1/ Learning painful lessons vicariously is preferable to touching a hot stove or peeing on the electric fence yourself. Vicarious lessons aren't as vivid as mistakes you make yourself, but they're still valuable. One great learning opportunity was the late 1990s Internet bubble.
2/ When NASDAQ peaked in March 2000 if you didn't see people learning vivid lessons, you weren't paying attention.
1. The only thing you can spend is cash- This seems obvious, but if you need cash fast and take a giant haircut when quickly selling an asset you own, it is vivid.
3/
2. When a correction happens, everything financial is correlated. People run from risk. This causes them to sell what’s most liquid and that, you know, quickly impacts price. What people thought was diversification, isn't, especially in the short run. Cash gets scarce fast.
4/
3. Losing what was once real cash hurts emotionally far more than losing paper wealth.
In 2000 some people owned shares which had zero basis that went from a very high price to zero. Other people paid cash for those shares that went to zero.
Paper wealth is paper wealth.
5/
4. Lenders who offered margin debt or prepaid forwards on shares that have traded radically down won't say: "Take your time in getting that cash to me." Collateral will be sold at what may be the worst possible time. Staying power collapses to zero. You're totally screwed.
6/ Were these lessons part of this recent GME carnival sideshow for some people? In some ways, but at the scale of a pimple on the tail of the Godzilla that happened in 2000.
The GME stock rise and fall was like watching a car wreck in slow motion if you lived through 1997-2001.
7/ An entrepreneur built a company and sold it to Lucent in 1999 in a stock deal. His Lucent stock then fell in price, but he didn't sell because he would incur a loss from the high water mark he booked in his mind. This is loss-aversion at work. He rode Lucent all the way down.
8/ A hedge fund manager raised $250 million for a short fund in 1997. His shorts took the fund to zero and the limited partners had zero return of capital by mid 1999. Not just no return on capital, but zero of capital too.
Being too early is indistinguishable from being wrong.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
"Can you recall when a promoter bought a stock that was more than 100% shorted and was able to convince many people who didn’t know exactly what to do that if the promoter was buying that stock then it was a good idea for them to buy the stock?"
2/ Not exactly is the answer. Munger was actually using the example of oil company CEOs buying fertilizer manufacturers to illustrate "bias from over-influence by social proof, that is, the conclusions of others, particularly under conditions of natural uncertainty and stress."
3/ Cialdini: "We will use the actions of others to decide on proper behavior for ourselves, especially when we view those others as similar to ourselves. When we are uncertain, we are willing to place an enormous amount of trust in the collective knowledge of the crowd."
"The film is described as exploring how a populist uprising of social media day traders beat Wall Street at their own game, turning the stock market upside down and shaking the financial world to its core." msn.com/en-us/movies/n…
If all else fails, pretend!
The bar for "shaking the financial world to its core" has apparently been lowered! I didn't get that memo.
A bunch of traders staging a modern day Piggly Wiggly "corner" of an over shorted stock didn't shake anything but the heads of actual investors.
"Populist uprising" was a narrative spread by promoters to generate the desired feedback. Journalists assisted.
As with Long-Term Capital Management, cannibalistic hedge funds smelled blood and jumped in to profit from other hedge funds who were left exposed by their shorts.
2/ At the heart of the Writer's Guild's dispute: 1) agents collecting packaging fees; and 2) the ownership by agents of affiliated production companies. The new agreement removes incentives to increase share of the profit pool at the expense of writers. latimes.com/entertainment-…
3/ Here'a an analysis of the profit pool in the auto industry circa 1998.
How has Tesla changed the profit pool? Is any former participant no longer in the value chain in the case of Tesla? hbr.org/1998/05/profit…
"The game of Corner—for in its heyday it was a game, a high-stakes gambling game, pure and simple,
embodying a good many of the characteristics of poker—was one phase of the endless Wall Street
contest between bull and bears."
2/ "The situation would be set up when a group of bears would go on a well-organized spree of short selling, and would often help their cause along by spreading rumors that the company back of the stock in question was on its last legs. This operation was called a bear raid."
3/ "The bulls’ most formidable—but, of course, riskiest—counter-move was to try for a corner. Only a stock that many traders were selling short could be cornered; a stock that was
in the throes of a real bear raid was ideal."
1/ I was going to write about this "Elon does Live Clubhouse (Featuring Vlad)" event last night, but Casey made several key points before I could, so he preempted me in a good way. platformer.news/p/clubhouses-m… "Because you’re on a phone mediocre audio quality doesn’t grate as much."
2/ Casey: "Mainstream tech coverage in recent years has become, in the sharp framing of Ben Thompson, dominated by rational skeptics; A16z spotted a gap in the market, and now seeks to fill it with rational optimism."
This is upsetting to people who sell "sharp spicy takes."
3/ I love a sharp spicy take too, but I like a mixed diet that includes rational optimism. What I love even more as a writer is more people like Casey showing that writers have alternative ways to make a living from their work. That helps even staff journalists get a higher wage.