As Iran announces it will halt complementary access requests by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Additional Protocol, let's remember that Iran was already in breach of its AP commitment last year during a stand-off over undeclared nuclear sites. Short thread.
The media focuses a lot on what we can see Iran doing: enrichment. What Iran wants us to see for their own extortion strategy to gain sanctions relief without giving up its nuclear ambitions. It's time to focus on what we don't see - what Iran doesn't want us to see or to learn.
Based on news reports and statements by the IAEA over the last two years, it's clear that Iran is facing a full-blown investigation into undeclared nuclear material, sites and activities -- a clear breach of its fundamental obligations under the NPT.
We've seen reports that a warehouse exposed by Israeli PM Netanyahu was inspected and samples taken there tested positive for the presence of nuclear material. The same is true for at least two more undeclared nuclear sites in Iran. This included a standoff last year over access.
Iran didn't know who would win the US prez election. And it was afraid that the E3 might join the US in the snapback of UN sanctions. An access crisis may indeed have forced the UK's hand. The IAEA likely used this leverage to get Iran to allow inspectors in to take more samples.
We recently saw the @WSJ break news that IAEA samples taken at these additional undeclared sites came back positive for nuclear material. Reuters confirmed the WSJ report late last week. The IAEA is likely to report about this as the March Board of Governors meeting approaches.
What is Iran hiding? Why? What are the consequences for NPT non-compliance? Iran doesn't want this conversation. It destroys the premise of the JCPOA and represents a major hurdle for those who wish to resurrect it. But to understand today's news, you need to ask those questions.
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