1) Everybody who knows about trade knows that significant barriers have been built up in EU-UK trade. As a consequence, comparatively EU-UK trade will take a hit.
2) I am entirely certain that the comparative decrease of UK-EU trade as opposed to UK rest of the world trade resulting from these trade barriers will be cited as evidence that reorienting is the right choice.
3) Yet, for some reason we cannot, may not, vigorously evaluate the TCA. Even though...
4) Brexit is over. The UK left the EU in 2020. EU law now no longer is in force for the UK. And Brexit is uncontestedly over: no party with any chance at country-wide importance is arguing for joining the EU. The SNP is, but its focus is decidedly on Scotland.
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I refuse to go into debates on the content of the contract, but there’s an interesting lesson on transparency: the contract was published months ago. Yet when CNN asked about it, the government said they cannot have it because of risks to national security. What do we learn?/1
We learn that “transparency” is more than just publishing a document. Because we no longer live in a time of information scarcity. We live in a time of excess information still poorly adapted to that change. /2
You cannot hide a document more effectively than by publishing it in an obscure place. (Yes, the hitchhiker‘s guide and the publication for the plans to destroy earth comes to mind). What to do? /3
The institutional split between EU trade and rest of the world trade, once justifiable because of Art. 50 TEU and the specifics of the Brexit process, makes no more sense in a post Brexit world. But the politics of it ain’t easy /1
First of all with the creation of a separate Brexit process a fiefdom was created. That currently belongs to Lord Frost and Michael Gove. Frost leads the EU-UK relationship. Gove represents the UK on the Partnership Council politico.eu/article/eu-wan…
(The same holds true on the EU side where it’s not Dombrovskis who leads for the EU as Trade Commissioner)
NI is all too often used as a pawn in political games. I very much applaud this sentiment: let us tackle the problems and work pragmatically to find solutions.
On SPS specifically: I urge the government to treat the group on regulatory divergence as a matter of priority. The country needs to finalize the regulatory debate about divergence to start a meaningful debate about further trade simplifications @naomi_long
We cannot remain in this limbo in which “we can finally deregulate” and “we have the same regulations” continue to be two simultaneous mantras. So: let’s urgently decide where to diverge and where we actually like what we have.
The UK opted for a phased approach to building up the border. This allows the government to build up the border control posts needed until July (see the first graph).
One would hope that this will give industry time to adapt, but I am not all too optimistic seeing the current issues. And it creates another issue: the illusion that the UK won’t impose the same type of border the EU imposes.
I did not bother commenting on the export debate in general, because it felt like the old PPE debate. Everyone forgets that they are misbehaving, but looks only at the misbehaviour of the others. politico.eu/article/uk-cor…
Twitter. Today I saw idiotic takes on contract law that would make a 1L cry. I saw speculation that makes you wonder whether we actually need any basis in actual information or not. Don’t do that to me again. /1
One slightly more plausible take that also happens to not be convincing: the comparison of the contract with AstraZeneca (the one we don’t know) with that of Curevac (we do know). Why is that unlikely to say very much? /2
Because not only the product is different, also the functions and sizes of the companies involved. Curevac was the innovator. It has 500 employees and doesn’t even have the capacity to do a pharmaceutical trial (which is why they are still not on the market). AstraZeneca? /3