@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory The story of the Brodie device is relatively easy to find. The April 1946 issue of the Field Artillery Journal had a three page article on the development history.
The USS LST-776 carried the device to Iwo Jima & Okinawa.
The Marines didn't think much of it. The 77th ID loved
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory ...the Brodie device as L4 Cubs launched from it spotted several hundred explosive suicide boats at Kerama Retto before they landed.
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory If Operation Olympic had kicked off after the Atomic bombings of Japan. There were no end to the fun and games the Brodie devices would have gotten into.
The 40th ID and all three US Army Corps had a Brodie LST.
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory While the USMC was going to put it's L-5's on CVE's. All the Brodie LST's would not only be spotting for artillery & air strikes.
Some of them would have live TV Cameras!
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory Dr. Vladimir Zworykin’s Block III Television Seeker Guidance System showed up all over the place in Operation Olympic.
The OSS-FEAF Javaman boat bomb -- intended to attack the Kanmon railway tunnel between Honshu & Kyushu -- also carried the puppy.
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory There was a Signal Corps Technical Team that demonstrated the L-5 plus camera kit to MacArthur in May 1945 and it was in the August 1945 Operation Olympic invasion plans.
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory The major developmental issue for the Block III TV equipped L-5 was it's downlink was the same downlink as the USN's Project Cadillac AEW radar planes....also in Olympic.
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory However, the biggest role of the Brodie L-5 planes had to so with their ability to move whole blood from the Koshiki Retto sea plane base through the Brodie LST's to shore if or when blood bank LST's got blasted by the Japanese.
@NavalHistWar@AC_NavalHistory This photo of a Zworykin’s Block III television seeker in an L-5 similar to the one demonstrated to Douglas MacArthur.
See my:
Secrets of the Pacific Warfare Board — Block III TV in the Invasion of Japan, Fourth of an Occasional Series
August 15th, 2014 chicagoboyz.net/archives/44897…
@MilAvHistory & @CBI_PTO_History have a great video on the February 1942 IJN attack on USN carrier Task Force 11. (link & title in @MilAvHistory tweet) watch the whole thing.
This thread is going to expand on the "Scope dope" of that engagement. /1
@NickHewitt4 The LVT's would have made a huge difference at Omaha beach for the same reasons they were the margin between victory and defeat at Tarawa.
They let a large body of formed infantry with an intact chain of command and intact radio net get right on top of an enemy position.
@NickHewitt4 More importantly, they would have used the Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett's Kwajalein LVT radio net procedures.
US Army’s 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Kwajalein put VHF band, quartz crystal controlled FM radios in every LVT.
@NickHewitt4 The 708th was a converted US Army independent tank battalion built to support US Army infantry divisions. Everything it did at Kwajalein was standard operating procedure for US Army independent tank units, which had had “Shoot, Move and Communicate” in its...
@CBI_PTO_History@maltby1941 Kenney is one of those really polarizing personalities because he was literally the most innovative USAAF flag rank leader in WW2. This made him an existential threat to both the US Navy and the bomber barons as a post WW2 USAF Chief of Staff.
Kenney also cheesed off MID G-2
@CBI_PTO_History@maltby1941 You literally cannot trust anything people say about the man without checking primary sources not only for the SWPA, but for what the USAAF Bomber Barons were saying at the same time.
Overclaims, are and sea, are the usual stick to beat up Kenney.
@CBI_PTO_History@maltby1941 1. Compare Kenney's air to air claims in 1943 to 8th & 15th AF bomber air to air claims.
Kenney's claims were in the usual six to one
The Bomber Generals in the ETO/MTO were anywhere from 15 to 100 to one wrong in their air to air claims & knew they were lying because of Ultra.
This thread is on Section 22's role in the Nov 3 1943 raid by Saratoga & Princeton on the IJN cruiser force assembled at Rabaul to stop the Bougainville invasion & radar threads leading else where.
Effectively, you use a horizontal antenna whip to broadcast a low power HF straight up, bounce the HF signal off the ionosphere, and you get radio communications in thick foliage or behind hills for 200 miles with no skip zone.
@ReassessHistory The US Army Campaign in New Guinea made extensive use of NVIS in the jungle and it was released as this:
War Department Technical Bulletin TB SIG 4 (Jan. 44) "Methods for Improving the Effectiveness of Jungle Radio Communication".