Li Keqiang just announced that China’s GDP growth target – surprising most analysts, who did not expect China to set one this year – would be set “above 6%” in 2021. Most analysts were expecting growth this year to be between 8% and 10%, while...
the more conservative IMF on January revised down its 2021 forecast from 8.2% to 7.9%. This target consequently should come as a shock to most analysts and journalists.
But I have been arguing pretty consistently since December that these forecasts were likely...
3/12
to be wrong for the same reason that forecasts of negative growth in 2020 were so wrong. I expected growth to be 6-7% this year. Why? Because we have to see fixed-asset investment in infrastructure and real-estate development as the residual Beijing uses to meet...
4/12
politically motivated growth targets. Healthy, sustainable growth in China – what Beijing calls “high-quality” growth – consists mainly of growth generated by consumption, exports, and business investment, with the third closely tracking the first two. Beijing wants as...
5/12
much "high-quality" growth as possible and as little FAI as necessary, clearly because it recognizes that the latter generates non-productive growth and an enormous debt burden.
Because of Covid-19 “high-quality” growth last year was expected to be negative, which...
6/12
is why most analysts predicted negative GDP growth overall, but that was always unlikely. Since April I had expected GDP growth in 2020 to be between 2-3%, mainly because Beijing would respond to negative high-quality growth by kicking off a major FAI spending spree...
7/12
which would drive up the debt-to-GDP ratio by at least 20 percentage points. In the end that is what happened, with the debt burden rising in fact by an astonishing 25 percentage points.
That is also why I wrote in January that "it is only...
because Beijing sharply increased all the things it has been trying to rein in that the GDP measure was able to rise.”
In 2021 much of this would go into reverse. With a partial reversal of last year’s increase in household savings, consumption and business investment...
9/12
would probably drive roughly 6-7 percentage points “high-quality” growth this year. Given the terrible debt numbers and the very visible worries among top policymakers, this gave Beijing a chance to cut back sharply on FAI in infrastructure spending and real estate and...
10/12
allow them to successfully “stabilize” China’s debt-to-GDP, keeping it growing by probably no more than 1 or 2 points this year.
That is why I didn’t expect GDP growth this year to be anywhere near the consensus. It would almost certainly come in much lower as Beijing...
11/12
used the one-off surge in consumption to reverse (only partially) some of the FAI- and debt-related damage last year.
But it is important to remember that this is only a one-off. Once the partial reversal of last-year’s contraction in consumption is completed, we are...
12/12
back to the same old growth model, in which any growth target above 2-3% will require significant FAI and a soaring debt burden.
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Guo Shuqing is right to worry about the impact on Chinese financial stability of a continued flood of foreign capital into China. Once foreigners comprise a significant share, the regulators will no longer be able to forcibly restructure...
liabilities at will in order to address the huge imbalances, insolvencies and mismatches in the Chinese banking system. What is more, the risk of contagion will increasingly run both ways. Chinese markets are thoroughly speculative too, and the only reason they don’t yet...
3/10
matter to the rest of the world is because foreign participation is still low. This will change in the next 1-3 years.
He is also right to worry that the more integrated Chinese financial markets are with the rest of the world, the harder it will be to run independent...
We have to be careful not to misinterpret this point. Chinese investment in Australia peaked in 2016, as the chart shows, before petering off sharply in 2019-20. So of course did Australia's current account deficit, which further swung into surplus by mid-2019 and 2020.
That is what the graph below shows. In itself this shouldn't be surprising. The current account, after all, is equal to the difference between domestic investment and savings, and by definition net foreign inflows must either raise the former or reduce the latter.
3/12
That is why whether or not Australia's current account deficit is a good thing or not depends on whether it is driven by more overall investment or less overall savings. More foreign inflows into Australia (whether from China or elsewhere) will result in more...
Guo Shuqing, China's top banking regulator, is worried that "the bubble problem in foreign financial markets will one day pop. China’s market is now highly linked to foreign markets and foreign capital continues to flow in.”
Although foreign participation in Chinese markets is still too low to matter, he is right to worry. China's banking system is rigid, unstable, and largely insolvent, but it was never at much risk of breaking down because of the ability of regulators to isolate it and...
3/4
restructure liabilities at will.
Over time, however, as Chinese financial markets become more integrated into global markets, it will be much harder to suppress adjustment in the domestic financial sector, and so they will become much more like those of typical...
Lou Jiwei's claim that the US is monetizing its budget deficit to transfer its debt burden to the rest of the world, especially to developing countries like China, shows just how terribly confused even fairly intelligent people are about the...
basics of the balance of payments. Foreigners can only be "forced" to acquire US assets to the extent that their policies result in their running surpluses against US deficits. Saying that the world should not be forced to acquire American assets is exactly the same as...
3/6
saying that the world should not be allowed to run surpluses with the US.
Clearly this is the opposite of what Beijing really wants. As long as Chinese policies result in soaring trade surpluses, it must acquire foreign assets. The reason it acquires American assets is...
Very interesting article. It seems pretty clear that the point of massively expanding China’s transportation infrastructure over the next 15 years has more to do with the goal of doubling reported GDP over the period than with improving the...
economic efficiency of Chinese transportation. China probably already has the best transportation network in the world for its level of development, and almost certainly a more expensive transportation network than is productively justified.
3/9
In that case there are at least three important concerns with this strategy. The first and most obvious is that the doubling of GDP will necessarily involve overstating the comparable value of GDP, so that it becomes a meaningless proxy: GDP may double temporarily, but...
While it is definitely a good idea to come up with innovative ways to fund needed infrastructure, government funding really isn’t an issue for self-liquidating projects. Consider China’s case. Chinese debt has been rising extremely rapidly since...
the late 1980s, but no one noticed until roughly two decades later.
Why? Because until then China was severely underinvested in infrastructure and manufacturing capacity, and so while nominal debt rose rapidly, its contribution to real GDP rose just as rapidly. It was...
3/7
only once debt was used to fund investment whose cost exceeded its contribution to the real economy that China’s debt burden began to rise, after which of course additional debt can only be serviced by transfers, and not just by increases in real debt-servicing capacity.