yesterday, Vera Songwe of UN's Economic Commission for Africa called for Biden Administration to support a G20 SDR reallocation to low-income African countries
This is official development support for 'a market re-entry access vehicle that lowers sovereign borrowing costs and brings in the private sector'
or, in less complex language, a vehicle to subsidise private bondholders and increase demand for African sovereign debt
it is a 2020 proposal cooked up by PIMCO and UNECA - a Liquidity and Stability Facility (LSF) that uses, you guessed, the repo instrument to extend repo loans on preferential terms to private investors
Schnable makes strong case for monetary-fiscal coordination.
public sector 'insensitive to low policy rates', giving Euroarea a fiscally restrained stance that further weakened monetary policy
why? fear of market tensions and public debt sustainability.
she wont say coordination, but ' policy response to the pandemic is a remarkable showcase for the power of monetary and fiscal policy interaction to boost confidence'
now that the S/B duo and other New Keynesians worry about pent-up demand, excess savings & inflation
I am reminded of similar debate, won by 'excess savings' crowd, with disastrous consequences in formerly planned economies.
it's 1989, the Berlin Wall is shaking, and IMF economists + theoreticians of centrally planned economies need to come up with a plan of what exactly transition macroeconomics should look like.
IMF and Disequilibrium School agreed: planned economies were 'chronic excess demand economies'
why? monetary overhang = the socialist worker couldnt spend her income because of chronic shortages and rationing.
pent up demand would explode into hyperinflation if left unchecked
In my evidence to @LordsEconCom, I argued that QE has fiscal spillovers that are poorly theorised & understood.
Reliance on QE alone created a massive failure of fiscal-monetary governance in 2010.
Good to see @guardian editorial warn against repeating that mistake post-pandemia
Bank of England's Internal Evaluation Office noted that the Bank should understand better the monetary-fiscal linkages created by QE.
I would go further, and argue that this gap affects:
a) transparency of QE
b) effectiveness of QE
c) design of fiscal measures
d) unwind of QE
a) Is QE transparent?
NO, if transparency = communicating clearly and effectively reasoning behind quantitative targets
two reasons: no theoretical tools to arrive at precise number, and no explicit consideration of 'monetary-fiscal linkages'
now for the exciting session on monetary populism on Hungary from Julia Kiraly, ex deputy governor of MNB (Hungary central bank):
my friends from the left and right, be careful!
oh, someone has read my work on Eastern European carry-trades.
Hungarian monetary populism: central banking subordinated to politics, that is divorced from economic thinking, but subservient to Orban oligarchs (!!!!!)
chief economist of the Slovakian central bank in conversation with @BJMbraun:
'there is nothing progressive about dismantling central bank independence and subjecting it to the will of the people' #nextgencentralbanking
reminded me of famous Mervyn King quote:
'central banks are often accused of being obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. If they are obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy'
Luis Garicano (EP): if @Isabel_Schnabel arguments wins the day and @ecb corrects market mispricing of climate risk, what next?
should ECB correct housing market imperfections? social/poverty imperfections?