Thread by @CollinSLKoh

@fravel Thank you Professor Taylor. Under Ch3, clause 20, the CCG is authorized to order foreign organizations or individuals to cease such unlawful activities or to dismantle/remove the structures, floating or fixed, within waters and on islands and reefs under national jurisdiction...

@fravel And the subsequent mention is that if the foreign organizations or individuals fail to heed those orders, CCG is authorized to stop those activities (i.e. construction of those structures) or forcibly dismantle/remove them...

@fravel This clause gives "stability-inducing cover" to CCG, because it first mandates CCG to order the other party to desist from constructing/emplacing those structures, and failing which, escalate the action to stop such activities or forcibly dismantling/removing those structures...

@fravel So in a way, it's aimed at warning other parties in those maritime disputes involving Beijing that they would be given the opportunity to cave in to CCG demands, and thereby the onus falls upon them to take "remedial actions", and failing which CCG is free to respond in force...

@fravel This "stability-inducing clause" seeking to give moral justification for CCG won't cut ice, in my view, since it basically constitutes a threat aimed at deterring other claimants from undertaking legitimate construction and navigational aid works within their EEZs..

@fravel It doesn't actually signify any new policy in my opinion. Before CGL is promulgated, Beijing has been undertaking actions aimed at stopping such activities, e.g. intimidating Manila as it constructs a beaching ramp on Thitu Island) and Vietnam in Vanguard Bank (Hakuryu-5 rig)...

@fravel So CGL is supposed to give legitimate cover for the continuation of such activities, with the added clause of course that it now empoweres CGL to undertake forceful actions to stop those activities. This latter added authorization is therefore destabilizing...

@fravel The only question is what are those forceful actions that can be undertaken. As mentioned earlier, Beijing has already been using such coercive methods as show of force for its coastguard and maritime militia around rival occupied features (Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal)...

@fravel And floating structures (Hakuryu-5) in a bid to compel those rival claimants to cease or desist from their activities. CGL doesn't specify what exactly those forceful actions can be, so it can be widely interpreted to therefore mean use of all means to stop the activities or...

@fravel To dismantle/remove these structures, which would definitely be destabilizing if the other party chooses to resist CCG actions. It may well depend on the actual situation on the ground, though it'll be interesting to know what operational directives could be issued to...

@fravel The CCG units out there in the disputed areas, and how those operational directives are translated from the CGL, and of course, the C2 relationships involved - between CCG units and HQ, and between the ship CO and the political commissars on the vessels. END