Thread by @BeirutCalling

Saad Hariri, in his interview with Marcel Ghanem last October, signaled a radical change in his political approach, composed of two parts: First, a decision to base his domestic political strategy on a partnership with the main Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal.

This he showed by denouncing his erstwhile allies Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblatt, who had spent months criticizing Hariri. He effectively told them that if he and the Shia parties agreed, Geagea and Joumblatt could follow if they wanted, but if they did not, tough luck.

Two days later Joumblatt shifted his position, realizing that he risked being isolated. Geagea didn't, but is today marginalized domestically, as if confirming that those who are aligned with Saudi Arabia in Lebanon are destined to write themselves out of the story politically.

And second, Hariri broke off his previously unique reliance on Saudi Arabia as his main regional sponsor. He did so because he sensed this would lead to his political death. Instead, he built ties to other regional Sunni powers—the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, and even Qatar—and France.

The aim is to secure regional legitimacy as the main Sunni representative in Lebanon. He will never cut with the Saudis, but nor will he rely solely on them. In that way Hariri can impose himself domestically as a main actor vis-a-vis Hezbollah, but with 2 key differences:

First, he now seeks a partnership with Hezbollah domestically, not a confrontation; and second, he would have regional backing, which means he can become a figure around which regional Sunni as well as European states, can base their Lebanese policy.

Hezbollah may not be very happy with a revitalized Hariri, but nor would it oppose having a valid Sunni partner who provides them with a measure of cover, can secure outside aid, and who can ensure the avoidance of Sunni-Shia strife.

That's why Hezbollah may try to play a Maronite president off Hariri internally to weaken him; but it will also mean that if they want to preserve Sunni-Shia domestic concord, they cannot really prevent Hariri from acting as a relay of sorts for the Sunni states.

And if regional Sunni states back Hariri's domestic policy of openness to the Shia, as several will, it could lead to the potential emergence of a regional Sunni-Shia arrangement over Lebanon, where there is an understanding to maintain stability in the country.

One of the potential consequences of this could be Iranian de facto acceptance that Lebanon is more of a regional concern than strictly an Iranian one. Neither they nor Hezbollah wants this, but it's not immediately clear how they can cut Hariri off from the Sunni states.

There are surely many obstacles in the way of such a scenario, but the rigid Saudi and Iranian attitudes toward Lebanon (Tehran seeing it as an unchanging satrapy, Riyadh as a place meriting only open ended isolation) is inadequate given the dynamics shaping the region.

If this is Hariri's thinking, then it means he's not that interested in what the U.S. thinks, since such a scenario can take place with or without a nuclear deal with Iran. And it may mean that the current blockage with Bassil and Aoun is a small obstacle that will be removed.