Ok so let’s try these checklists out and see what it’s like to lock a phone down. I assume I’m concerned about someone else accessing my iCloud account as well as apps being evil.
Here’s step 1.
Ok this works pretty well, but it gives me the following confusing exception.
I was trying to be really low-key on this one, so let me make it really blunt. There is every reason to believe the NSA tried to subvert commercial cryptography in the 2000s, and now one of the architects of that work runs applied crypto at Amazon.
I couldn’t tweet a better description than the headline for this piece: After SolarWinds breach, lawmakers ask NSA for help in cracking Juniper cold case. cyberscoop.com/nsa-juniper-ba…
For those who haven’t heard this story, the context here is back in 2015 hackers broke into the source code repository of Juniper’s NetScreen firewalls and introduced serious vulnerabilities. 1/
Everyone has heard of the SolarWinds supply chain attack, but almost nobody outside our little community remembers Juniper. We don’t even know who the ultimate victim was. And there’s a reason for that. 2/
My students @maxzks and Tushar Jois spent most of the summer going through every piece of public documentation, forensics report, and legal document we could find to figure out how police were “breaking phone encryption”. 1/
This was prompted by a claim from someone knowledgeable, who claimed that forensics companies no longer had the ability to break the Apple Secure Enclave Processor, which would make it very hard to crack the password of a locked, recent iPhone. 2/
We wrote an enormous report about what we found, which we’ll release after the holidays. The TL;DR is kind of depressing:
Authorities don’t need to break phone encryption in most cases, because modern phone encryption sort of sucks. 3/
Stories like this remind me that people in the Infosec community routinely make and sell exploits to these nations. citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-gr…
I’m honestly curious how conscientious security researchers justify selling these tools, knowing how likely it is that they’ll be used for applications like this one.
One of the interesting things about this story is how difficult it must be to instrument iOS devices to catch these 0-click exploits in action. Partly because Apple makes it difficult.