Thread by @CollinSLKoh

Generally I find RAND research outputs really insightful and useful. But sorry to say that this report is afflicted by certain stereotypes, and some wishful thinking about areas for future cooperation. rand.org/pubs/research_…

THREAD 1/: As of this writing, Singapore’s economic performance is sluggish, and national elections in 2020 marked a
transition to a new generation of leaders. Given these considerations, Singapore is undertaking
an effort to boost its ties with Beijing (p.12)

2/: Since the upheavals in 2016, SG has already undertaken efforts to mend ties with Beijing, and recent moves represent a continuation, not a "boost" as asserted by the authors. It also implied the new-gen leadership is inclined towards policy shift. This is incorrect.

3/: "China pushes the idea that Chinese culture must be tied to the PRC politically, and several interviewees indicated that there are an increasing number of people in Singapore who buy the Chinese narrative." I do question how these interviewees can determine the increase.

4/: Put aside the sample size of how many interviewees the authors consulted in the course of their research, the next question is whether such views offered by the said interviewees is based on hard data, anecdotes, personal experience or "gut feel" are reliable at all.

5/: In any case, I'll refrain from making direct conclusions simply based on the data available. Otherwise, it does give a misleading impression of the state of SG society, especially the ethnic Chinese, and its perspectives towards this cultural aspect of broader ties with PRC.

6/: "One interviewee noted that Singapore exercises a “passive-aggressive” approach to PRC influence efforts, conveying messages back to Beijing that make it seem like
Singaporeans are not worried about Chinese activities, while they are in fact a source of growing concern." p.22

7:/ PM Lee's speech in Sep 2017 counts as "passive-aggressive" approach? I don't think so. It's as explicit in its language and tone as it can get. And coincidentally, this speech was made not long after the Huang Jing incident. pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/pm-le…

8/: "The fact that the U.S. ambassador post in Singapore has been vacant since January 2017... such diplomatic disconnects might hamper broader efforts by the United States to keep track of and, if necessary, counter Chinese influence operations in Southeast Asia." p.31

9/: This observation just doesn't sound right to me. SG is playing an out-sized role in US counter-PRC influence ops in SE Asia? I'm puzzled.

10/: "This balancing act has worked reasonably well for Singapore so far, but it could become increasingly difficult to maintain if U.S.-China competition continues to heat
up over the next five to ten years." p. 33. Seems to discount the durability of agency exercised by SG.

11/: "Other domestic political factors could come into play as well... Singapore is undergoing a transition to a new generation of leaders, a significant historical development that could influence Singapore’s ability to insulate its foreign policy from domestic politics..."

12/: "...The potential for a somewhat greater amount of domestic political contestation in Singapore, compared with previous periods during which the ruling People’s Action Party has dominated politics..."

13/: "... could complicate Singapore’s efforts to maintain continuity in areas such as external relationships and defense policy." (p. 35). Well, this assumes too much change and less continuity across demographic changes in SG.

14/: There's less public debate on defense spending and external relationships than on issues that are closer to the hearts and minds of individuals, such as national service. Generally, older and younger generations of SGeans support consistent and continued defense investments.

15/: And this observation in the report left it unexplained how this generational shift will influence government policies towards US and PRC. Perhaps the authors could take a little more time to speak to more SGeans, especially the younger ones, to probe deeper.

16/: "Deliberately seek opportunities to work with Singapore to counter Chinese political interference and influence operations." I'm not too sanguine whether this is going to even fly. Honestly. But it sounds like a non-starter.

17/: "Work privately with Singapore to counter China’s narrative regarding behavior in the SCS and elsewhere... Other efforts should involve shining light on areas in which the Chinese are seeking opportunities to interfere with political and academic choices and freedoms..."

18/: "...and considering concrete actions to mitigate regional problems created by some BRI projects." I wonder the authors know how deeply embedded SG interests are in BRI, both at govt and private levels. In any case, we're already cooperating in this. straitstimes.com/singapore/spor…

19/: In conclusion, I'll have expected a much better report from RAND on SG and how it posits itself in the PRC-US rivalry, in terms of certain observations made and the policy recommendations which can be more realistic and doable. END