The different outcomes for FB and Google in Australia related to the country's impending news publishing law underscore the fundamental differences between their operating models that any successful regulatory treatment must recognize (1/X)
2/ @benthompson's daily update is the best starting point for background on the topic. @benedictevans also provides trenchant analysis. Essentially: Google capitulated & cut a deal with News Corp, FB simply called the Australian govt's bluff ben-evans.com/benedictevans/…
3/ Google indexes information for search and discovery and FB operates a network of users that allows them to share content. Both monetize with advertising but that's really a superficial similarity. The businesses' core use cases are fundamentally dissimilar
4/ Of course, it's easy to be reductive here, as these companies each comprise multiple businesses. But foundationally, Google indexes data, Facebook connects people. This explains why Facebook could walk away from the Australian market and Google needed to take it more seriously
5/ All content on FB is effectively UGC. If users can't share certain classes of content, it doesnt reduce the effectiveness of FB's advertising placements around them (or in them). Placing limitations on any specific class of content, even a large one like news, doesnt hurt FB
6/ It does hurt Google, because Google indexes that content and directs people to it when they seek it out. If Google cant provide the content that people are specifically searching for, it cant monetize that content. It needs to be able to index *everything*
7/ FB on the other hand can limit the entire universe of shareable content classes at the margins and not face any immediate monetization loss. Platform (and ad) engagement isnt dependent on any given piece of content but rather interactions facilitated by connections
8/ It's interesting to note the differences in consequence because we see them highlighted elsewhere. Australia's rev share "tax" on news hurts Google but FB can ignore it. Meanwhile, ATT impacts Facebook more than Google because of these structural differences
9/ This is all to say: any regulation may disproportionately impair one company relative to others because "Big Tech that Monetizes via Advertising" is a meaningless distinction. This gets even fuzzier given commercial interactions eg. Google/Apple, Google/FB
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
One flaw in many mobile-first consumer tech cos that has been exposed by Apple's ATT policy is how little many executives understand the platforms on which their companies are fundamentally dependent (1/X)
2/ Even today many CEOs dont understand how IDFA deprecation / ATT will impact their businesses. You can see this in earnings calls: CEOs cant clearly articulate how the efficacy of their performance advertising will change once ATT is made mandatory
3/ Not only does this underscore a lack of understanding of their core businesses (most mobile-first companies grow exclusively through performance DR advertising), but it lays bare an ignorance of the platform dynamics that define them mobiledevmemo.com/high-growth-lo…
An abundance of information released today related to iOS 14 / ATT / SKAdNetwork. Attempting to consolidate it all in a thread (1/X):
2/ Apple released the iOS 14.5 beta, which disables developer access to the IDFA by default (meaning: mandatory ATT). The beta released today likely means the March-ish timeline for public release is valid
3/ Apple updated the SKAdNetwork documentation. SKAdNetwork 2.2 is released with iOS 14.5 and includes a new parameter that allows for view-through attribution developer.apple.com/documentation/…
Here are two things that both Apple and Facebook have clarified over the past few weeks with respect to advertising restrictions coming to iOS14 when ATT is made mandatory (1/X):
2/ One misconception is that advertisers will simply be able to pipe user-indexed conversion events back to Facebook via the conversions API to avoid campaign-level data aggregation. Facebook has plainly stated that it will not allow for this facebook.com/business/help/…
3/ The second is that fingerprinting -- sorry, "probabilistic attribution" -- exists as a simple workaround to ATT that will allow advertisers to glean dependable user-level conversion and attribution signals. Apple made its stance on fingerprinting even more explicit this week
Apple seems to be privileging its own ad network with its new privacy guidelines: on January 6, it published documentation for a new attribution API for Apple Search Ads that contains more functional granularity than SKAdNetwork (1/X)
2/ The new API is called the Apple Ads Attribution API. It "attribute(s) app download campaigns that originate from the App Store, Apple News, or Stocks on iOS devices" developer.apple.com/documentation/…
3/ The payload contains the kind of data an advertiser would use to optimize ad campaign performance: click date for cohorting, creative ID, etc.
eComm and D2C will be acutely impaired by the ATT opt-in mechanic coming to iOS (rumored made mandatory in March). ATT doesnt exclusively impact app advertisers, & in fact may disproportionately damage eComm and D2C. Some thoughts on how those advertisers should prepare (1/X)
2/ In the @MobileDevMemo 2020 mobile advertising predictions post, I posit that D2C ad spend may drop by as much as 50% in Q2 2020. FB revealed in December that app-to-web campaigns will be governed by ATT opt in, severely limiting campaign efficiency mobiledevmemo.com/2021-predictio…
3/ FB had only previously discussed ATT in terms of app campaign relevance. This new revelation likely stemmed from further instructions from Apple following FB's initial guidance mobiledevmemo.com/understanding-…