Here's a 3-part axiom I think US defense thinkers & planners should consider in devising concepts for the defense of US/allied vital interests in the Western Pacific.
Plans for major conflict against the PLA should not rely on any of the following to win:
Plans for major conflict against the PLA should not rely on any of the following to win:
- Units or forces that require anything but episodic communication or data flow.
(Ex.: UxVs that rely on consistent human oversight to do their job, esp. given current policy restraints on lethal autonomous weapons.)
(Ex.: UxVs that rely on consistent human oversight to do their job, esp. given current policy restraints on lethal autonomous weapons.)
- Any important fixed and hard-to-repair object or facility on or within the 2nd island chain.
(Ex.: fuel tanks, HQ buildings, repair facilities, comms equipment, etc.)
(Ex.: fuel tanks, HQ buildings, repair facilities, comms equipment, etc.)
- Assuming politics may require letting the PLA shoot first, any non-stealthy & non-dispersed platforms within IRBM range of China when the shooting starts.
(Ex.: aircraft on the ground, valuable ships within ASBM range, non-dispersed BMD assets. They may survive, but may not.)
(Ex.: aircraft on the ground, valuable ships within ASBM range, non-dispersed BMD assets. They may survive, but may not.)
N.B.: part 3 is specific to the beginning of a conflict, when the PLA has a peacetime-quality targeting picture, and may not apply to forces brought in after conflict has begun and PRC C4ISR has been degraded.
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