Until quite recently South Africa acted out of a concern over how growing militarism and global geostrategic rivalries could overshadow regional maritime security concerns THREAD
The Sereti Commission in 2013 heard that “it is much better for South Africa to play a meaningful role in our continent than to leave that open to people from outside the continent because we don’t have the capability”. (Former Chief of Naval Staff RADM Higgs). 2
And South Africa's parliament heard and applauded the suggestion that “Africa cannot afford to outsource the security of its coastline, ports and harbours to non-African powers” (ANC MP Pallo Jordan). 3
Let's not forget that at the same time Operation Copper was launched, Jack Lang, the UN Special Adviser on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, had just pessimistically told the UN Security Council that “the pirates appear to be winning”. 4
South Africa's Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, is on record stating that the “visible presence and active patrols has led to the absence of piracy incidents in the Mozambique Channel and the total absence of maritime piracy within South Africa’s maritime zones”. 5
South Africa subsequently carried the burden of Operation Copper - neither Mozambique nor Tanzania could contribute as much in regards to capacity, and Tanzania has pulled out of the agreement after an "Operational Pause" in 2013. 6
The point I am making, for now, is that the consequences of maritime security threats to the SADC maritime domain are far-reaching and affect every country in the region - coastal and landlocked. Somali Piracy is no longer one of them, but regional inertia and deadlock is... 7
Operation Copper is not undertaken in a vacuum and its functions and outcomes should not be set apart from the emergent competition for influence in the name of maritime security that seems to be unfurling. 8
A unique nexus of counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotic initiatives exist in the northern Mozambique Channel and onshore in the Cabo Delgado province. It is a future fulcrum or pivotal area, not simply for Mozambique, but numerous actors around the world. 9
SADC's 2011 strategy seems to have been effective in deterring a southward spread of Somali piracy. SADC's Standing Maritime Committee has advised “there is a need for it to be reviewed and re-evaluated in order to meet the current and possible future maritime threats”. 10
The 39th SADC Summit “noted the gravity of maritime security threats, such as piracy, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal carrying and trafficking of weapons and ammunition, and agreed to jointly address them as part of SADC Maritime Security Strategy”. 11
SADC must urgently take action - for instance it could convene an extraordinary meeting of its Standing Maritime Committee to review available naval capacity and funding, provide options to guide decision making, and suggest a SADC maritime operational strategy. 12
Maritime security should become a statutory item in the AU Peace and Security Council’s discussions on both its activities and its reports on the state of peace and security in Africa (which are presented to the AU Assembly). 13
This could start to address the weak integration or mainstreaming of maritime into Africa's peace and security architecture - most clearly evident in the lack of references to the role of maritime security in its key pillars (PSC, CEWS, POW, ASF, Peace Fund, AU-REC relations). 14
The failure to tackle maritime crimes, either through enhanced law enforcement or collaborative capacity-building severely impacts the ability of vulnerable countries to create the preconditions necessary for sustainable development. 15
The next outcome must be producing regional and AU strategies with strong maritime components leading to a greater appreciation by African decision-makers of both the security and wider geopolitical consequences of both their action and inaction if they do not act promptly. END.
It is not hindsight to say that to keep open the best available means of escape, supply the increasing number of internally displaced people with aid, and to prevent hijackings of vessels around the Afungi peninsula is to gain and keep control of the coast and adjacent waters
@KellyBMoss had great foresight last year - warning that the lack of control and vulnerability of islands and littoral waters surrendered the initiative to the insurgents and gave them strategic options they should never even be allowed to consider stableseas.org/maritime-terro…
@KellyBMoss and @Jasminechic00 went on to consider the implications of the government losing control over the Cabo Delgado coastal area. I do recommend you watch and listen to what they had to say.
Over 600,000 people have been displaced and over 4000 killed since 2017 in the conflict between Mozambique government and insurgent forces that is consuming Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. The recent attack on Palma should not have happened. A twitter thread follows...
Last week insurgents attacked and overran a hotel outside Palma where a number of foreigners were trapped and an unknown killed when attempting to escape into the surrounding bush or when their convoy was ambushed.
As @Jasminechic00 Africa analyst at @ACLEDINFO has tweeted, “Why in God’s name was no action taken in response to early warning intelligence. It’s a disgrace.”