Two months after Britain left the single market and customs union in favour of the TCA, a short thread based on my piece in this week’s issue.1/
Most obvious: multiplying complaints from seafood and pork exporters to fashionistas and musicians. Some are teething problems, but most flow directly from Boris Johnson’s choice to prioritise sovereignty over market access in the TCA.2/
Biggest political problem is NI protocol. Johnson chose this to avoid hard border with Ireland, while taking GB out of SM and CU. Barriers in the Irish Sea the inevitable result. Yet ERG Tories want to scrap what they eagerly voted for. 3/
Larger economic issue is trade across the channel. Here the big problem is rules of origin that hit businesses from supermarkets to pet foods to fashion designers. Strict sanitary rules also obstruct exports of shellfish and agrifoods. 4/
I recommend @rdanielkelemen, whose list of examples of Brexit trade barriers in first two months has now reached close to 220.5/
Regulatory equivalence for financial services looks far off. Musicians, actors and others gripe about red tape and travel restrictions. Provisional acceptance of data adequacy a rare ray of hope.6/
The key point is that the chances of reducing any of these barriers very small. Minor fiddles yes, but any substantial change, eg alignment with EU SPS rules, would cross sovereignty red lines.7/
Promotion of David Frost to replace Michael Gove does not augur any compromise. Nor does foolish row over EU ambassador in London, to whom Johnson government (alone in the world) refuses full diplomatic status. 8/
The cost of hard Brexit will take time to emerge. But it looks consistent with LSE modelling for @UKandEU: a fall over ten years in British exports to the EU of 36% and in incomes per head of 6%, bigger than impact of covid-19.9/
Brexiteers who insist benefits will emerge in ten years should recall Switzerland, whose voters rejected the single market (EEA) in 1992. Over the next decade the Swiss economy grew more slowly than any EU country’s.10/
Yet striking that Swiss did not change their minds. And, though polls point to narrow Remain majority, Brits unlikely to either. The scratchy and antagonistic relationship in prospect makes this ever less likely. 11/
@Mij_Europe was criticised for saying the EU gets on badly with its neighbours. I put it differently: the EU is bad at enticing voters who spurn it. That will apply here, even when Brexit damage is obvious. We are stuck with it.12ends/
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As so often, the consensus today is that we will get a Brexit trade deal, probably during next week. But I have my doubts.(Thread) 1/
The consensus is based on assumption that both sides are logical and rational. A deal benefits both, no deal harms both. Biden wants a deal too. Hence there will surely be one. 2/
Yet I don’t think the talks are governed by logic or rationality. If they were (a) there would have been an extension of transition and (b) the principles of a deal would have been agreed by now. 3/
Even by his own low standards, Boris Johnson’s Telegraph article plumbs new depths of shoddiness and dishonesty (short thread) 1/
It was obvious to anyone who thought for 5 minutes that Northern Ireland and specifically the border with Ireland would be a massive problem if the UK voted for Brexit 2/
When it did, Britain agreed to an EU demand that NI should be part of the Withdrawal Agreement, not the future relationship. It could have said no. Johnson was foreign secretary at the time. 3/
Why is Boris Johnson’s government refusing to extend transition for a year, when case for is clear, and treaty allows it to be agreed before end-June? A short thread based round my comment in this week’s issue. 1/
Transition of 11 months was always extremely short to get a complex deal agreed and ratified. But covid-19 distraction, problems of negotiating remotely and two extreme mandates have made much worse by producing deadlock in UK/ EU talks. 2/
UK firms on their knees thanks to covid-19 are just not ready for sharp break in January , even if there is a deal in place. Customs agents? Licences? SPS checks? Rules of origin? 3/
Trouble ahead on EU/UK negotiations, a short thread after a few days in Brussels based on my article this week. 1/
The gap between Barnier’s draft guidelines and Johnson’s speech/statement is wide, and because Johnson refuses even to consider an extension time is exceptionally short. 2/
The EU is taking an extreme position on level playing-field. UK has a point when arguing that no other FTA requires a partner to follow EU rules so rigorously. 3/
What we have learnt about Brexit’s next stage, short thread based on my Economist piece this week. 1/
First, Parliament no longer matters. The sight of MPs rejecting all amendments to the WAB, however reasonable, and passing all its new provisions, however undesirable, confirms that the Johnson government can do what it likes now. A far cry from the days of Theresa May. 2/
This means Brexit will happen on January 31st. But it will not be “done” and nor can the word Brexit be dropped as the news shifts to business pages. We will be in an 11-month transition during which a highly complex deal on the future must be both completed and ratified. 3/
Why I am worried about Johnson getting Brexit done, short thread based on my piece in this week’s Economist./1
With a Tory majority, Parliament seems sure to ratify the Article 50 withdrawal agreement Johnson renegotiated in October in time for Brexit on January 31st./2
The psychological importance of Brexit formally happening will be profound, not least because it will kill the argument for holding a second referendum./3