Infrastructure plan is likely to substantially raise both high-income individual taxes & the corporate tax rate. Biden’s 2nd most likely major agenda item is going to be more difficult to pass & not primarily due to the filibuster axios.com/corporate-tax-…
Business opposition & high-income voter opposition are both associated with difficulty enacting proposals, even if they are supported by the public as a whole. Democratic leaders are not aligned with business, but business still has the power to block most change
Much discussion of bills with near zero chance of passage, but even the next most likely bill to pass (infrastructure, after COVID) faces big obstacles
Since the COVID bill had no pay-fors, it was easier to limit intra-party opposition.
As we start to see details & members' distinct priorities come out now, especially in a drawn out public process, an initially popular bill could lose support:
Republicans are more optimistic about (relative & absolute) social mobility, but no less accurate. Democrats (public & officials) understate social mobility. Dems think mobility is constrained by race & parent wealth; Reps think it’s hard work. dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/mobilit…
In estimating chance of making it from the bottom quintile in childhood to the top quintile in adulthood, the public is more optimistic than policymakers. In predicting children’s chance of making more $ than their parents, Republican officials are the most optimistic
Partisans (in the public & among officials) divide on factors that matter for social mobility. Everyone thinks education is important. Republicans are more likely to cite hard work & not having kids until marriage; Democrats are more likely to cite race & parent wealth
State political elites are more trusting of state & local government than the public, but not the federal government
They also see Whitmer as an effective actor in the pandemic, but not federal actors
Michigan political elites had lower levels of white identity, racial resentment, SDO, & moral traditionalism than the public & higher levels of white guilt & egalitarianism. There were also big differences on sexism: ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/…
Elites remain less averse to value change & more accepting of increasing diversity than the public, but both the public & elites have become more accepting of social change since 2016.
Rep opposition to COVID stimulus hasn’t mobilized public against it. But we don’t know yet whether that signals that Trump cultural resistance politics can’t fit with economic conservatism (as it did under Obama & Clinton) or if it’s specific to this bill nytimes.com/2021/02/19/us/…
@jonathanchait makes the case timid Republican opposition to Biden stimulus means they know the base never cared about big government & are giving in: nymag.com/intelligencer/…
We’ll get another opportunity to see soon with infrastructure.
I’m open to real change, but so far it could be about the (perhaps accidental) dynamics of this particular Bill, Trump distractions, & COVID environment (& despite that, Reps are still voting against it & belatedly trying to build opposition). More time & bills could help them
Both district policy opinion & symbolic ideology influence how lawmakers cast roll call votes; the operational-symbolic divide in public opinion explains why Republican lawmakers vote more inconsistently with district policy opinion #polisciresearch cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Democrats approve of their representative more when the member votes on bills in alignment with their policy preferences; Republicans approve more when they their representative votes in alignment with their ideology (even if their policy-specific views are unaligned).
Republican districts differ only a bit on policy preferences from Democratic districts but a lot on symbolic ideology. Republican representatives vote more in alignment with their district’s ideology, Democrats more in alignment with their district’s policy-specific preferences.
Prez polls missed in 1948, 1952, 1980, 1996, 2000, & 2016 & we’ve had many repeated discussions: late movers, likely voter models, 3rd party overestimates, shy voters, sampling methods, absentees, undecideds, last-minute events, herding, misinterpretation amazon.com/Lost-Gallup-Po…
Polling miss Recriminations have long been intertwined with academic skepticism & a long feud over journalistic vs social science descriptions of campaigns. The precursor to data journalism was “precision journalism,” an explicit call for integrating social science.
presidential elections have long been seen as the big (often failed) test for public social science. Blaming presentation of results & too much certainty & worrying about influencing results have long histories. But reporting has long suffered from the problems blamed on polls
A strong US presidency is critical for addressing national concerns, but Trump & global populism highlighted deficiencies. Howell & Moe recommend expanding agenda power (fast-track for everything) while cutting pardons & insulating DOJ & intelligence. amazon.com/Presidents-Pop…
They pinpoint threats to governance in the contemporary Republican Party & compare Trump to global populists in message & behavior. But they also see federal policymaking as inherently ineffective (blaming Congressional response to interests & localities), stimulating populism.
I did not see much evidence that objectively poor governance stimulated Trump's victory & I do not think strong centralized liberal policymaking would diminish populist backlash; longstanding thermostatic trends in opinion & policy suggest it would likely increase it.