Thread by @andrewsweiss

What does the Kremlin think #Navalny's weak points are and how does that inform its current pressure campaign? Fascinating piece by @baunov. Quick thread 1/
carnegie.ru/commentary/838…

Baunov points out the effectiveness of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to disparage Navalny as a tool of Western intelligence services bent on provoking a street revolution. "This [claim] may sound preposterous, but it will resonate with certain segments of the public." 2/

Well-publicized state-sponsored violence and forced video confessions may shock people in the West, but they're also a deliberate attempt to make Russians think twice about the higher cost the regime will make them to pay for engaging in unsanctioned political activity. 3/

Navalny's team are incredibly skillful at appealing to younger Russian and creating viral content, but it's harder to overcome the quirks of Russian demography (aging population, smallish numbers of under-25s) 4/

Russian polling seems to confirm Navalny's overall support inside Russia (approx 20% of voters) hasn't surged in the wake of a state-sponsored assassination attempt, the street protests, or ongoing show trials. Did Navalny and his team expect a bigger bounce in public opinion? 5/

Finally, the Kremlin knows who its voters are and how to take care of them. To avoid blowing through $600 billion in hard currency reserves, the Kremlin has dribbled out programs aimed at the large segment of the population that's politically inert and happy to receive hand-outs

Of course, Putin's political team knows full well that average Russians are plenty grumpy at the moment. So they're braced for surprises at the ballot box in the autumn Duma elections. But they're far less worried than you might think END. carnegie.ru/commentary/838…

Oops - use this link for @baunov's article: carnegie.ru/commentary/838…