Interestingly enough, when the Massachusetts Bank Commissioner first went after Charles Ponzi’s scheme in August 1920 (only 8 months after it started), many of his investors blamed their subsequent losses on highly biased meddling by the...
authorities, and angrily accused the financial elites of trying to destroy an operation that was bringing the secrets of Wall Street to the masses. Ponzi, they said, was trying to help ordinary people in their struggle with the bankers, and the bankers had decided to...
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go after him only because his financial operations had been so successful .
One way to be a successful con man, it seems, is to tap into the legitimate resentment of the aggrieved and convince them (and perhaps yourself) that you are their champion. By the way at least...
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six banks in Boston, including one he ended up controlling, went under once Ponzi’s scheme unraveled. He was able to do an enormous amount of damage in only eight months of operation.
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As Beijing tries to limit the money entering real estate and wealth-management products, both of which have assumed bubble-like proportions in the past several years, it seems that money is now pouring into mutual funds, which were up 48% in 2020.
Such is the frenzy for new funds that 20-30% of the cash raised by new equity funds is redeemed within six months. Investors seem to be churning new fund launches the way they churn IPOs, buying new funds for an expected pop in value and then quickly flipping them.
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This isn't an especially new problem in China, but it does reinforce the lesson – one we've seen many times before in many other economies – that you can't really control bubble-like behavior by clamping down on the symptoms of any particular bubble. If the underlying...
Economically troubled Liaoning province is merging 12 banks into one “first-class urban commercial bank” that has a “clear shareholding structure, abundant capital adequacy, tight internal risk control and fine governance.”
While the provincial government hasn't given any information about which banks will be merged, what their new structure will entail, and how they will be capitalized, there is an important lesson here about the positive feedback between GDP growth and bank expansion.
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When the economy is growing rapidly, banks learn to expand credit too generously and encourage borrowers to take on balance-sheet risk, both of which further encourage growth. The problem is that once the economy begins to slow, this highly pro-cyclical process goes..
I don’t think population density fully explains the difference, Houze. The EU’s population density is not much below that of China (it is nearly 80% of China’s), but while China has 2.4 times the geographical size and 3.1 times the population of the EU, it has 4.2 times...
Japan’s population density, on the other hand, far exceeds that of China (it is 230% of China’s), and while China is 25 times the size and has 11 times the population, it has more than 12 times as many miles of HSR as Japan.
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Even this means comparing apples to oranges. EU workers are roughly 3.5 times as productive on paper as Chinese workers, and the Japanese 4 times as productive, and the real difference is greater if you believe, as I do, that GDP in China tends to overstate real...
I disagree strongly with the methodology used, Damien. For one, it is based on passenger projections that depend on China’s remaining within the positive part of a highly pro-cyclical process for another 30 years. It also assumes significant passenger diversion from...
conventional rail, air travel and highways and includes the benefits of this diversion while ignoring the infrastructure cost of building these alternatives. When you have no alternatives, a piece of infrastructure is much more valuable than when you have plenty of...
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alternatives on which you have spent heavily.
The biggest problem is that it is almost impossible correctly to calculate the total economic value of a substantial infrastructure buildout – most of the costs and benefits are indirect – so usually the best you can do is...
For the past 2-3 years regulators have encouraged Chinese banks to issue perpetual bonds as a way of recapitalizing. The newest twist involves perpetual bonds with an equity-conversion feature, with two Zhejiang banks selected for pioneering issues.
The problem is that most of these bonds, as I was told by two former students working in the industry, are bought by other banks, and what is worse, usually by similarly-sized banks in similar markets. In this case, for example, my understanding is that most of...
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the bonds were purchased by other small Zhejiang banks. Similarly, the big national banks are the main buyers of each other's perpetual bonds, regional banks are the main buyers of perps issued by other regional banks, and so on.
Caixin says that regulators may soon forbid Chinese provinces with excessive amounts of hidden LGFV debt from borrowing for any other reason than to service existing debt (although much of their borrowing is done for precisely that reason).
While this will probably be manageable in 2021, once we get through the initial economic surge driven by the partial reversal of last year's collapse in consumption, a constraint on the ability of provinces to leverage up will run up against any possibility of the...
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country's annual GDP growth rate exceeding 2-3%. Provinces can only generate much higher growth rates by borrowing huge amounts and aggressively funding investment projects, most of which do not generate enough productive capacity to service the debt.