Rep opposition to COVID stimulus hasn’t mobilized public against it. But we don’t know yet whether that signals that Trump cultural resistance politics can’t fit with economic conservatism (as it did under Obama & Clinton) or if it’s specific to this bill nytimes.com/2021/02/19/us/…
@jonathanchait makes the case timid Republican opposition to Biden stimulus means they know the base never cared about big government & are giving in: nymag.com/intelligencer/…
We’ll get another opportunity to see soon with infrastructure.
I’m open to real change, but so far it could be about the (perhaps accidental) dynamics of this particular Bill, Trump distractions, & COVID environment (& despite that, Reps are still voting against it & belatedly trying to build opposition). More time & bills could help them
Reconciliation dynamics mean they’ll need to adjust as Biden policy changes will continue to be framed as budget items & be sold as economic stimulus; Dems will also give life to immigration, Heath, & climate but Reps need some budget message to work against the passable bills
Both district policy opinion & symbolic ideology influence how lawmakers cast roll call votes; the operational-symbolic divide in public opinion explains why Republican lawmakers vote more inconsistently with district policy opinion #polisciresearch cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Democrats approve of their representative more when the member votes on bills in alignment with their policy preferences; Republicans approve more when they their representative votes in alignment with their ideology (even if their policy-specific views are unaligned).
Republican districts differ only a bit on policy preferences from Democratic districts but a lot on symbolic ideology. Republican representatives vote more in alignment with their district’s ideology, Democrats more in alignment with their district’s policy-specific preferences.
Prez polls missed in 1948, 1952, 1980, 1996, 2000, & 2016 & we’ve had many repeated discussions: late movers, likely voter models, 3rd party overestimates, shy voters, sampling methods, absentees, undecideds, last-minute events, herding, misinterpretation amazon.com/Lost-Gallup-Po…
Polling miss Recriminations have long been intertwined with academic skepticism & a long feud over journalistic vs social science descriptions of campaigns. The precursor to data journalism was “precision journalism,” an explicit call for integrating social science.
presidential elections have long been seen as the big (often failed) test for public social science. Blaming presentation of results & too much certainty & worrying about influencing results have long histories. But reporting has long suffered from the problems blamed on polls
A strong US presidency is critical for addressing national concerns, but Trump & global populism highlighted deficiencies. Howell & Moe recommend expanding agenda power (fast-track for everything) while cutting pardons & insulating DOJ & intelligence. amazon.com/Presidents-Pop…
They pinpoint threats to governance in the contemporary Republican Party & compare Trump to global populists in message & behavior. But they also see federal policymaking as inherently ineffective (blaming Congressional response to interests & localities), stimulating populism.
I did not see much evidence that objectively poor governance stimulated Trump's victory & I do not think strong centralized liberal policymaking would diminish populist backlash; longstanding thermostatic trends in opinion & policy suggest it would likely increase it.
Americans are using a bit more ideological language in explaining their party attachment over time, though the growth is mostly among Republicans; Democrats still use a lot more group benefits language #polisciresearch automated coding of likes/dislikes dropbox.com/s/ho4h6ne58w6l…
This paper also only uses in-party likes.
You can see the common words in each category below.
Voter conceptualizations are surprisingly uncorrelated with our party messages data. Both Republican voters & politicians talk about ideology more & groups less (& Democrats the reverse) but partisans aren't responsive to year-to-year changes in rhetoric.
Trump underperformed the national Republican House vote share in 2016 by 3 points. He may underperform Republican House candidates again this year. House Republicans also may gain share over Democrats vs. 2018. Trump-specific explanations should account for broader Rep success.
Republicans have won at least 18/27 of Cook House toss-ups (with Democrats leading in only 3) along with 4 lean Democratic races & 1 likely Democratic race: cookpolitical.com/analysis/house…
That sounds like even stronger poll overperformance than President or Senate.
Unclear whether House Democrats will blame Leadership for poor performance, whether anyone will challenge Pelosi, and how much value she’ll see in continuing.
Reporters & activists spent a primary year portraying Democrats as moving left & embracing ideological politics. But Biden has run a decidedly non-ideological campaign. If he & moderate Senate candidates win, unclear why they would learn a different lesson than they normally do
Relative Dem underperformance with minorities might lead to calls for a return to more identity-based appeals. But high turnout could reduce perceptions of turnout/persuasion trade-off for moderation. Some Dem primary fights will continue but could be harder in Rep backlash years
In governance, Dems may encounter similar internal difficulties as 2009 (even with many of same issues, eg health & climate). But the left traditionally concedes if the alternative is passing nothing. It’s unclear why that changes now. & Red state Dems may get cautious quickly