1/4

As Beijing tries to limit the money entering real estate and wealth-management products, both of which have assumed bubble-like proportions in the past several years, it seems that money is now pouring into mutual funds, which were up 48% in 2020.

ft.com/content/e9a7f4…
2/4

Such is the frenzy for new funds that 20-30% of the cash raised by new equity funds is redeemed within six months. Investors seem to be churning new fund launches the way they churn IPOs, buying new funds for an expected pop in value and then quickly flipping them.
3/4

This isn't an especially new problem in China, but it does reinforce the lesson – one we've seen many times before in many other economies – that you can't really control bubble-like behavior by clamping down on the symptoms of any particular bubble. If the underlying...
4/4

structural liquidity conditions haven't changed, clamping down on one asset will only shift speculative excesses to another. For those old enough to remember the Japanese financial markets of the 1980s, a lot of this will seem pretty familiar.
By the way here is yet another article about further attempts by regulators to try to slow real estate speculation, this time by punishing banks that look the other way as property investors use personal and business loans to speculate on real estate.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Michael Pettis

Michael Pettis Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @michaelxpettis

1 Feb
1/4

Interestingly enough, when the Massachusetts Bank Commissioner first went after Charles Ponzi’s scheme in August 1920 (only 8 months after it started), many of his investors blamed their subsequent losses on highly biased meddling by the...

ft.com/content/4916c4…
2/4

authorities, and angrily accused the financial elites of trying to destroy an operation that was bringing the secrets of Wall Street to the masses. Ponzi, they said, was trying to help ordinary people in their struggle with the bankers, and the bankers had decided to...
3/4

go after him only because his financial operations had been so successful .

One way to be a successful con man, it seems, is to tap into the legitimate resentment of the aggrieved and convince them (and perhaps yourself) that you are their champion. By the way at least...
Read 4 tweets
29 Jan
1/5

Economically troubled Liaoning province is merging 12 banks into one “first-class urban commercial bank” that has a “clear shareholding structure, abundant capital adequacy, tight internal risk control and fine governance.”

caixinglobal.com/2021-01-29/lia…
2/5

While the provincial government hasn't given any information about which banks will be merged, what their new structure will entail, and how they will be capitalized, there is an important lesson here about the positive feedback between GDP growth and bank expansion.
3/5

When the economy is growing rapidly, banks learn to expand credit too generously and encourage borrowers to take on balance-sheet risk, both of which further encourage growth. The problem is that once the economy begins to slow, this highly pro-cyclical process goes..
Read 5 tweets
29 Jan
1/4

I don’t think population density fully explains the difference, Houze. The EU’s population density is not much below that of China (it is nearly 80% of China’s), but while China has 2.4 times the geographical size and 3.1 times the population of the EU, it has 4.2 times...
2/4

as many miles of HSR as the EU.

Japan’s population density, on the other hand, far exceeds that of China (it is 230% of China’s), and while China is 25 times the size and has 11 times the population, it has more than 12 times as many miles of HSR as Japan.
3/4

Even this means comparing apples to oranges. EU workers are roughly 3.5 times as productive on paper as Chinese workers, and the Japanese 4 times as productive, and the real difference is greater if you believe, as I do, that GDP in China tends to overstate real...
Read 4 tweets
28 Jan
1/5

I disagree strongly with the methodology used, Damien. For one, it is based on passenger projections that depend on China’s remaining within the positive part of a highly pro-cyclical process for another 30 years. It also assumes significant passenger diversion from...
2/5

conventional rail, air travel and highways and includes the benefits of this diversion while ignoring the infrastructure cost of building these alternatives. When you have no alternatives, a piece of infrastructure is much more valuable than when you have plenty of...
3/6

alternatives on which you have spent heavily.

The biggest problem is that it is almost impossible correctly to calculate the total economic value of a substantial infrastructure buildout – most of the costs and benefits are indirect – so usually the best you can do is...
Read 6 tweets
27 Jan
1/8

For the past 2-3 years regulators have encouraged Chinese banks to issue perpetual bonds as a way of recapitalizing. The newest twist involves perpetual bonds with an equity-conversion feature, with two Zhejiang banks selected for pioneering issues.

caixinglobal.com/2021-01-26/chi…
2/8

The problem is that most of these bonds, as I was told by two former students working in the industry, are bought by other banks, and what is worse, usually by similarly-sized banks in similar markets. In this case, for example, my understanding is that most of...
3/8

the bonds were purchased by other small Zhejiang banks. Similarly, the big national banks are the main buyers of each other's perpetual bonds, regional banks are the main buyers of perps issued by other regional banks, and so on.
Read 8 tweets
27 Jan
1/5

Caixin says that regulators may soon forbid Chinese provinces with excessive amounts of hidden LGFV debt from borrowing for any other reason than to service existing debt (although much of their borrowing is done for precisely that reason).

caixinglobal.com/2021-01-27/chi…
2/5

While this will probably be manageable in 2021, once we get through the initial economic surge driven by the partial reversal of last year's collapse in consumption, a constraint on the ability of provinces to leverage up will run up against any possibility of the...
3/5

country's annual GDP growth rate exceeding 2-3%. Provinces can only generate much higher growth rates by borrowing huge amounts and aggressively funding investment projects, most of which do not generate enough productive capacity to service the debt.
Read 5 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!