My written testimony for today's @USCC_GOV hearing on cross-Strait deterrence is now available on the commission's web site. You can see it here: uscc.gov/sites/default/…
If you've been following me for a while, you'll see some familiar themes, as well as some new material and information.
My overall assessment of the state of cross-Strait deterrence, which is underlaid in large part by the associated military balance, is that we're entering a period of deep uncertainty.
This is in contrast to the situation of in the past, when I would have predicted failure for the PRC in any cross-Strait military aggression. It's also in contrast to the situation, absent changes in current trends, that we seem headed towards: PRC military domination of Taiwan.
The trends that concern me most are not those directly tied to comparisons across the Strait. What I'm most concerned about is China’s development of broader regional capabilities clearly intended to counter or deter a U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan.
These broader counter-intervention capabilities are most visible in the form of China’s deployment of large numbers of capable precision-strike Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), its growing long-range bomber force, and its rapidly growing blue-water navy.
I've explored China's precision-strike IRBM force here before, in this thread:
One new piece of information that I provided to the Commission was this: it appears, based on open-source imagery, that China's missile forces may be developing the ability to strike specific high-value aircraft on U.S. air bases in the region.
This previously-unpublished image, from the missile impact range in western China, shows what appears to be a mock target specifically designed to imitate a parked E-3 Sentry airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS).
IMO the use of a mock target to represent a specific U.S. aircraft type (no one else in the region operates them) may indicate the development of a warhead with the capability to recognize and home in on specific aircraft, rather than having to blanket an entire airfield.
It also provides yet another indicator that China's missile force is practicing, quite specifically, attacks on U.S. bases in the region. My colleague Javier Gonzalez and I talked about this in detail in our report "First Strike" in 2017:cnas.org/publications/r…
The next topic, on China's growing bomber force, is one that I've also discussed here:
Any ideas out there on what this new building is near the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka?
It's pretty big, over 300m long. Most recent image is from 8-2020, with other images from earlier in and before construction.
Here it is in relation to the port. You can see how big it is in perspective.
I somehow never noticed this before. Apparently a few years back before it got overgrown and altered, it was a clearer "China SLK", indicating a China-Sri Lanka joint venture, comity, etc.
As I said within this article, “When seen in combination with the ongoing major expansion of China’s nuclear submarine shipyard capacity, an expansion of China’s diesel submarine production capacity as well may point toward...
How it went: sound on to hear Fleet Commander calling targets, issuing orders to our 180-person fleet. And watch me trying desperately to keep up as enemy ships are killed before I can even target them...
As I've been reading Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, a 1952 book about logistics in the Pacific in WWII, I've been struck how often the topic of tugs has come up: ships that were saved because of their presence, or perhaps lost due to their absence.
Some examples that jumped right out: that the carrier USS Yorktown might have been saved at Midway, had the Navy yet appreciated the value of fleet tugs.
That the carrier USS Hornet and destroyer USS Porter might have been saved at the Battle of the Santa Cruz islands if tugs had been available:
Logging in and getting ready for what promises to be one of the largest multiplayer virtual fleet battles in history:
We already have 6000+ players logged on in our alliance's forward staging area, just waiting to go into the fight. My corporation has already sent in a 256-person fleet, and is forming up four more to go soon:
Here's a 3-part axiom I think US defense thinkers & planners should consider in devising concepts for the defense of US/allied vital interests in the Western Pacific.
Plans for major conflict against the PLA should not rely on any of the following to win:
- Units or forces that require anything but episodic communication or data flow.
(Ex.: UxVs that rely on consistent human oversight to do their job, esp. given current policy restraints on lethal autonomous weapons.)
- Any important fixed and hard-to-repair object or facility on or within the 2nd island chain.