1) Let's talk about the story of Youzan, an e-commerce back-end SaaS platform for omnichannel retail, implied market cap of $12.2Bn.
Their founder is legendary, high-school dropout turned artist turned Alipay PM turned founder.
Imo it's the Chinese Salesforce, not Shopify
2) So while Youzan's founder is called Ning Zhu, he goes by the moniker White Crow (白鸦 aka Bai Ya). In homage to a parable where a white crow chooses freedom and starving to death over a lifetime of cushy cage-dwelling.
3) He grew up in the poorest county in Henan. After dropping out of secondary school, he worked a series of odd jobs, including peddling clothes and construction work but eventually returned to education and got a degree in art and design.
4) After a break-up in 2003, he got on a train to Beijing and vowed to work for six years as a web designer to see what would come out of it. The timing was right and he ended up working at Baidu before joining Alipay in '08. Working his way up to being the lead designer.
5) In 2011, with one failed startup behind him. He embarked on a new venture. A merchant CRM based on the newly established Wechat. The name was Pocket Tong (口袋通)
When WeChat's user count exploded in 2013, more merchants everyday wondered how to do business on the platform.
6) Then the unexpected happened, Alibaba blocked WeChat's links in Nov 2013. The fanbase that merchants had spent a year cultivating had no place to go to finish their purchase journey.
The team had an opportunity in front of them, and they took it.
7) The way forward was an e-commerce platform that utilised the private and decentralised traffic of WeChat to transact. Youzan pivoted from merchant tooling to being a full-stack micro store.
8) Youzan is at the intersection of several Chinese tech trends right now; the rise of private traffic in e-commerce, getting Chinese enterprises to pay for software and how to own the funnel.
9) They follow the 'own the funnel' strategy after a crucial realisation. Chinese companies see making money as their core competence; this means improvements in efficiencies and cost reductions are nice-to-haves. Tools that increase revenue are need-to-have.
10) They are reluctant to pay for process optimisation but are willing to pay for positive outcomes. I believe every Chinese SaaS company encounters this mindset sooner or later, and the smart ones decide that they too need to make money and become revenue generation offerings.
11) With this ethos, Youzan's offering enables its merchants to be a one-stop-shop for their customers.
12) In terms of what the product looks like. Storefront layout is relatively set and allows a certain degree of customisation. The layout takes heavy inspiration from Taobao (and I guess so does every other e-commerce platform).
13) While a general comparison for Youzan has been about how it's the Chinese equivalent of Shopify, upon closer examination, Youzan's product strategy is strikingly similar to Salesforce's. I think of Youzan being a CRM that commercialises through their e-commerce platform.
14) On the 28th of February, they made an announcement that they will be delisting from the Growth Enterprise Market of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and have applied to be listed on the Main Board. It's getting ready for prime time, and I'm excited to see what it'll do
1) AliCloud is finally profitable 12 years after its inception. Posting topline rev of $1.78bn and EBITDA of $3.7m in Q3 2020. In comparison, it took AWS 20 years to reach profitability.
However, interesting times ahead - some facts and thoughts on the state of cloud in China:
2) Don't get me wrong, Alicloud is doing well. Gartner rated them as being the global top 3 for IaaS in market share in 2020.
It just took them billions of investment to get there and unclear how much more billions in the future
3) Alicloud will invest an additional RMB 200 billion in the next three years. Tencent will invest RMB 500 billion in the next five years to build multiple million-level servers. Baidu will scale to 5 million units in 10 years, equivalent to an investment of RMB 300 billion
1) Ok, Chinese tech watercooler news - On 6th March, the Alibaba intranet got a ~5,000-word post from an employee who quit the next day.
His blistering and funny critique of Alibaba’s culture failings has been causing a ruckus. Zhihu, Mai Mai and intranets have been blowing up
2) Fractions are appearing inside Alibaba, taking different sides of the argument (there is a donkey fraction).
It is a really funny, post and here are some choice excerpts:
3) "When we joined Alibaba, we all had expectations. No matter what we thought about Alibaba afterwards. On the outside, we all had some admiration for the company. This caused my first confusion as I entered Alibaba. Such a sizable company, but why the constant anxiety?"
1) Let's talk about my framing for e-commerce product strategy.
It answers why in Chinese tech there is a fanatic fixation on internet traffic. Why every consumer app become a super-app.
Ubiquitous in Chinese tech but also prevalent in Facebook, Shopify and Google' strategy.
2) Every player is always working on owning the awareness-to-fulfilment funnel (or customer journey). This is a descriptive product strategy that builds on a foundational ethos of "owning the user".
3) Relative to western consumer tech companies, who tend to focus on “serving a function” as their core mission, Chinese companies tend to focus on “owning the user” as their core mission (though the initial wedge into the consumer is always through a function.
1) Let's talk about how to think about applying a successful Chinese tech trend to your tech ecosystem.
Let's deconstruct the elements of what made livestreaming take off in China, and what is easily replicable and what isn't
2) So I've discussed before that I view livestreaming as both an entertainment product as well as a distribution channel. So when people are asking whether livestreaming can take off, they are really asking two questions about monetisation.
3) - Will people tip livestreamers?
- Will people buy things from a livestream?
The answer to both these questions involves understanding the technological, institutional and cultural underpinnings of Chinese tech. Yeah, bummer we gotta know all that.
1) Let's talk about the stealthiest player in the short-video war and the implication on Bilibili, Kuaishou and Bytedance as well as the longer direction of travel for western social media in the future.
I'm talking about WeChat video
2) WeChat Video was launched silently last January and broke through 200m DAU by June 2020 and is estimated by third parties to be at 350m DAU currently.
By comparison Kuaishou took 5 years to reach 300m DAU in June 2020.
3) WeChat's video feature is a response to other short videos platforms (Douyin / TikTok being the biggest one) and though it had a late start, it has some distinct advantages.
An existing collection of brands and influencers who built their house on WeChat official accounts
1) Let’s talk about the three things I found interesting and weird about the Chinese VC ecosystem
- Corporate Venture Capital regimes supreme
- Much shorter fund time horizons
- LPs are mostly government
1) Corporate VCs (CVC) are the corporate venture arm of established firms. In the west they often get a bad name since they’ve had a history of blocking sales of startup to their competitors or applying a corporate mindset to venture.
2) Google venture seems to be the exception to the rule, but often western founders typically want a CVC to follow in a round. When they are leading its a bad signal.
The opposite is true (at least by rule of thumb) in China. Startups think of CVCs as credible