How come that as we get better tools to be more productive (software, …), in some jobs, productivity didn’t increase too much?
More tasks that don’t add value, of course. But why do we choose to engage with them, rather than being productive?
1/N
2/ To explain this phenomenon, called productivity homeostasis (which roughly translates to “stays the same”), we must first look at a similar phenomenon: risk homeostasis.
3/ The Fence Paradox (see image below) is an example of risk homeostasis: the idea that, when an activity becomes safer, people often react by increasing their risk taking.
4/ One reason is that people participate in activities to grab resources that they can use to mitigate other risks.
Important: the risk they mitigate might be external to the activity at hand.
For example, …
5/ The car ABS made driving safer all things equal, but people reacted with driving faster, keeping the perceived risk constant to grab more of a precious resource, time, they can spend to mitigate other risks, such as getting divorced if not spending enough time at home (say).
6/ If we were subject to only a single risk in our lives, risk homeostasis would make no sense. Just decrease the risk as much as possible!
However, as we are subject to multiple threats, it might be risky not to take some risks of doing so would decrease another risk.
7/ Hence, the rationality of risk homeostasis (in some conditions).
8/ Of course, in the example of the fence over the canyon, risk homeostasis is not rational. But that’s because we don’t perceive correctly the increased risk.
What I mean here is that, even if we perceived risk correctly, risk homeostasis would still be rational.
9/ Back to productivity homeostasis.
If employees were only subject to the risk of not producing enough, then productivity homeostasis would not make sense.
10/ But if we add in political risk, social risk (losing status with colleagues), etc., then it makes sense to fill the time available with communication rather than production.
11/ Of course, there’s a lot of individual variation, people have different motives, etc.
That said, in general,
12/ Most forms of behavioral homeostasis are explained by people working to get *many* resources to mitigate *many* risks
rather than considering each activity single-purpose like it might seem to a superficial observer
Hence,
13/ When an activity becomes more performant across one dimension, people often react by changing the way they perform that activity to spread the advantage across many of the risks they are subject to.
This is the rationale of work filling the time available, etc.
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A peek inside my adaptive systems course starting on the 23rd of February.
In this thread, a list of what participants will learn.
1/N
MODULE #1: HARNESSING ANTIFRAGILITY
The organic is both antifragile (we lift weights → our muscles grow) and fragile (we lift too much → we injure ourselves).
What determines antifragility?
What's the relationship between it and fragility?
What to do about it? 2/N
3/ Antifragility can make us stronger (exercise → stronger muscles) or weaker (no exercise → muscles atrophy).
It can make us adapt (famine → we adapt by storing more nutrients) or maladapt (lack of famine → we take risks & store less nutrients, making us more fragile).
Societies are adaptive systems. What a policy does is less important than how people adapt to it.
Our body is an adaptive system. We lift weights not to move them, but for how our muscles adapt to it (they grow).
(thread, 1/N)
Teams are adaptive systems. In the short-term, a manager's decision matters for what it does. In the long-term, it matters for how the team adapts to it. What behaviors does it make more likely?
2/N
Markets are adaptive systems. Many strategies only work until the market adapts to them.
Marketing, sales, and strategy are about adaptive systems. In the long-term, what matters is how customers, competitors, and suppliers adapt to a new product.
3/N
A Nobel prize can tell us two things: how good is the recipient or how bad is the committee.
“Unless you have confidence in the ruler’s reliability, if you use a ruler to measure a table you may also be using the table to measure the ruler.” – @nntaleb
2/ I used to express Wittgenstein’s ruler as follows: the more the free parameters, the less you know what is being measured.
For example, last spring COVID mortality could have been informing us about how aggressive is the virus or how good is a country’s testing
3/ In addition, and this is the point of this new thread, it just dawned to me that Wittgenstein’s ruler is not just about the precision of the ruler but also about its choice.
Those who put too much ego in their car do things that are good for their car (eg spending Saturdays afternoon washing it) rather than things which are good for them (eg hanging out with their friends and family).
We do what is good for what we invested our ego in.
1/4
2/ Those who put too much ego in their job stop doing things that are good for them and instead do things that are good for their job.
Those who put too much ego in their political party stop doing things that are good for them and instead do things that are good for their party
3/ Those who put too much ego into racial discrimination stop doing things that are good for them and instead do things that are good for racial discrimination.
When Twitter banned Trump, I wrote that even though I don't like Trump and thought that the world would be better off without him, I was also against its censorship for fear of a slippery slope.
3 weeks later, did it happen?
Yes. Examples & implications 👇
1/8
2/ After Twitter, FB banned him. Then, Google suspended Parler from its store, Apple did it too, and finally Amazon banned it from its infrastructure.
3/ Two comments:
– What looks inconsequential if one small company does it is very consequential if all major players do it.
– It started with banning a few bad apples, it ended up with banning full categories of users.
(the latter should give the chills; also see tweet #5)