My piece on the UK warhead announcement today, looking at some—though certainly not all—of the possible rationales for the shift to a larger stockpile. Thanks to @heatherwilly for input on what the review might mean by the "doctrinal threat" from Russia economist.com/britain/2021/0…
Do read @tjaplant & @harries_matthew: "Although UK has ceased to publicly discuss a ‘sub-strategic’ role for its nuclear arsenal, this increased stockpile & greater flexibility could provide greater room for use of low-yield variants." This is "troubling" rusi.org/commentary/goi…
And a harshly critical judgment here, too: "The review asserts the UK’s commitment to nuclear disarmament but offers no new steps to offset the impact of its stockpile increase and sets out no vision for future arms control negotiations ..." rusi.org/commentary/goi…
"MPs, whether they support or oppose nuclear deterrence, should take today’s developments as their cue to get serious about scrutinising the UK’s nuclear warhead programme, as a matter of sound policy and expenditure if nothing else" rusi.org/commentary/goi…
Malcolm Rifkind for @theELN: "increasing the number of warheads without increasing the number of delivery vehicles is unlikely to make a significant difference...the proposed increase in warheads is disturbing. It will weaken the effectiveness of the NPT" europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/eln…
More @harries_matthew: "changes in the strategic military balance may not be the only driver for the higher stockpile cap. There could be practical issues, such as the way nuclear warheads are maintained and upgraded, that make increasing the cap useful.." ft.com/content/0fe2bf…
"in the event that global arms control does progress and the UK is drawn in, its new warhead ceiling could approximate to the number that the UK might negotiate down from. So its policy change should be kept in perspective and all hope should not be lost." ft.com/content/0fe2bf…
Russia's response (OK, a Russian expert's response ...) to the warhead buildup is: meh.
🧵 A note on cyber and nuclear. Some picked up on this line in IR: "we reserve the right to review this [negative security] assurance if the future threat of [WMD] [including] emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary" assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
Sources told the Telegraph this referred to: '... “game changers” such as cyber, AI, encryption and laser directed energy weapons ...' telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/… (let's leave aside "encryption"). Some interpreted "cyber" to mean highly destructive cyber attacks. I'm less sure
It made me think of the changed language in 2018 US nuclear posture review, which said "significant non-nuclear strategic attacks" could include "attacks on US or allies’ nuclear forces, their command & control, or warning & attack assessment.." nti.org/analysis/artic…
🧵A few other random bits and pieces from the integrated review that caught my eye:
UK promises to "introduce a new, robust security framework for telecoms to ensure our networks are secure and resilient to future challenges; and work with partners, including the Five Eyes, to create a more diverse and competitive supply base for telecoms networks."
On China, an interesting mix of cautious and robust language. "The significant impact of China’s military modernisation and growing international assertiveness within the Indo-Pacific region and beyond will pose an increasing risk to UK interests."
"What this speech undeniably proves is that Brown and the US Air Force in general have deep concerns about the affordability of the official programme of record for 1,763 F-35As to eventually replace all the services’ legacy fighter types" rusi.org/publication/ru…
Nugget from @Justin_Br0nk. "the total acquisition cost per F-35A in FY2020 was around $102.7 million rather than the $80 million touted by Lockheed Martin. However, this is still equivalent to or below those of most advanced four-and-a-half-generation Western competitors"
"The real problems for the viability of the original 1,763-aircraft order are high ongoing support and operating costs of the F-35A, which at around $36,000 per flight hour are ... well above that of legacy F-16s." rusi.org/publication/ru…
Nice to see a report that doesn't revel in space hype, but acknowledges clearly "space was never really a sanctuary", and explicitly addresses the US history with counter-space weapons csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pu…
Defensive satellite "maneuver also depends on having near-real-time and continuous tracking data for incoming warheads. Thus, maneuver is best employed in combination with other active defenses that target the sensors guiding an ASAT" csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pu…
"stealthy satellites can use a smaller size, radar-absorbing coatings, radar-deflecting shapes, radar jamming and spoofing, unexpected or optimized maneuvers, and careful control of reflected radar, optical, and infrared energy" csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pu…
"For the @BritishArmy it'll mean operating from a number of "global hubs" in parts of the world where it already has a presence–Kenya, Oman and Brunei...We see those as launchpads through which we can routinely send more of the British army out to train, develop and demonstrate"
"Mr Barry, of the @IISS_org , says allies in eastern Europe are left wondering whether the British army of the future will be sending "armour and infantry or aggressive algorithms" to help defend them." bbc.co.uk/news/uk-560070…
"Mr Barry and @Jack_Watling also question whether an army of 72,000 could do another Helmand - a long, enduring campaign. Brig Clark insists it could. But the British army has a recent history of biting off more than it can chew."" bbc.co.uk/news/uk-560070…
"When asked if, in 2025, a British war-fighting division will be capable of ‘overmatching the forces of a peer opponent such as Russia’, Minister for Defence Procurement Jeremy Quin replied ‘absolutely’. This ... runs counter to the MoD’s own evidence" iiss.org/blogs/military…
"The shortfall in armour is the result of procurement problems compounded by inadequate funding ... It is highly likely that a Russian tank division would overmatch this much weaker British formation." iiss.org/blogs/military…
Note the especially vast gulf in anti-tank weapons