided to create and spend money without "borrowing" it at all.
6/But what happens then?
At some point, presumably, you get hyperinflation.
But here's the catch: No one has any idea where that "some point" is!!
7/Remember when a bunch of people thought Quantitative Easing would lead to inflation during the Great Recession?
8/In this excellent blog post about debt sustainability, @dandolfa tells the hard truth: We just don't know how much borrowing it would take to cause hyperinflation.
11/So you'd think macroeconomists would be scrambling to study this, right? After all, hyperinflation is one of the worst economic catastrophes that can happen.
And yet...they almost completely ignore the topic.
12/There was one famous paper about hyperinflation in 1982, by Thomas Sargent. Unfortunately, it focuses on the end of inflation rather than the beginning, it doesn't have much data, and all its examples are from post-WW1 Europe.
13/Sargent does add one interesting idea, which is the theory that policy "regime changes" -- not just new policies, but widespread perceptions that the WAY policy is being made has changed -- could trigger hyperinflation.
But he can't test this theory.
14/More recent papers about hyperinflation tend to be very theory-heavy and not really useful, since the theories are generally impossible to test, and don't make firm predictions anyway.
16/Most of the common characteristics of hyperinflation that the author finds are characteristics of resource-dependent emerging markets. That's not super helpful for the U.S. case...
17/BUT, he does find one important helpful useful empirical regularity.
When hyperinflation starts, it tends not to start all at once! There are a few years when inflation is high but not "hyper".
18/In other words, we'll probably get SOME warning before complete disaster strikes. If we start to see inflation rise significantly, we should pull back. I'm not talking like 4% inflation, but more like 15% or higher.
19/Anyway, this is one of the most important topics in macroeconomics, so economists need to be studying it a lot more.
Don't just fight the last war! Don't wait for disaster to strike before you admit the possibility of disaster, like you did with the financial crisis!
20/But as for the rest of us, we're just going to have to learn to live with radical uncertainty.
21/I can't tell you how much the government can safely borrow -- no one can.
But we're not there yet.
And if we start to get there, inflation will probably give us a heads-up.
I respect disagree with this thread. The idea that hyperinflation results from a regime change is an unproven hypothesis. It's something we should be studying, yes, but for now it's just a guess.
In particular, if we stop worrying about austerity like we used to, and then at some point we DO experience hyperinflation, the Tom Sargents of the future will look back and call our attitude shift a "regime change". And who will be able to disprove them?
Biden's vaccine target should be 200 million in 100 days, not 100 million in 100 days.
I guess with only 235 million adults in the U.S. and a large fraction hesitant about taking the vaccine, 200 million probably isn't possible. But 100 million seems like a lowball.
Also, vaccine production is running at about 2 million doses a day (enough to vaccinate 1 million people), so 100 million in 100 days is probably close to the limit of production capacity unless we approve the Johnson & Johnson vaccine.
2/Left-NIMBYs have developed a canon of interlocking, mutually reinforcing beliefs about housing and urbanism.
These beliefs are mostly false, but they form a powerful "canon" that quickly ossifies into a hardened worldview.
It looks something like this:
3/Fortunately, Nathan J. Robinson of Current Affairs has written an article that perfectly encapsulates the Left-NIMBY worldview (and quotes me in it!).
1/Today in @bopinion, I talk about the legacy and career of Jim Simons, the founder of Renaissance Technologies, who is stepping down as the hedge fund's chairman.