IMO: If you are an econ theorist, and are regularly attempting more than 6 hours of research work a day, you are not on the research-leisure Pareto frontier. Real focus is physically draining, and creativity can't be forced. 🧵
By research work, I mean work that requires full concentration and mental acuity, e.g. writing proofs, learning new technical tools, learning other papers. Answering routine e-mail not included. I make no claims about empirical research.
You can sprint more than 6 a day (e.g. for a conference deadline), but this should be occasional or you will burn out. You might do a proof for 10 hours in a state of flow, but that is a rare blessing.
Of course, not everyone has the luxury to even attempt 3 hours of research a day. Teaching loads and administrative obligations are heterogeneous across academics. Those can take substantial time that I'm not counting here.
My point is that even if working on a proof for 9 hours a day without weekends is in the feasible set, (in the long run) it is probably dominated in both productivity and leisure by working on the proof for 5 hours a day. Go for a walk to clear your head. Watch a movie. Breathe.
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There’s an econ paper by a Harvard law professor that uses game theory to deny that the Japanese military held sex slaves during WW2. Yes, it literally makes that claim. chwe.net/ramseyer/ramse…#EconTwitter
The consensus among historians is that the Imperial Japanese military held tens of thousands of sex slaves, sometimes called “comfort women”, from all over East Asia. The modern Japanese government holds that this happened. The UN holds that this happened.
The Ramseyer paper argues that because indentured servitude contracts can be explained by “game theoretic principles of credible commitment”, it follows that the atrocity never happened.
As someone who occasionally read letters for PhD admission, I give less weight to letters from pre-doc employers compared to letters from undergrad or grad advisors. Why?
Pre-doc employers have different incentives: if their pre-docs don’t consistently place well into PhD programs, then they are less able to recruit in future. Of course they will not make an explicit quid pro quo. But potential employees will look!
By contrast, each academic in a BA or masters program accounts for only a small share of the students. Many of their students will not even be thinking about PhDs, and the quality of the incoming class is only weakly related to the academic’s personal productivity.
New working paper! Consider the decision problem, "For this choice rule, does there exist a strategy-proof mechanism?" This is an easy problem; by the revelation principle, we just need to check that the direct mechanism is IC, which takes linear time. (thread) #EconTwitter
Now consider the problem, "For this choice rule, does there exist an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanism?" OSP depends on the extensive form, so the class of candidate mechanisms is combinatorially complex.
A prior result establishes that, if such a mechanism exists, it can be verified in polynomial time. (So the decision problem is in the complexity class NP.) But can we decide the problem quickly? A brute force search through all the mechanisms would take exponential time.
A lightboard-style setup without the lightboard. All you need is an ipad, a stylus, and OBS. Thanks @rithvikra0 for the idea! #EconTwitter
1. connect iPad to mac via USB-C. 2. open sketch software with dark background. 3. add ipad as video source in OBS. 4. add crop and chromakey filters, choose custom color equal to background. 5. tweak to taste. 6. overlay on webcam video source. 7. write!
here are some chroma key settings that work well with the dark background on goodnotes.
@ATabarrok proposes that "the NYTimes should bet a portion of Silver’s salary, at the odds implied by Silver’s model, randomly choosing which side of the bet to take, only revealing to Silver the bet and its outcome after the election is over". 2/N
He writes, "A blind trust bet creates incentives for Silver to be disinterested in the outcome but very interested in the accuracy of the forecast." Is this true? 3/N
Experimental #EconTwitter, here's an open question about mechanism design that lab experiments could answer. There's been an explosion in formal standards for what counts as a 'simple' mechanism. Do these in fact predict subject behavior? (1/N)
My JMP gave some evidence that one of these concepts (OSP) has some empirical support in auctions. It predicts, for instance, that subjects will make mistakes in second-price auctions but not in ascending auctions. But what about other settings? (3/N)