Host @mwlippert welcomes our guests to the nineteenth #CapitalCable, and begins by asking @motokorich to walk us through what's happening in Tokyo––what are some of the big key drivers in Japanese policymaking these days?
The question is whether the new Japanese PM @sugawitter will have a similar close friendship as PM Abe had with @POTUS45 with President @JoeBiden, of course Biden having been President Obama's vice president is not an unfamiliar face here in Tokyo, @motokorich remarks.
On COVID: there's a lot going on in Japan at the moment under a state of emergency; the coronavirus situation in Japan has never spun out of control the way it has in the US or Europe, but it has gotten a lot worse we are experiencing our third wave here, @motokorich says.
There have been a striking increase in deaths and people on ventilators, with some people saying that there aren't enough hospital beds. This affects the trajectory of the postponed Olympics schedule, @motokorich states.
.@mwlippert turns next to @AlastairGale to pick up the discussion with a perspective from Seoul.
In terms of what's happening in Seoul, in contrast to new leaders in Japan and in the US, next year is going to be President @moonriver365's last year in power so you know he's trying to look for an achievement and legacy to show for his five years in power, @AlastairGale says.
On President @moonriver365's COVID response: @AlastairGale thinks the pressure is on him right now. In the early stages, SK was a model for the rest of the world, but we've seen a resurgence in the virus and Seoul is trying enforce stricter measures to try and limit the spread.
.@AlastairGale also highlights the importance of the Japan-ROK relationship and hw the current relationship is on the rocks. President @moonriver365 has expressed desire for better relations, but recent developments have not gone so well.
Next speaker, @VictorDCha, thinks the EA region is relieved that four years of @POTSU45 are over, and that the United States is going to start speaking a language that they understand again.
But there are there still huge cleavages and @VictorDCha thinks one of the big cleavages is that the United States can stay focused on Asia when there's so much going on at home.
Second, a big piece that cuts across all of this will be what role climate change will play in US foreign policy as a priority and to what extent it's going to actually color not just climate decisions but economic decisions, and even national security decisions.
And a third piece related to that is rejuvenating alliances, and how countries can come together for supply chain resilience, clean 5G networks or protecting countries against predatory Chinese economic punishment or retaliation, @VictorDCha.
.@SueMiTerry wonders how draconian COVID measures are affecting North Korea's foreign policy and their decision making being the first country to close the border with China suspending all flight services including severe restrictions law domestic movement.
.@SueMiTerry doesn't think the COVID situation is going to get any better; we know they're wanting to get vaccines. So these circumstances will have a significant impact on Pyongyang's decision-making, but we don't have a definitive answer of "this is something that needs to be."
.@mwlippert asks @DavidNakamura how Washington is prioritizing aforementioned policies regarding China, alliance rejuvenations, climate change agenda, etc. What are some of the first moves that are likely in the region?
.@DavidNakamura says it's complicated. @POTUS45 took a lot of actions, especially on his final year, on China, but I think that the first big question is on 5G and trade. Trump was more willing to take risks in policy, I don't know that the Biden team is going to do that.
.@DavidNakamura also wonders just how much Seoul and Tokyo would look to Washington to help fix their own bilateral issues. President Obama gave that issue a little bit of attention, and so it would be interesting to see how the @POTUS administration would tackle this.
.@motokorich comments of Tokyo-Seoul relations: with the recent decision by the Seoul High Court demanding that Japan pay the last remaining comfort women creating a lot of anger in Japan, Japan-ROK relations have plummeted once again with no foreseeable truce in the near future
There is some nostalgia for the Obama administration in that there was some initiative from Washington to try to broker some kind of peace between the two, @motokorich remarks.
@AlastairGale on SK's Chin policy: I think South Korea tries and balance its security priorities with their relationship with China, which can be a difficult thing to do.
@VictorDCha says he would like to see Korea join the Quad, but is not sure that would happen under the @moonriver365 govt, just because China is so important to their North Korean policy.
Korea's preference is always to hedge on these sorts of things. But when it comes to being caught between the United States and China, then they've got to choose sides, @VictorDCha remarks.
Question posed to @SueMiTerry: Thoughts on North Korean receptivity to talking with Japan on the abduction issue? Receptivity to the upcoming Olympics?
Based on political trends North Koreans seems not to show any interest in talking to the Japanese govt. about the abduction issue, @SueMiTerry says.
In terms of the Olympics, @SueMiTerry can see North Koreans wanting to go to the Games in theory, but predicts paranoia about COVID to hamper such desires.
Tune in for a fascinating discussion on North Korea's trajectory ahead of the new @POTUS administration, and see thread below for live coverage of the event.⬇️
📚 Read the latest report on the “Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base” @CSIS (@BeyondCSISKorea/@CSISKoreaChair) By Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha. This is the first public comprehensive description of the Kumchon-ni missile operating base in #NorthKoreabit.ly/2lYZZ40
Located 1,100 kilometers west of Tokyo and 165 kilometers northeast of Seoul, the Kumchon-ni undeclared ballistic missile operating base houses a battalion- or regiment-sized unit equipped with Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM)
This base is one of approximately 20 undeclared ballistic missile operating bases and one that is reported to be tasked with not only strikes against the southern half of Japan, but is also capable of striking all of South Korea