1/12

After listing a series of quite specific economic steps and goals proposed during the Two Sessions, this front page People's Daily article turns to rebalancing, about which it says: "Committed to expanding domestic demand as a strategic...

en.people.cn/n3/2021/0311/c…
2/12

move, China will step up efforts to develop the Internet economy, encourage the consumption of physical goods, explore new models of services consumption, and scale up support to manufacturers."
3/12

It is striking that all of these recommendations are supply-side measures that will, at best, boost the efficiency of consumption. None of them will help actually rebalance demand towards consumption because none of them delivers a greater share of income to...
4/12

households (unless this is what they mean when they say later that Beijing will "act on the new development philosophy".

In an Odd Lots podcast I did 3 weeks ago (released today) @tracyalloway asks me why Beijing finds it so hard to implement...

bloomberg.com/news/audio/202…
5/12

demand-side policies rather than supply-side policies. I think this is something we really need to understand if we want to project China's growth and adjustment trajectories.

The answer, I would argue, is that the paths a country can follow are heavily constrained...
6/12

by existing institutions. Albert Hirschman was especially sensitive to these types of problems. He argued that after many years of a "successful" economic model, a country develops a whole series of powerful institutions – social, political, legal, financial, and so...
7/12

on – around which political and economic power is formally and informally structured. These institutions won't adjust quickly and frictionlessly to whatever new model the government or the IMF try to impose unless it directly benefits them. That's why there is always...
8/12

significant resistance to reforms, and perhaps why they usually fail.

Take Russia's "shock therapy" reforms in the 1990s, for example. In principle these reforms made economic sense, but I'd argue that they assumed – incorrectly – that Russian institutions could adjust...
9/12

quickly and efficiently to the new conditions. But because they couldn't, the result was political and economic chaos. The same happened in Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the LDC crisis forced them to adopt the "Washington Consensus" reforms.
10/12

For reforms not to be politically disruptive, they must fit into existing institutions, and they must evolve in ways that do not threaten current relations of politcal and economic power. This seems to be what happened in Meiji Japan, and even in post-Mao...
11/12

China, although not without seriously disruptive periods in either case.

Even though we pretty much know what China must do to rebalance domestic demand sufficiently to keep the economy growing quickly (redistribute at least 2-3 percentage points of GDP every year...
12/12

from elites and local governments to ordinary households), it doesn't mean it will be easy to do if it also involves – as it must – a significant transfer of formal and informal economic and political power.

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More from @michaelxpettis

12 Mar
1/8

Interesting article. Certain government officials have been warning that Biden’s recovery plan for the US economy could inflate global asset bubbles, cause further financial market turmoil and lead to higher inflation, especially in China.

scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/8

Beijing doesn't have a good track record predicting US interest rates and the dollar, but it is interesting that this has become such a concern recently. After all soaring debt, wasted investment and asset-price bubbles have been serious problems in China for many years.
3/8

So what has changed? My suspicion is that what is really driving this may be rising concern among more sophisticated officials about the adverse impact of the existing surge in flows into China. So much money pouring into the country through the trade and financial...
Read 8 tweets
10 Mar
1/4

This prominently-placed Xinhua article about steps to promote "dual circulation" is fairly revealing. Except for a couple of abstract promises to expand consumption, without explaining how, each of the more concrete proposals involves increasing...

xinhuanet.com/english/2021-0…
2/4

production efficiency, subsidizing production costs, or substituting foreign imports, and then suggesting that more production will lead automatically to more consumption.

It might, but of course rebalancing doesn't mean more consumption; it means having domestic...
3/4

consumption absorb a larger share of total production so that China can reduce its dependence on non-productive investment and trade surpluses for growth. Until Beijing puts into place concrete policies that increase the GDP share retained by ordinary...
Read 4 tweets
10 Mar
1/6

The seeming paradox that stronger-than-expected economic growth in the US can actually undermine growth in developing countries by setting off capital outflows is further evidence, if more were needed, that unfettered capital damages the global...

wsj.com/articles/u-s-g…
2/6

economy. The widespread assumption that global productivity actually benefits from the free flow of capital implicitly assumes that, in the aggregate, investors mostly try to take advantage of productive growth opportunities and, by doing so, reinforce that growth.
3/6

But it's been decades since anyone (except the occasional economist) pretends that this is indeed the way the world works. International capital doesn't flow towards productive investment opportunities. It mostly flows to take advantage of expectations of short-term...
Read 6 tweets
9 Mar
1/5

The "national team" may be intervening to stabilize Chinese stock markets which, as of this posting, are up roughly 1.4% on the day. Although I don't think there is anything wrong with counter-cyclical behavior when speculative markets are soaring...

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5

or crashing, this does indicate one of the major difficulties Beijing faces when it tries to rein in debt or stabilize housing prices: policymakers have almost no tolerance for rapid price declines.

If you believe, as I do, that debt in China must surge and real-estate...
3/5

prices rise for structural reasons, there is little Beijing can do to address these problems that won't automatically result in rapidly-slowing GDP growth or falling real-estate prices. For all the promises of the past decade, and no matter how urgent they have recently...
Read 5 tweets
8 Mar
1/4

No country in history has ever been able to choose its long-term economic growth rate. The fact that China – like several countries before it, by the way, before they were forced into "unexpectedly" difficult adjustments – was able to target high...

scmp.com/economy/global…
2/4

GDP growth rates for many years, and plans to continue doing so for another 15 years, must mean either that the Chinese economy and its economic institutions are manipulable in a way that is almost incomprehensible, or that GDP growth simply doesn't mean in China's case...
3/4

what we think it means. It is astonishing to me that most analysts continue to opt for the former, and work on the basis that China's GDP growth rate is somehow comparable to GDP growth rates of other countries. Fortunately Beijing seems to be getting increasingly...
Read 4 tweets
7 Mar
1/4

Yet again Beijing promises to try to get a grip on real estate prices, this time by making more land available to developers. I suspect however that for all their worry, they are not yet willing to take the necessary steps to stop the bubble.

scmp.com/business/china…
2/4

The reason I continue to be skeptical is because it has been a long time since real-estate markets in China were responding mainly to fundamentals. We have been firmly in the world of real-estate speculation for well over a decade, and few economists seem to understand...
3/4

that the dynamics of a speculative market are very different. In a speculative market it is expectations of rising prices that drive demand, in which case there is almost nothing Beijing can do to stabilize prices, let alone have them gently glide downwards. Prices must...
Read 4 tweets

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