Analysis of the IAEA's Iran monitoring and verification report with @TheGoodISIS. Thread on key findings: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
1) Iran's breakout time to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for one nuclear weapon, if it chose to do so, has a range of 2.7 to 3.5 months, where the average is 3.1 months. Iran could produce a second amount of WGU, and have enough for two nuclear weapons, within five months.
2) Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) stock now exceeds by fourteen-fold the limit set by the JCPOA. As of Feb. 16, Iran had a stockpile of about 4390.2 kilograms (kg) of LEU (hexafluoride mass), almost all enriched below 5 percent, or 2967.8 kg (uranium mass).
3) If this LEU is taken as all at 4.5 percent enriched, admittedly a worst case, then its current stock has grown sufficiently to support the production of enough WGU for three nuclear weapons, which it could produce within six months.
4) Monthly LEU production of up to 5 percent LEU (excl. near 20% & enriched uranium not in form of UF6) increased from 146.7 kg/month (u mass) in prev. reporting period to 205.5 kg/month this period. Monthly average production of 2 to 5% LEU increased slightly to 154.3 kg/month.
5) As reported, Iran started to produce near 20% enriched uranium on Jan. 4, in 1044 IR-1 centrifuges located at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Iran has enriched 17.6 kg (u mass) to near 20%.
6) Iran’s total estimated enrichment capacity at Natanz and Fordow has increased from 6963 separated work units (SWU)/yr to 8258 SWU/yr in currently enriching centrifuges; an increase of nearly 20 percent.
7) Current enrichment capacity at Natanz and Fordow, ignoring the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), is 6744 SWU per year.
8) If Iran installs all cascades of advanced centrifuges it is currently installing and firmly planning (a total of six), the total capacity increases to almost 12,900 SWU per year. This enrichment capacity is almost three times larger than allowed under the JCPOA.
9) Iran’s stock of heavy water as of Feb. 15 was 131.4 metric tonnes, above the JCPOA’s limit of 130 metric tonnes. Iran also shipped out 5.4 metric tonnes.
10) Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design. It also has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies for the original reactor design.
10) Iran produced 3.6 grams of uranium metal from natural uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, testing the process in preparation for a scaled up enriched uranium metal production line at the FPFP.
11) Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol & agreed to fully implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement & a “temporary bilateral technical understanding...for up to 3 months.” The technical annex remains secret, and as such, its effectiveness cannot be evaluated.
Read more at: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
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