Interesting article. Certain government officials have been warning that Biden’s recovery plan for the US economy could inflate global asset bubbles, cause further financial market turmoil and lead to higher inflation, especially in China.
Beijing doesn't have a good track record predicting US interest rates and the dollar, but it is interesting that this has become such a concern recently. After all soaring debt, wasted investment and asset-price bubbles have been serious problems in China for many years.
3/8
So what has changed? My suspicion is that what is really driving this may be rising concern among more sophisticated officials about the adverse impact of the existing surge in flows into China. So much money pouring into the country through the trade and financial...
4/8
accounts must necessarily exacerbate the bubble conditions of the past several years, just as it also must necessarily undermine the ability of regulators to restructure domestic liabilities. Over the next year or two, in other words, it will become harder than ever for...
5/8
regulators to suppress financial instability.
Beijing has tried recently to manage the impact of inflows by encouraging outflows but, as I have explained elsewhere, when lower net inflows are caused by higher gross outflows, this only increases the balance-sheet mismatch...
6/8
and makes China more susceptible to global liquidity shifts. If Chinese bond markets really were starting to play a global role similar to that of US and European bond markets – as so many fund managers are giddily proclaiming – inflows and outflows into China would be...
7/8
countercyclical, like in most highly developed financial markets, or at worst neutral. But in China they are more likely to be as procyclical as those of any other developing country, and so highly destabilizing.
I suspect that all these warnings by some officials...
8/8
may be part of an attempt to change Beijing’s attitude towards the internationalization of China’s financial markets. If successful, regulators may even start to take initial steps later this year or next to discourage foreign financial inflows.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This paper argues that there's no evidence of an adverse “China shock” on the US economy, and uses the following graph showing employment in the manufacturing sector to make that point.
But as Matt Klein and I argue in our book, this approach is...
based on an obsolete model of trade. First, it has been many decades since the impact of trade on the US or any other economy can be assessed as a function of bilateral imbalances. Given the highly globalized nature of trade, these are really not meaningful...
3/8
any more, and matter only to the extent that they affect overall trade imbalances. And because these are mainly drive by savings imbalances in the surplus countries, which are themselves a consequence of the way income is distributed, I really don’t think bilateral trade...
According to this Caixin article: "As the government battled last year to reboot an economy pummeled by the Covid-19 epidemic, it opened the debt spigot and put on the back burner its long-standing commitment to tackling the mountains of...
debt and hidden financial risks accumulated by local authorities from years of investment spending."
Beijing, in other words, can always achieve more GDP growth simply by encouraging more local government spending on investment, but it doesn't want to. Clearly it...
3/7
believes this spending isn't a good thing.
And it isn't. If it were productive, the debt that funds it could not have soared relative to GDP for the past two decades because, by definition, debt used to fund productive investment causes GDP to grow faster than the debt.
After listing a series of quite specific economic steps and goals proposed during the Two Sessions, this front page People's Daily article turns to rebalancing, about which it says: "Committed to expanding domestic demand as a strategic...
move, China will step up efforts to develop the Internet economy, encourage the consumption of physical goods, explore new models of services consumption, and scale up support to manufacturers."
3/12
It is striking that all of these recommendations are supply-side measures that will, at best, boost the efficiency of consumption. None of them will help actually rebalance demand towards consumption because none of them delivers a greater share of income to...
This prominently-placed Xinhua article about steps to promote "dual circulation" is fairly revealing. Except for a couple of abstract promises to expand consumption, without explaining how, each of the more concrete proposals involves increasing...
production efficiency, subsidizing production costs, or substituting foreign imports, and then suggesting that more production will lead automatically to more consumption.
It might, but of course rebalancing doesn't mean more consumption; it means having domestic...
3/4
consumption absorb a larger share of total production so that China can reduce its dependence on non-productive investment and trade surpluses for growth. Until Beijing puts into place concrete policies that increase the GDP share retained by ordinary...
The seeming paradox that stronger-than-expected economic growth in the US can actually undermine growth in developing countries by setting off capital outflows is further evidence, if more were needed, that unfettered capital damages the global...
economy. The widespread assumption that global productivity actually benefits from the free flow of capital implicitly assumes that, in the aggregate, investors mostly try to take advantage of productive growth opportunities and, by doing so, reinforce that growth.
3/6
But it's been decades since anyone (except the occasional economist) pretends that this is indeed the way the world works. International capital doesn't flow towards productive investment opportunities. It mostly flows to take advantage of expectations of short-term...
The "national team" may be intervening to stabilize Chinese stock markets which, as of this posting, are up roughly 1.4% on the day. Although I don't think there is anything wrong with counter-cyclical behavior when speculative markets are soaring...
or crashing, this does indicate one of the major difficulties Beijing faces when it tries to rein in debt or stabilize housing prices: policymakers have almost no tolerance for rapid price declines.
If you believe, as I do, that debt in China must surge and real-estate...
3/5
prices rise for structural reasons, there is little Beijing can do to address these problems that won't automatically result in rapidly-slowing GDP growth or falling real-estate prices. For all the promises of the past decade, and no matter how urgent they have recently...