This is only one obvious example of a broader tendency in Dem/progressive electoral thinking in recent years, which really wants to reduce elections to be turnout and electoral strategy to grassroots organization
It's a romantic view, since there's no secret of the progressive love of organizing. It's also a convenient view, since it shields activists from questioning their views or whether they represent who they say they do. It's also self-justifying: the solution is more campaign staff
And it was reinforced by the contrast of Democratic midterm losses in 10/14, which were certainly exacerbated by a less favorable turnout.
Democrats lost the plot when they tried to explain 2016 (and now 2020) away in the same way
One last anecdote on the role of the midterms in creating the turnout myth: Iowa results v. partisan turnout edge*
2012: Obama+6; GOP+3.3
2014: Ernst+8; GOP+9.2
2016: Trump+8; GOP+4.5
2020: Trump+8, GOP+2.6
*defined by dif btwn mjr party electorate and registrants by party reg
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FWIW, there's a fine anti-mail ballot opinion /thinkpiece piece to be written from the left/Dem standpoint, and it could easily be an element of a hypothetical but not-going-to-happen bipartisan bill intended to improve the electoral system
There's no serious reason to think Democrats benefit from mail absentee voting and it does have some downsides for the electoral system. Dems could even trade it for something they should care about, if a bipartisan electoral bill was possible (doubt it)
There are many disadvantages: ballots cast before all info available, days before a result, unsecured ballots in transit, depends on often late third party delivery, mediocre verification leads to *both* unneeded rejections and credibility issues
What happened in Georgia just can't be exported to the Midwest. That's not to say that organizing and party building is irrelevant and that there couldn't be any lessons. But the outcomes aren't replicable nytimes.com/2021/02/11/opi…
The core of what happened in Georgia since, say, '06 has happened almost everywhere in the country. It just works out to the Democratic advantage in Georgia in a way that it hasn't elsewhere
1) Obama mobilized a huge and partly durable increase in Black voter turnout. That largely happened between 04 and 08; it subsided partly since 12, and it helped Ds more in GA-->30% black--than anywhere else that matters.
Hence, Obama only lost by 5/8 pts in Bush+17 state
I've never really understood the case against this, given that the Democrats could always go to reconciliation in the end (as Manchin notes), and I'd be interested to read it
The case for it seems straightforward:
--Quicker action on the most time sensitive vaccine/COVID aid, which could have been done already
--A political/public opinion benefit to a) bipartisanship; b) multiple bills
--An unknown shot that bipartisanship breeds bipartisanship
The case against it mainly boils down to delaying the package as a whole, but:
--Democrats still control timing, and can bolt whenever conditions merit it
--Much of the package isn't *that* time sensitive
--Delay can be the excuse that lets progressives get to 2000 dollar checks
There's less confidence in the electoral system because people tried to erode confidence in it, not because of the way the election was administered
No 'blue-ribbon' plan could have gotten us out of the mess we found ourselves in
Go through that call between Trump and GA SOS, and think about how many of his assertions would be fixed by, say, a ban on mail absentee voting and a strict photo identification requirement
The answer is: not much of it
You can still assert that someone shredded ballots, or pulled a box from under a table, or that someone wasn't watching, or that there were 'dead' voters based on a file match, or that there isn't a perfect match with poll books, or lie that there are 'more votes than people' etc
Here's North Carolina, just a few months ago (and the hick up in the estimate around 11PM result was induced by an IRL irregularity in the NC results, not the needle).
Here's how Senate control would have changed over the last decade if DC had been a state:
2010: D (IRL) --> D (with DC)
2012: D --> D
2014: R --> R
2016: R --> R
2018: R --> R
2020: D --> D
Here's how Senate control would have changed over the last decade if DC and Puerto Rico had been states:
2010: D (IRL) --> D (with DC+PR)
2012: D --> D
2014: R --> R
2016: R --> R
2018: R --> R
2020: D --> D
*ALSEN in 2017 is an interesting side-story
If PR/AL were states, then the Doug Jones race in 2017 would have flipped Senate control (which the GOP would win back in 2018), though there's a distinct possibility that Jones wouldn't have won if Senate control was on the line