Both good thoughts. Because I can’t get back to writing my draft article until I get this off my chest, a long thread about article length. These observations are triggered by Dave’s suggestion but not directed at these points, which I think are basically good. /1
2 hypotheses and 1 argument about Why L Rev Articles Are So Long:
1. It’s as much a function of who is reading/reviewing as it is about mere word limits/expectations.
2. Jr. scholars are likely going to bear the brunt of the Your Article Is Too Long complaint. /2
3. Sr. scholars complaining about article length (which is not what Dave is doing in the above RT) is my least favorite genre of academic tweet.
So please stop. (Again, not what Dave is doing, but some of you might already be doing it in the replies/RTs.) /3
First, it’s about the process. When the reviewer is not specialized, it takes time to situate the idea, frame it, give background without seeming like it’s unnecessary background, and introduce the reader to your special little area of the law. Really, it takes time & words. /4
Intros also get long under the time pressure of the submissions cycle. If you expect that the editors reviewing your piece will only have time to read ~10 pages, then you’d better do a lot of that situating, framing, and arguing in the intro. It becomes an executive summary. /5
My *guess* is that this is especially true for those in specialized fields, where we can't be confident we'll encounter a reader who has taken even an intro course in our area. We need to do more of that work to make it relatable. More words. /6
Second, junior scholars have to pay attention to all of this, because they don’t have name recognition, which is another good way to get published. We need the form because we don’t have the brand. /7
So then we diligently learn how to write a law review article. And then, while on the job market or up for T&P, we feel consistently subtweeted by profs who complain about reading articles that “could’ve been a blog post.” /8
This feels like the latest in a long line of legal industry bait-and-switch moves. There are 10,000 reasons not to hire someone, the latest being that their article in the Such-and-Such Law Review could have been a lot shorter. /9
There are millions of these tweets. When I was on the market, one of them came from someone who was then on a hiring committee, complaining about an article’s 11-page intro. My job talk intro was about that long for the reasons stated above. Not great. /10
What’s worse is that the complaining profs often make exceptions for themselves or their friends. I saw one such tweet that made an exception for “historical” articles, though many legal history journals have hard caps at ~12k words. “Length for me and not for thee.” /11
So that’s my third point. As we reconsider law review article length, please recognize that structure is driving this and don’t dunk on the authors, especially juniors. /12
Also a few concrete suggestions. First, you don’t need to accept shorter articles to accept more articles. You can just stop publishing paper copies, and get rid of that artificial limitation. I like paper, but even I can’t justify keeping old journal volumes./13
Second, T&P standards must move in line with—preferably before—changes in journal practices. I know many scholars who would rather focus on blog posts instead of articles and the world would be better for it. We should accommodate them. @espinsegall has made a similar point. /14
These first two points are linked, actually. Many journals *already* have online editions for shorter work. The editors themselves are often blissfully unaware of how differentially these two “sides” are treated by our peers. We can fix that by just behaving differently. /15
Third, journals, don’t do this. Not now. I broke myself during covid trying to finish for Feb. and didn’t quite make it. If you switch it up on me and do this, as if I have infinite time, I’ll just fucking cry at my desk for the next five months. And I’m sure I’m not alone. /End
A continuation of my thread on investment and national security. I’m so enthusiastic about this topic I couldn’t fit it all in a single thread, it seems. …
I left off with the US-Peru FTA and its self-judging security footnote. That one is interesting, because 2 years later China concluded a PTA with Peru, and flipped the script, making a non-self-judging footnote. It’s interesting to speculate as to why. 26/
The 2015 India Model BIT is fascinating because it combines elements of all the models. There’s self-judging language, alongside a GATT-style list of security concerns, with some new additions (“critical infrastructure”). There’s even a GATS-style reporting obligation. But… 27/
Today in investment law and policy, we’re talking about investment and national security (my favorite topic). The students read treaty text and Continental Casualty v Arg, and also watched a short recorded lecture by me. Other links below were not assigned to students. 1/
First, a little background from my recorded lecture. When folks say that today there is greater overlap between #NatSec & #ISDS, what do they mean? What kinds of measures are they talking about? How would they violate investment rules? 2/
Historically, the primary concern might have been economic sanctions. The US, in particular, has for years applied sanctions, asset freezes, and embargoes under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act and the 1977 Int’l Emergency Economic Powers Act (pictured). 3/
A thread on what’s going on in this odd (or, as @t_streinz put it, “quirky”) essay. Owing to my association with @nyuiilj, I’ve been a longtime consumer of US administrative law scholarship, which I found incredibly generative of ideas for the study of int’l institutions. /1
I think US admin scholarship tends to break down according to whether you believe: 1. that the administrative state is a practical necessity; and 2. that administrative governance suffers from something like a “deficit” of democratic legiitimacy. Like this:
/2
The top-left box I associate with first-wave critical legal studies, particularly Frug’s 1984 piece The Ideology of Bureaucracy. jstor.org/stable/pdf/134…. /3
Really enjoyed this post from @AntheaERoberts@taylor__stjohn. There are many good pieces about the proposals for ISDS reforms & tradeoffs. What is unique about this piece is its emphasis on a political, deliberative forum as the emerging system's "center." Initial reactions 1/n.
I agree that it's important to think about the diplomatic and political fora that will compliment/steer whatever court or appellate process is eventually set up. I've learned a lot from @loyaladvisor about this dimension of the trading system. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf… 2/n
There's lots of helpful literature on the role of political fora, both vis-a-vis courts and as governance mechanisms in their own right. The post's reference to the UNFCCC (likely deliberately) calls to mind Churchill & Ulfstein's foundational work: cambridge.org/core/journals/… 3/n
A provocative take on the US national security tariffs. bit.ly/31peM8A. @rodrikdani suggests "the best we can hope for is what one might call 'democracy-enhancing global governance'" based on procedural requirements. 1/4
I generally agree with the diagnosis. I'm skeptical that the response is as easy as shifting from substantive to procedural review (e.g., for transparency). In practice, these procedural principles are so open-ended they can simply mask a more substantive decision. 2/4
Neither do I think that 100% non-jusiticability is the answer - maybe in other times/contexts, but not today. But int'l courts could steer deliberations about #NatSec measures to other domestic & int'l fora where appropriate, & this is worth exploring further. 3/4
/1 Just finished a quick first read of the WTO panel decision today on Article XXI (Russia - Traffic in Transit, DS512). Thanks @rdmcdougall@howserob. Some very preliminary reactions for purposes of discussion. (Long thread).
/2 Section 7.5.2 is in some sense as important as the panel's judgment, as it sets out the positions of member states. We already had some sense of the members' positions, and some (US, EU, Australia included) had released their briefs. At least 2 interesting things there:
/3 First, Canada and the EU both accept justiciability of Art XXI, but are on opposite sides on whether the exception has "objective" elements. Notable given that #CETA essentially replicates the Article XXI formulation, as does 2004 Canadian model FIPA.