Welcome to the fourth Twitter comment post (Feb 22, 2021) in the “Section 22 Week” count down to the 24 Feb 2021 Bilge Pumps podcast with the Section 22 Special Interest Group e-mail list. Today’s post will include slides 49 through 60 of 82 of the Section 22 information packet.
These Powerpoint slides cover Section 22 combat operations from January to July 1945. Today's cost posts are:

Welcome to Section 22 Week, Day 4
chicagoboyz.net/archives/65441…
&
"Section 22 Week" Feb 22 2021 post
Banzai facebook group
facebook.com/groups/1414345…
Today's "Twitter extra" involves legacies of US Naval leadership, both moral and toxic, that are wrapped up in the archival document photo here.
That photo is Adm. Raymond Turner endorsing Radio Electrician George L. Johnson's Nov 1944 redesign of the Mark III IFF to prevent Japanese exploitation of the system to identify allied ships and planes.

Johnson worked on USS Rocky Mount during the Leyte invasion while she...
...flew the flag of Rear Adm. Forrest B. Royal as commander of Amphibious Group Six. Johnson's section on Rocky Mount was responsible for getting 7th Fleet IFF gear combat ready for Leyte and Sec 22 Asst. Dir. Jolley's efforts hit them like a hammer.

Literally in between...
Kamikaze attacks, Radio Electrician George Johnson took Cmdr Jolley's warnings to heart, redesigned and submitted a production design to his chain of command on USS Rocky Mount.

(See attached document photo extract)
If Radio Electrician George L. Johnson's actions in the previous tweets are a legacy of Cmdr Jolley's moral leadership as Assistant Director of Section 22.

Then Adm. Turner's inactions on IFF are the legacy of CNO Adm. Ernest King's toxic leadership.
You see, while Adm Raymond Turner sent Johnson's designs up to the Bureau of Ships in Dec 1944.

Turner did not include Cmdr Jolley's IFF "delousing procedures" that identified when the Japanese were using their radars to identify allied planes & ships in the Iwo Jima & Okinawa
...invasion orders. Turner was to intimidated by King to do the right thing.

There is no knowing the human costs of this toxic leadership.

We can only guess.
I’ll give you my guess.

100(+) preventable US Navy & USMC casualties? This feels certain.

1000(+) preventable US Navy & USMC casualties? This feels like a very, very soft “no.”
Now, the modern "toxic leadership" gut punch.

Both admirals King & Turner are celebrated in the institutional histories of the US Navy.

Cmdr Jolley & Radio Electrician Johnson are unknown.

Which would you prefer as leaders in the USN today?

And what does the USN have?
This seems to be the answer.

Today's USN is Admiral King's navy and not Cmdr. Jolley's.

nbcnews.com/news/military/…

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23 Feb
Welcome to the 5th Twitter comment thread (Feb 23, 2021) in the “Section 22 Week” count down to the 24 Feb 2021 Bilge Pumps podcast with the Section 22 e-mail list.

Slides 61 through 72 of 82 of the Section 22 Powerpoint information packet are in the slide thread. /1
Today's slides start here:



These slides cover Section 22’s part of the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands called “Operation Olympic,” the last RCM flight of WW2 by the successor of Field Unit #6 that ended in tragedy, the “Defenestration”/2
...(being “thrown out the window” of the official historical narrative) of Section 22 by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff with the “Seventeen guys on an e-mail list” credits and resource links for further research for naval history academics./3

Today's Twitter extra is from
Read 9 tweets
21 Feb
Welcome to the Section 22 Week comment thread for Feb 21, 2021.

Each day the Section 22 slide thread is updated, this is day three, there will be a separate comment thread with cross posted links to both Facebook and the Chicagoboyz weblog Section 22 Week posts. Image
Today’s slide thread includes slides 30 through 48 of 82 of the Section 22 information packet. Those slides include a spotlight on Section 22’s third Assistant Director, Cmdr. J.B. Jolley, USN reserve whose picture was in the previous tweet.
Today's social media cross posts are:

Welcome to “Section 22 Week,” Day Three
February 21st, 2021
chicagoboyz.net/archives/65412…

"Section 22 Week" Feb 21 2021 post
Banzai facebook group
facebook.com/groups/1414345…
Read 5 tweets
19 Feb
Hello all,

Welcome to Twitter's SECTION 22 WEEK, a multi-media history event. Section 22 was a secret WW2 radar intelligence unit in the S.W. Pacific.

This thread will host a 82 slide information packet that will be released over six days prior to a CIMSEC Bilgepumps pod...
...cast.

I ask you all to refrain from responding until the complete packet is up 24 Feb 2021. This is so I can do a @ThreadReader twitter thread unroll that will enable people to download the whole package as a PDF doc.

1st slide of 82 Image
2nd slide of 82 Image
Read 84 tweets
14 Feb
@NavalHistWar @AC_NavalHistory The story of the Brodie device is relatively easy to find. The April 1946 issue of the Field Artillery Journal had a three page article on the development history.

The USS LST-776 carried the device to Iwo Jima & Okinawa.

The Marines didn't think much of it. The 77th ID loved
@NavalHistWar @AC_NavalHistory ...the Brodie device as L4 Cubs launched from it spotted several hundred explosive suicide boats at Kerama Retto before they landed.

See:
combinedfleet.com/OkinawaEMB.htm
@NavalHistWar @AC_NavalHistory Drawings from the Brodie patents are on-line here:

rexresearch.com/brodie/brodie.…
Read 13 tweets
12 Feb
@MilAvHistory & @CBI_PTO_History have a great video on the February 1942 IJN attack on USN carrier Task Force 11. (link & title in @MilAvHistory tweet) watch the whole thing.

This thread is going to expand on the "Scope dope" of that engagement. /1

The book "Radar and the Fighter Directors" by David L. Boslaugh, Capt USN, Retired is on-line at the Engineering & Technology History Wiki.

The TF 11 engagement is covered here:

The CXAM Goes to War - Chapter 6 of Radar and the Fighter Directors
ethw.org/The_CXAM_Goes_…
/2
The "Scope dope" I'm going to talk about applies at about
~31:30 in @MilAvHistory video.

See at the time hack in the link below./3

Read 28 tweets
30 Jan
@NickHewitt4 The LVT's would have made a huge difference at Omaha beach for the same reasons they were the margin between victory and defeat at Tarawa.

They let a large body of formed infantry with an intact chain of command and intact radio net get right on top of an enemy position.
@NickHewitt4 More importantly, they would have used the Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett's Kwajalein LVT radio net procedures.

US Army’s 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Kwajalein put VHF band, quartz crystal controlled FM radios in every LVT.

See:

chicagoboyz.net/archives/41455…
@NickHewitt4 The 708th was a converted US Army independent tank battalion built to support US Army infantry divisions. Everything it did at Kwajalein was standard operating procedure for US Army independent tank units, which had had “Shoot, Move and Communicate” in its...
Read 15 tweets

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